



# **AUTHORITY STRUCTURE IN PAKISTAN AND ITS IMPACTS ON GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT**

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## **ACCEPTANCE CERTIFICATE**

This is to certify that the thesis “the Authority Structure Of Pakistan and Its Impact on Governance and Development” is an original research study carried out by Muhammad Kaleem s/o Muhammad Aleem, roll no 02 session 2012-15, in fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of PHD political science. I have supervised this research and found it as an excellent quality work.

## **APPROVAL SHEET**

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## **WRITTEN OATH**

This is solemnly swear that this research work is the outcome of my own efforts and I have also believed in good faith that this work has not been approved for the fulfillment of any degree in any university of Pakistan.

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***Muhammad Kaleem***

# *Dedicated*

With

**Respect and love**

To

**My father (late)**

**For all my support and prayers**

**ABSTRACT**

Why has no civilian institution ever forcefully challenged the military or its role in governance? Ayesha Siddiqi in her book *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy* offers two explanations. First, there is a symbiotic relationship between military force and political power. The members of other elite groups in the country accommodate the military's interests for mutual benefit. It is a case of collective over-plundering. Second, there is a mutual dependency between the military and other elite groups. The military regimes have been the source of power for most political leaders and certain important members of the corporate sector. The country's history shows how a number of politicians like the Bhutto's, Sharif's, Chaudhries (of Gujrat) were produced and propelled into prominence (political as well as economic) by the military.

This was the beginning of crystallization of the establishment at the centre being dominated by the military and supported the feudal politicians, civil bureaucrats, judges and business interests. This establishment was designed to be hostile to the people of Pakistan and their democratic aspirations. When the people of East Pakistan spoke with one Voice in the elections of 1970 and demanded real power to be transferred to the political party having won the majority in the National Assembly, the establishment in West Pakistan did not do so. It deliberately allowed the country to break up because the establishment regarded the people of East Pakistan as democratic nuisance and a threat- to its monopoly of power. It chose to retain the western part of the country, which they regarded as politically pliable and weak, to ensure its future adventures and dominance. The post 1971 history is of the gradual dominance of the military over the political power of the state reducing other elements in the establishment to a subordinate and subservient position.

The military establishment has thus grown into a neo-colonial power succeeding the British colonial power. The military has emerged as the new colonizer and the colonial framework is back in place.



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## **ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY**

### **ABBREVIATIONS**

BPS- Basic Pay Scale

CCS - Covenanted Civil Service

CDA- Capital Development Authority

CENTO- Central Treaty Organization

C-in- C - Commander in Chief

COAS- Chief of Army Staff

CSP- Civil Service of Pakistan

DMG - District Management Group

EBDO- Elected Bodies Disqualification Ordinance

FATA- Federally Administrated Tribal Area

FSP- Foreign Service of Pakistan

ICS- Indian Civil Service

IP- Indian Police

KDA- Karachi Development Authority

LDA- Lahore Development Authority

NWFP- North West Frontier Province

OSD - Officer on Special Duty

PCS- Provincial Civil Services

PIDC – Pakistan Industrial Development Cooperation

PML (N) - Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)

PPP- Pakistan People's Party

PSP - Police Service of Pakistan

SEATO - South East Asia Treaty Organization

TAG- Tribal Administrative Group

UCS - UN Covenanted Service

WHT- Withholding Tax

## **Glossary**

Baluchi an Ethnic Group Speak Baluchi

Biradari an Extended Family

Fauji Army man

Jagirdars, Land Lord

Jawan Army Soldier

Lambarder, Village Headman

Maliks Tribal Chief

Musalman Muslim

Nawab Traditional Rich Man

Nazims Term Used For District Head

Pakhtun an Ethnic Group Speak Pushtu Lives in North West Part of a Pakistan

Pirs Religious Leader Believes On Sufism

Patwari Village Accountant

Rais Rich Man

Sardars Head of Tribe

Sajjada Nashin Caretaker of Sufi Shrine

Shaheed Martyr

Taqdir Fate

Zaildar. Head of zail

Zamindars Landowner



## **INTRODUCTION**

To Most of the Asian countries experienced the European colonialism which changed the traditional structure of their society and culture. To undermine their resistance, the colonial powers appropriated not only their material resources, but expectations of people were high when these countries liberated themselves from the clutches of the colonialism and established their own independent states. But the hope of the people soon dashed when mostly the ruling classes of the newly independent countries not only retained the exploitative institutions of the colonial era but further distorted them to keep the absolute power. The result of this policy was that democracy ideologies deepened their roots resulting in ethnic, linguistic, and secretarial conflicts and political and economic instability. (Ali Mubarak, 92:1)

There is a deadly combination of forces that sustains the praetorian role of the Pakistani forces and retards' the process of democratization in the country. These forces have been

- An overdeveloped military bureaucratic oligarchy
- Pakistan peripheral capitalist mode of production
- Domination of elite classes in the political parties

Each of these forces thrives on the others

The political power is necessary to safeguards the economic interests this thing motivates elite classes to remain in power and play influential role in government. “we Americans have a society in which money is increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few people and in which that concentration of income and wealth threatens to make democracy in name only” Paul Krugman, American economist.

The British established two strong institutions to run the country; these were civil and military bureaucracy and also running the government through an indirect way of governance and club with them the local landed elites. After the partition the system remained the same. The norm of exploitation of state resources was maintained as done by imperial power and personal interests are always preferred over national interests by all the powerful groups of the country.

## **POLITICAL STRUCTURE BEFORE PARTITION**

During British colonial rule they ran the Indian subcontinent through civil bureaucracy which was known as the steel frame of British India. Bureaucracy was answerable to governors and Viceroy which were controlled through the Secretary of State of India. The motive of imperial power was to gather economic gains and capital interests so bureaucracy was given abundant power to control the people. The colonial power used carrot and stick policy to control India. Local classes of Feudal Lords and Capitalists were created which were regulated through bureaucracy.

## **THE LANDLORD**

The contemporary class structure in Pakistan owes its origin primarily to the colonial policy pursued by the British. As the administrative and economic needs of the empire dictated, the British superimposed on the indigenous stratification systems of the Indian subcontinent small groups of functionaries and privileged classes whose orientations and interests were deflected from the common concerns of their own people to serve the interests of empire. The famous British Sandman reintroduced and

strengthen the tribal system already existed in Baluch tribes he removed difference among these tribes and united them under competent and hardworking chiefs. He also work to reestablish their lost glory, these tribal head in return remained loyal to the crown. They also have given large amount of money in return of their services to the Raj. They were also given lands in the canal districts of Punjab. This policy started its working in 1876, Khan of Kalat is the famous example of this policy (Saeed 1980,5)

From the beginning these groups constituted several levels of title holders to landed estates, who often maintained custodial armed detachment on behalf of the colonial authorities. Permanent land settlement programs were also used by the British viceroys to reward loyal subjects in the form of huge land grants. Large tracts of land were in some instances awarded to people who were ruthless enough to indenture masses of laborers to dig a canal or build a strategic road. These land owning gentry came to be known as zamindars, talukdars, jagirdars, nawab and so forth. (Gardezi, 1991-24)

## **THE CAPITALISTS AND BUSINESSMEN**

A dominant stratum that began to emerge at the turn of the century consisted of big businessmen and industrialists. When the British first established their foothold in the subcontinent they found the area rich in raw materials soon became a major source of supply for the large scale manufacture which had commenced in England as a result of the industrial revolution. On the other hand, indigenous industries and commerce were seen as having no value except the negative one of reducing the Indian market for manufactured goods coming from England and competing with the mother country's products in foreign markets. Thus, throughout the eighteenth

century and early part of the nineteenth century, local commercial and manufacturing activity was undermined, first through outright plunder and later by calculated neglect and the use of discriminatory tariff restrictions. The British belatedly started paying attention the industrial and commercial development of the subcontinent. This commercial and industrial activity was promoted in the best tradition of capitalism, this emerged sizeable class of local industrialists and entrepreneurs whose mode of production and related social philosophies were imported ready-made from England. (Gardezi, 1991-26)

## **STATE INSTITUTIONS AS POLITICAL CLASSES**

At the time of independence the basic class structure and apparatus was already created. The elite group includes the landlord, owner of large capital and industry, senior administrators and other professionals.

After the Second World War, in the process of decolonization, a number of independent countries emerged in Asia Africa with new boundaries and new names. Pakistan is one of them. It comes into existence after the partition of the Indian subcontinent on august 14, 1947. At the time of inception, it was divided into two parts: East and West Pakistan.

There are armies that guard their nation's borders, there are those that are concerned with protecting their own position in society, and there are those that It can be maintained that during the greater part of Pakistan's history, higher bureaucracy has ruled the country; in fact Pakistan can be described as a bureaucratic polity. Thus

the symbiotic relationship which should exist between the political institutions and bureaucracy failed to develop in Pakistan. (Kennedy: 1998, 4)

## **THE ECONOMIC MODEL AFTER INDEPENDENCE**

At independence therefore the landed aristocracy which includes the zaminders and Khans together joined with the tribal Sarders emerged as the dominant class in Pakistan, later to be joined by embryonic national bourgeoisies comprised of largely of immigrants from the industrially more developed provinces of India. One could hardly expect this mix of structural foundations of a modern bourgeois democratic state. A number of land reforms act passed in Pakistan including an act to abolish sardari system failed to subsequently diminish large land holdings. The basic framework for Pakistan industrialization was developed and implemented in Ayub era after deeply entrenched in the neo colonial alliance with the United States and its allies. The regime emphasized free play of market forces, establishment of import substitution consumer industries in partnership with metropolitan monopoly capital heavy reliance on foreign aid utilization of the cheap labour powers of the impoverished masses and generous incentives and concessions to private entrepreneurs. This strategy resulted into increase in GNP but by product spiraling inflation heavy debt burden class gender and regional inequalities and fascist repression. This phenomenon was not restricted to Pakistan but most of the new independent countries witness the same political economy

Pakistan has remarkable high growth rate throughout the history nearly 5% on the average which is higher than most of the third world in general but this strategy created gulf between haves and have not as 25% of the population still lives below

the poverty line. The growth and development is not uniform to all the regions of Pakistan it created regional disparity and resentment into the less developed regions. Human Development Index which is the main source of actual development remained low and Pakistan ranked 134 at development index in the year 2010. It shows that growth rate not materialized into actual development of the country.

It is the mix of forces on which the authoritarian oligarchic rule in Pakistan has perpetuated itself. Nothing short of mobilizing an egalitarian independent and genuinely enlightened response can prepare Pakistan to counter these forces. And until such a broad based response is developed, democracy in Pakistan remains a game of musical chairs played by the rich at the expense of the poor. It is clear then the problems of national unity and viability of democracy have deep roots in the alienation of the Pakistan state and those wielded state power from the people. Neo colonial ties with the United States and its imperial allies must be broken or systematically loosened to say the least before new initiative can be formulated and implemented. The internal threat to democracy comes from the rise of communal groups and parties. The ultimate solution of these divisible trends is the equitable treatment of all nationalities comprising the federation of Pakistan and acceptance of their legitimate rights of self-determination. "The purpose of this economic structure is to maintain status quo and nothing else, in the name of change the relative brothers etc. come in the government only faces changes the underline policy line remain same to accumulate wealth more in the hands of ruling elite if any middle class person emerged a winner, he also preferred to follow the footsteps of the ruling elite the reason is only to fill one's own pockets. The political system has degenerated into a contest between feudal and business interests under the patronage of the military establishment. The interests of these elites are intrinsically in conflict with the

national interest. The feudal have a stake in keeping the country backward, illiterate, dependent, and retrogressive so that they can reign supreme. Industrialists and businessmen are trained to maximize their profits and for them, politics is business. They advance their personal interests at the expense of the national interest, but for a few statements here and there and a few cosmetic steps as window dressing, they have little concern for the problems of the common man. This situation suits the military which enjoys the real power in Pakistan.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

The military before partition was very important institution but after partition its importance and significance increased many folds as Pakistan foreign policy was against Indian threat so state converted into security state therefore army importance enhanced many times. Pakistan also opted for the Western ally and got huge military aid by signing pacts of SEATO and CENTO. Army turned into modern most organized and disciplined institution of Pakistan Economically, huge defense budget and massive military aid from the US in 1950s boosted the organization's national standing. Besides, the most significant development was the establishment of Fauji (soldier) Foundation in 1953 which ventured in textile, sugar and cereals in the name of army personnel's welfare (Siddiqi 2003).

In addition, the military personnel largely benefited due to its political position in the praetorian oligarchy with respect to redistribution of evacuee land (left by non-Muslims who migrated to India in 1947). This land was leased for 99 years to the military for operational purposes which the latter appropriated for personal gains (Siddiqi, 2008).

The political degeneration in the country at the same time also made army chiefs more formidable than before. These events gave strength to the Pakistan army and it remained sleeping partner of civil bureaucracy (1947-58) but as it realized its strength it started taking active part in maneuvering the political set-up in the country. The event that triggers army direct intervention was invitation from Sikander Mirza to do military coup in the country on 8-10-1958. (Rizvi 2000:87). President Ayub Khan started working on his constitution and gave the name of Basic Democratic and introduced presidential system in the country all the feudal lords and local elites gathered under the leadership of Ayub Khan and established the party with the name of Conventional Muslim League. (Ziring 1971:89).

The different military and political expert analysis the role of Pakistan army in active politics differently. According to Hassan Askari Razvi army intervenes in the politics due to the political vacuum created by the political leadership of the country and socio-economic factors also helped army to dominate on the political affairs. As the new nation was fragmented and masses were illiterate these conditions favored the domination of the army.

Ayesha siddequa views the role of army in politics is due to its economic interests in the country and it wants to safe guard those interests. She was of the view that army intervened in the politics to safe its capital interests (siddequa, 2008, 99)

She is of the view that army economic predominance is cause and effect of feudalism in the country. The feudal system in the country is based on the authoritarian system and only safe its interests one way the other. Stephen p Cohen also endorses the view of Hassan Askari Razvi of political vacuum.



Javed in his PhD thesis from London School of Economics with title " Class, power and Patronage The Landed Elites and Politics In Pakistani Punjab" narrated the linkage of landed classes with others Administrative elites he goes into the details how the Landed class in Punjab retained his power at the local level and have bargaining power with Army as well so Army need them for their legitimacy. But in his thesis he totally ignored business classes of Pakistan and how they became rich in the country. He also not covered the area of governance and development and why the service delivery is weak in the country.

Ishrat Hussain in his book Pakistan the economy of Elitist elaborated that in Pakistan elite classes are enjoying the luxurious life and the masses are deprived of the basic needs. All the government policies favours the ruling elites in one way the others the feudal classes don't give taxes as Agriculture tax is enforced which is minimum and they are reluctant to pay that minimum taxes. In his book he did not explain the nexuses of the ruling classes in the country means political elites and administrative elites.

Aminullah Chaudhry in his Book Political Administrator was given full length explanation and history of the bureaucracy and how the different reforms impacted on the Pakistan Administrative System. The book is complete on the bureaucracy of Pakistan and elaborated politicization of the administrative system in Pakistan and recruitment of army into the civil service of Pakistan. The book is deficient on the development and governance in Pakistan.

Pakistan a hard country written by the British writer Leviton gave insight about the family patronage and baradarism in Pakistan and the marriage as linkage between the different classes to create network of influential classes and explained

domination of few agriculture biradaries in the country. The book is deficient on the role of army in Politics and bureaucracy in doing misdeed in the country. The aspect of governance and development is not discussed in details. (Levitain; 2011; 12)

The book Who Owns Pakistan by Shahid-ur-Rehman gave full length details of 22 families who they became rich in short time. How the Privatization in Pakistan benefited business classes and the policy of the government always favoured the rich instead of poor.

Naiz Ilhan in his book The Culture of Power and Governance in Pakistan 1947-2008 elaborated the polarization of administrative system and causes of poor governance in Pakistan the book was an excellent effort to find out the impact of power on governance in Pakistan but the book give little assertion on the development aspect of the power and also about the role of Army in today's Pakistan.

My selection of this topic after going through the literature review is that i want to know the web of the elite classes and how they considered state as their estate and their historical development which took the country on this critical juncture that service delivery is poor, poor governance, rampant corruption and little or no accountability.

## **HYPOTHESIS**

“The Authority structure in every country effects on its development and governance, the authority structure in Pakistan has also affected on its development and governance. How this structure contributed to the governance and development of Pakistanis.

## **OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY**

The main thrust of this research is to study the following points:

- The main objective of this study is to understand how authority structure in Pakistan established
- The other objective is to know who this authority structure deprived the common masses from their just right of state service.
- The historical study of Pre partition will be done to know the links of the authority structure in colonial state of British India.
- To know the reasons of poor governance and slow service delivery in the country.
- Why Kinship system and patronage of network developed in the country with the passage of time.

## **SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH**

This research is very important to understand the authority structure in Pakistan and there is no difference between democracy and dictatorship as both rely on authoritarianism. The fruits of growth not reaching to the people

## **METHODOLOGY**

This research is based on the historical analysis of political and administrative role and its impact on the economics and development in the society so the method I will opt for this research will be regressive, historical and descriptive research to

explore the matter discussions original records and policies. I will use all technique of literature review by going through books, journals and newspaper on the subject. The historical institutionalism method will be adopted to look into the institutional development of the institutions political, civil and military bureaucracy how these institutions reached to the points where these are standing today, the points are divided into different points

- A) The time of independence at this point Administrative elite were more powerful and structures specially civil bureaucracy which is called steel frame of the subcontinent whereas army was stable but weak as compare to the civil bureaucracy Political parties were weak they did not have the experience of state running and managing political affairs of the country, Muslim League failed to become strong political party and remained a movement and political elites fought for their personal interests and the domination of local elites intact and local area even the ideology of Islam/Pakistan did not pave the way of ideological politics in Pakistan. This time is dominated by civil bureaucracy like Ghulam Muhammad Chaudhary Muhammad Ali and Sikander Mirza.
- B) The second important turn in Pakistan institution came in 1954 when commander in chief General Ayub Khan was given the status of defense minister by retaining its own seat of commander in chief till that time military became strong and highly organized and modernized institution of Pakistan due to the Pakistan military alliance with Western Block generally and with USA specially in 1951 and Pakistan also signed SEATO and CENTO with the West so a lot of military aid preclude in Pakistan. Pakistan signed these pacts due to the Indian factor and turned into security state syndrome. As these pacts seems to provide cover to the country in case of any foreign aggression. Also

army learnt that how weak and precarious political forces in the country that civil service which did not have any lethal power like army has, captured the political space in the country so commander in chief General Ayub Khan on the advice of the Sikander Mirza who was army man turned civil servant imposed martial law in the country on 8 October 1958. This event became supreme position to the army in the country and civil bureaucracy became second in command so at district provincial and national level remained powerful. In beginning Ayub Khan tried to get rid of the feudal lords and some of influential businessman turned politician but when he introduced the system of Basic Democrats to give legitimacy to his rule he used the same politician (political elites) and in return gave them patronage so in this period military emerged as neo colonial power with bureaucracy it's still frame and political elites as its allies and the structure of colonial legacy revived

- C) Third important point in the history of institution of Pakistan was the 3rd December 1971 when Bangladesh got independence and first politically elected government got the rein in the country in the leadership of Z.A.Bhutto introduced different reforms in the country out of which most important reforms were in the civil service of Pakistan. Bhutto finished constitutional safeguards to the bureaucracy and also disbanded CSP (Civil Service Pakistan) and introduced 12 service groups in the country CSP was changed by DMG District Management Group. The bureaucratic class was a powerful ally of the strong leaders until 1973 and played a major role in advising and implementing the agenda of their political masters. After 1973, when they lost their security of tenure, the nature of the alliance shifted to that of a docile,

subservient, and unquestioning group of functionaries who diligently carried out the orders of the politicians—right or wrong.(Hussain,1989;375)

But the post of D.C Deputy Commissioner retained who was the linchpin of the colonial era. Civil service became subservient to the politicians at national and provincial level but at District level they were still more powerful to the local government. The same system was retained in Zia era generally but position of the bureaucracy and politicians remained shuffle as some of the moral lost by the civil service retained by the bureaucracy but the role of steel frame was finished the same patterned followed in the democratic era of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif it is also important to note here that during political regimes no local body elections conducted and local areas are controlled by the bureaucracy.

- D) The fourth important point in the history of institution is the era of General Pervaiz Musharraf, he introduced reforms on the local level with the name of Devolution Plan as per this plan the local government that is District Government for the very first time given to the politician as Nazims and DCO (District Coordination Officer) who was a civil servant was sub ordinate to the Nazim of the District. Same politician who always ruled this country elected as nazims of the districts. The plan was not to give power to the people but to get bargain from the political elites that is feudal and business classes to support on national level. The role of civil service which dominated the local area since inception became virtually subservient to the politicians. All these points in the history of Pakistan gave us insight that Elite classes of Pakistan ruled this country their positions changed and share into the state resources

changed but the power remained to the these people and the masses were remained real sufferers and at lost.

Case study method is also used in this regard as we are studying complex role of the elite classes in capturing the power of the state and its impact on governance and development. We will trace out the history of these institutions by the help of historical institutionalism and its important characteristics of these institutions and role of these institutions and classes in the contemporaries.

Sample survey method will be used to get the test of the hypothesis. Close ended questionnaire of ten easy question will be drafted for this purpose to verify the conclusion and inferences drawn from the literature review and secondary data available to us for the research.

## **ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH**

The first chapter of this research thesis is about history of development of elite classes in Pakistan and its linkage with the colonial era, it elaborates the factors which lead towards its creation.

Second chapter is about the landlord class of Pakistan which strengthened during colonial era and after Pakistan remains dominant on the political map of Pakistan and made every attempt futile to decrease their dominant position and how they made land reforms failed.

Third chapter will be devoted to understand the capitalist class of Pakistan and its relation with other elite classes and how they manipulates conditions of Pakistan to maximize their economic benefits.

Fourth chapter will discuss military; it elaborates the factors which lead towards its domination. The views of different political thinkers why military intervene in politics and brief history of different kinds of political set up in Pakistan and the role of military in them. This chapter will also discuss the capital aspect of Pakistan military and how they manipulate the conditions of Pakistan to get benefits for their officers' corps.

Fifth chapters contain theoretical definitions and functioning of bureaucracy and its historical evolution and the role it plays in Pakistan. The characteristics of bureaucracy in Pakistan and the role played by the members of this institution in different set up of Pakistan.

Sixth chapter will discuss the impact of this political authority in Pakistan on its development and governance in it the factors of good governance will be discussed at length and why these are lacking in Pakistan.

Final chapter will be on findings, conclusion and recommendations.

## **CONCEPTS**

### **Governance**

#### **Definition**

Governance means process of decision making and the process by which decisions are implemented. The quality of governance is determined by the impact of this exercise of power on the quality of life enjoyed by the citizens. Asian Development Bank (1995) identified four basic elements of good governance such as



accountability, participation, predictability and transparency. McCauley (2005) categorizes governance issues at the macro and micro level. The macro level includes constitution, the overall rule of size and resources of the government, and relationship between legislators, the judiciary and the military, while micro issues of governance includes commercial firms, social institutions and civil society affairs. United Nation Development Program (1997) defines governance as the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences.

## **POLITICAL GOVERNANCE**

### **(i) Voice and accountability (ii) Political instability and violence**

The political governance indicator is intended to capture the process by which government is selected, monitored and replaced. As we discussed in the earlier pages Pakistan political history is full of uncertainty and it always selected not by people even if there is so called democracy present in this country. It is full of personification, weak political parties and strong Army which is the strong political parties of Pakistan it involved itself in destabilizing the civilian government and also do coup de to capture the civilian institution so political governance is very weak in Pakistan as always. Political violence is the normal routine of this country look at the change of every government only two civilian government Z.A Bhutto and PPP Zardari completed their tenure but during their tenure they also faced different violent movements against their government and Z.A Bhutto government was dismembered

due to the violent movement of P.N.A and finally military took over by Zia Ul Haq. The elitist growth model in practice focuses on Pakistan, which for the fifty years of its existence has followed this model with varying intensity. It traces the consequences of the various policies followed by seven successive non-military, nominated, appointed governments in the period up to 1958, the dictatorial regimes of Ayub Khan and Ziaul Haq, the socialist democratic era of Z.A Bhutto, and the new, democratically-elected governments since 1988. What is most puzzling is that the forms of government—democratic, nominated, directly or indirectly elected, dictatorial—did not matter. Nor did the professed ideological inclinations of the government in power—liberal, conservative, Islamic, leftist, and rightist—make any significant difference to the general thrust of this model. (Husain 1989, 8)

First indicator ‘voice and accountability’ measures political, civil and human rights and independence of the media. It includes a number of indicators measuring various aspects of political process, civil liberties and political rights. It measures the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of government. Pakistani citizen remained powerless all the history of Pakistan the elites classes of Pakistan decide their fate, even in the civilian government elections are rigged and managed to elect/select the pro establishment government. Even in non-controversial election of 1970 the government elected not work as per aspiration of the people.

## **ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE**

**(i) Government effectiveness (ii) Regulatory quality**

These two indicators summarize various indicators that include the government's capacity to effectively formulate and implement sound policies. The thrust of this index is on the input required government to be able to produce or implement good policies and quality delivery of public good. Every government in Pakistan failed to implement sound policies and every policies formulated by the government is always in favour of the elite classes of Pakistan. Indirect taxes are always collected as direct taxes are mostly paid by only salaried class of Pakistan instead of feudal lords and business tycoons as they are also political elite of the Pakistan. The period from 1958 to 1969 was dominated by the military rule of General Mohammed Ayub Khan, a leader whose regime was characterized by the paradoxical combination of the biggest growth rates in Pakistani history and large increases in income inequality, inter-regional differences, and the concentration of economic power. While the period had strong macroeconomic management, it paved the way for a series of problems that were exacerbated in subsequent regimes. (Hussain, 1989; 21)

Ayub years is mixed. While the consolidation of economic management and the high growth rates were important achievements, the growing income inequality and wage stagnation, the neglect of human capital, and the growing dependence on foreign capital inflows, (despite temporary reduction after the 1965 War) all promised a less than rosy inheritance for future regimes. (Hussain, 1989; 25)

The 'regulatory quality' governance indicator includes measures of the incidence of market unfriendly policies such as price control or inadequate bank supervision, as well as the perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in area such as foreign trade and business development. Pakistan failed to perform regulatory measures it failed to control prices of the essential commodities as

businessman wanted to maximize their profits so on this indicator government badly failed and monopoly of few elites are always maintained and poor of this country is the real sufferers. The 1990s have presented the Pakistani economy with a series of challenges as well as opportunities. The economic policy formulation has been in the right direction but actual implementation has been erratic, inconsistent and poor. The external sector and particularly the management of debt has put the economy under severe pressure. The cumulative imbalances of fiscal and current accounts combined with the decay of key institutions and rapacious governance have neutralized the liberal economic policy regime. (Hussain, 1989; 41)

## **INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF GOVERNANCE**

### **(i) Rule of law (ii) Control of corruption**

The final dimensions of governance indicators are summarized in broad terms as the respect of citizen and the state of institutions that govern their interactions. Rule of law, summarizes several indicators that measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of the society. In Pakistan there is no rule of Law there is no law for the rich it is only the poor and detached segment of the society from the elite has to bear the brunt of Fake F.I.R is the normal routine of the society tax evasion, Police is control by the influential of the local area crime and violence is the daily routine of this society. These indicators also shows the developing indicators of the society so when rule of law is not prevailing in the country so development is also weak and meager (Hussain,1989;235).

Corruption is wide spread in the country as political financial and moral corruption are in the roots of every department of the country. Corruption is also used as a coercive measure to control officer to do what influential people want them to do. State is considered as one' personal estate and elite manipulate state operations for their personal interests.

### **LACK OF DEVELOPMENT AND CONCENTRATION OF WEALTH**

The benefits of growth limited to small segment of elite group which is based on network and patronage. (Hussain 1989,7)

Elitist model, where both economic and political power are held by a small coterie of elites, the market is rigged and the state is hijacked in order to deliver most of the benefits of economic growth to this small group.( Hussain 1989,8)

### **LOW HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND INEFFICIENT SERVICE DELIVERY**

The history of political parties and elected governments substantiates this hypothesis of coalition making and alliances by the elite class drawn from different ethnic groups to protect and serve their narrow personal and familial interests.

The low rates of literacy among the population have actually played into the hands of the elite and helped to reinforce the tendency of concentration of economic and political power.

The method of the elite to capture economic gains through political power that is the reason there is no political parties loyalty and the mechanism of free market is lacking in the country. State was kept deliberately weak to gain personal interests of the elites

The low rate of literacy and the strong tradition of mai-baap (paternalistic behaviour) or subservience arising out of the feudal relationships and bureaucratic domination did not allow the majority of the ethnic groups to see through the game of their well-to-do leaders, and they never challenged the entrenched vested interests in any meaningful way. According to UNDP, Pakistan is at 146th position out 177 countries surveyed for UNDP for human development index and comes under low developing countries with 0.54 development rate, as per economic survey of Pakistan these are following figures on Human development Index.

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# CHAPTER 1

## **POLITICAL ELITES IN PAKISTAN**

All the newly colonial states inherited the system from the British empire and it became the basis of modern political system in these countries. The British also governed these countries through indirect rule as there were 562 princely states where as there were direct government local influential people were given special places in the deputy commissioner office which was the linchpin of British Raj. These local feudal lords and Sardars were free to many extent to treat their own tenant and could solve the conflicts among them. (Lieven, 2011; 20)

The last generation of British rule saw two Muslim mass political movements in South Asia, founded in 1906 and heavily influenced by Sir Syed's tradition, began as an elite movement to defend Muslim interests, ( Lieven,2011; 53)

The event of 1857 brought change in the administration of the India as now it became directly governed by the British Crown instead of East India Company. Then there emerged a new class in Indian-Subcontinent which helped the British to win the war and became their alliance in all this process. The war of 1857 brought the realization in the minds of the English-man that Bengalese are not loyal and created trouble and due to which mutiny started so they found a martial class in Punjab and their strong allies in form of the Punjab feudal lords and Zamindars. These local landlords were given large chunk of lands as gifts and grants and in return they had to provide jawans for the British army. At the time of freedom most of the army was from Punjab and NWFP. (Ali.1989: 4). This is the reason that punjab became their stronghold and core of their rule.

## **1.1 FEUDAL AS DOMINANT ACTOR IN POLITICS**

The famous British Sandman reintroduced and strengthen the tribal system already existed in Baluch tribes he removed difference among these tribes and united them under competent and hardworking chiefs. He also work to reestablish their lost glory, these tribal head in return remained loyal to the crown. They also had given large amount of money in return of their services to the Raj. They were also given lands in the canal districts of Punjab. This policy started its working in 1876; Khan of Kalat is the famous example of this policy (Saeed 1980, 5)

The region now a days included in FATA remained free and independent to create buffer zone between India and Afghanistan. The Baluch and Pathan chiefs were also given money to establish levies in the border areas. Maliks of FATA were responsible of maintaining peace in their areas and to safeguards the interests of the rulers overall these Maliks were free in their working and ruling local subjects. (Saeed 1980, 5)

The system in tribal areas was more complex and complicated as compare to the Punjab and settled parts of NWFP. The law of this area was totally different from the settled parts of India, as there were no local system and regulated through Frontier Crime Regulator. Land Alienation Act was introduced in Punjab and people were given proprietary rights as in Mughal era all the land belongs to state and no private ownership was with the people. This Act also freed tenants and feud lords from the debt of Hindu moneylenders but there was one restriction as the land could not be transferred to the nonagricultural biradaries of the Punjab in this way landed class became more strong and united under the British rule. This policy gave sense of

belongingness to the agriculture-class with the state and they worked day and night to strengthen the foreign rule. (Saeed 1980, 35)

The area today in Punjab and KPK were famous silk route and necessary to guard for the trade with central Asian states so its importance was not ignored by the Raj. It was also the region which provides the human resources for the British army as well. Colonial system was based on acquiring of resources from the colonial states and also fulfilling the requirement of the colonial state also from the resources of the land. At that time land was the major source of the revenue for the British India so they did all the efforts to improve this source and to linked itself with all the stakeholders relating to land so government tried it's all efforts to cooperate with them.

Punjab was the most important province of Indian subcontinent as the land was fertile so the network of canals were constructed to improve the supply of water to increase the cultivated land and also yield per crops. To improve the system of managing the record of revenue system, new administrative units were setup which are called Zails. Lumberdars were appointed in each zail to collect the revenue from the lands. Deputy Commissioner was overall in-charge of the district and responsible for the collection of all revenue under his jurisdictions. Lumberdars were appointed from the majority of the land owning biradari of the particular area. In this way Land Lord were given special place in this administrative structure

British laws not only benefited big land lords but also peasants, they were facilitated by the colonial government from the clutches of moneylenders. During this time large lands were distributed to pirs which had large influence in the rural areas of the Muslim areas of Punjab. These Pirs were present at every five miles in the rural

Punjab; they maintained their influence on the people of their areas. These Pirs were given donation by these poor people in a way he became rich on the amounts of these poor people but power to give punishment to any poor people without challenge of his authority. (Saeed 1980, 76)

The power of Jigardars and Pirs were much more in the province of Sindh as land ownership was large. These pirs were having the status of Behrman caste as that of Hindus (Saeed 1980, 96)

In order to ensure that the landowner had all the necessary coercive means to extract surplus from the producers (whether tenants, bonded slaves, wages workers, or others) The British gave legal sanction for wide-ranging extra-economic despotic powers to the landowners. (Khan, 1981: 136)

## **1.2 BUSINESS ELITES**

In 1947 there was hardly any industry of significance in the provinces now forming Pakistan. For a variety of reasons-the peculiar nature of British colonial rule, the resource endowments of the area, the control of trading by Hindus and Parses, who were located in other parts of India the dependence on agriculture and the inertia this caused, and finally, a complete absence of interest in industry on the part of those living in the area which formed Pakistan—the country inherited a weak industrial base at the time of Partition. Moreover, the mass migrations after Partition wreaked havoc on whatever minimal indigenous small-scale manufacturing capability there existed.

Agrarian economy like Pakistan has developed Industrial business classes in the urban areas of the country it include people of the migrated community from India

(Papa Nek, 1972; Levin, 1974), They took the benefits of the government policies for the development and growth of the industry in Pakistan but these policies remained subject to the criticism from various segments of the country. (Papa Nek, 1967; Burki, 1977), the structure and cohesion of the economy remained same specially in Punjab where these classes only emerged in cities with the feudal turned industrialist in agro industry sector.(Amjad, 1983; White, 1974).

The local people of Pakistan neither have experience nor have interest in commercialization and industrialization of the country to fill the gap of the vacuum created by departing Hindu Mohammad Ali Jinnah, invited leading Muslim industrialists of India, including the prominent Habibs and Ispahanis, to establish industry in Pakistan.

The Colonial government started promoting industrialization in India. So a new business class emerged in India with the help and promotion of British colonial government. Colonialism introduced capitalism; on the other, the peculiar path of this introduction was itself a fetter to the development of India (Rehman, 2012; 88)

A few families had the experience of industry before 1947 (papanek, 1967: 41). The famous 22 families of 1960s have a little or no experience in industry before partition they were all traders or merchants before jumping into industry.

These leading families owned 66 percent of the total industrial assets, 70 percent of insurance, and 80 percent of banking (Haq, 1968: 1). He listed Dawood, Saigol, Adamjee, Colony, Fancy, Valika, Jalil, bawany, Crescent, Wazir Ali, Gandhara, Ispahani, Habib, Jhyber, Nishat, Beco, Gul Ahmad, Arag, Hafiz, karim, milwala and dada as the leading industrial group of Pakistan.




At the time of partition the area constituted Pakistan was bread basket of India therefore no major industry was located in this area. Only small scale units most of them textile were present there so the government had to start from zero to established local industry in the country so initiative was from the state so people who were near state structure got the most of the benefits in terms of loans, licenses etc. The government established different public departments/institutions to help business class to start their business and industry in the country. Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) was First Corporation established for the purpose to facilitate the industrialist. (Rehman, 2012; 119)

The method of trickling down effect was adopted by the Ayub government resulted into the inequality in the society it increased the growth rate to 6-7% but also increased poverty in the country. The tax rebates and tax holidays were given to increase the investment in the country. The high duties on import was enforced to grow local industry which resulted into high cost and low quality products due to lack of competition. It also resulted into the monopoly of few families on industry with convince of government. (Naiz, 2008; 197)

## **COMPOSITION OF PROFESSION OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY**

### **OF 2013 (Figure.1)**

These are sources of income given by the candidates in their candidates form to the presiding officers. Source Election Commission of Pakistan website scanned copies of original forms. Detail is given below the data of 29 MNA is not available due to non-availability of form or candidate did not mention his profession.



Category	No.
Agriculture	112
Business	40
Agriculture/Business	23
Retired Civil Servant	1
MBBS/Property Owner	1
Teacher	1
Retired Teacher	1
Mudarsa	7
N/A	29
Advocate	6
Professional	19
Religion	2
Politics	11
Retired Army	1
Social Worker	1
MBBS/Social Worker	1
Professional/Agriculture	3
Agriculture/Civil	1
Landlord/Agriculture	1
Landlord/Property	1
Advocate/Professional	1
Advocate/Agriculture	3
Law Business	1
Professional/Tech	1
Labour	1
Ex.MNA	1
General Retired Social Service	1
Advocate / Business	1
Total	272

### **1.3 MUSLIM LEAGUE**

The creation of the Muslim League was totally different than that of the Indian National Congress; Muslim League was created in the Eastern Bengal. (Ziring 1997, 7)

The party leadership and membership was always remained in the hands of landlords of Bengal and Muslim landlords of Muslim minority provinces. The party remained absent from the areas constituted today's Pakistan as this area was dominated by the Unionist party of Sir Sikandar Hayat and it badly failed in the provincial election of 1937 and won only 1 seat. (Saeed 1980, 241)

The League had no roots in the Muslim majority provinces which were always controlled by local feudal elites and united in the shape of the Unionist party and not in favour of the Muslim League but when Congress decided to do land reforms after independence all the feudals decided to join the Muslim League to protect their lands. As these local elites had no sympathy and loyalty with the Muslim League so after independence they always grouped themselves with the strong group and violated the party loyalty for personal gains.

All military pacts should be placed before the legislature. Responsible bodies, including the Muslim League, are talking in terms that can justifiably lay them open to the charge of trying to make political capital out of the difficulties with which any government would have been confronted in a time like this. Pakistan's foreign policy was not evolved by the present government or even by its predecessor alone...

If the Muslim League government had the courage of its conviction, then the country would have supported it, and today possibly they would have been speaking from this side of the House rather than me. (Rafique; 1958, 56)

The nationalist parties and movements have been built around personalities, whose charisma is their greatest asset. These leaders serve as the national symbol and focus of loyalty of the common men.

#### **1.4 WEAK STATE STRONG CLASSES**

The personification made the state weak and groups strong the group or person with a little power can utilize state machinery for its own purpose. This situation in the country gave way to patronage and favour and absence of rule of law and good governance. This is the reason that only 1% of the population pays tax in the country they are also salaried class as rich class is sitting in the power gallery. Agriculture class virtually pay no taxes as feudal lords are in majority in the assembly. State is weak and most of the state services are available to the wealthiest class of the country. The network and kinship are only base of the influence in the country as state itself is recessive and not act itself.

#### **1.5 KINSHIP SYSTEM IN PAKISTAN**

Kinship is the basic of power in the country it had its root in the colonial system which promoted kinship system in the form of lumberdar and Zaildar in the rural area of the country. It not only the base of the strength and stability of the system. This is the most vital tool in the hand of feudal and urban elites. it is the notion of collective benefits and way of exploiting national resources for the benefits of particular kinship class

Marriage with members of the same kinship group, and when possible of the same extended family, is explicitly intended to maintain the strength, solidarity and reliability of these groups against dilution by outsiders.

The most powerful remaining 'feudal' in Pakistan owe their power not to the extent of their personal landholdings but to the fact that they are the chiefs of large tribes; and the importance of leadership roles in kinship groups extends down to the lesser gentry as well. It is clans (Lieven, 2011; 17)

As a chief of their kinship group they exercised a lot of power and strength and control their group in the rural areas of the country. (Lieven, 2011; 19)

This culture of kinship has not only maintained itself and also destroyed the very basic of the development of the country. In this system only particular group got the advantage in terms of economics and social and others deprived of their basic rights of living.

'Nor was Pakistani society capable of generating a true mass political party, independent of kinship loyalties and local power elites. (Lieven, 2011; 72)

That has never been possible in Pakistan, because the state is too poor and weak, and local bosses, kinship groups and religious affiliation are immensely strong. Moreover, no party in Pakistan has been able to generate the ideological fervor required to turn its cadres into purely obedient and disciplined servants.

Initially just another patronage-based alliance of landowners and urban bosses created by the military for its own purposes, this party subsequently developed a real identity of its own, and has been central to Pakistani politics ever since. (Lieven, 2011; 74)

Patronage and kinship form the basic elements of the Pakistani Political system – if water, chemically speaking, is H<sub>2</sub> O then Pakistani politics are P<sub>2</sub> K. Political factions are very important, but they exist chiefly to seek patronage, and have kinship links as their most important foundation.( Lieven,2011;204)

Every government got power and promised the general promises are to the population, and are of higher living standards, more jobs, better education and health services, and so on. The specific promises are to smaller parties and to individual politicians, who are offered individual favours to themselves, their families or their districts in return for their political support.( Lieven,2011;206)

## **1.6 REGIONALISM**

Meanwhile, at the level of parliament, the country has many ethnic groups and regional difference that no single party can get absolute majority. Even if it is army-backed; and even if it could, it wouldn't mean much, because for most politicians party loyalty means little compared to personal advantage and clan loyalty. So governments find that their parliamentary majorities are built on shifting sand. Sooner or later, the 'outs' have come together and found that they outnumber the 'ins'; and also find that the state's failure to improve the loss of the population means growing discontent on the streets, or at least a public mood of disillusionment which inclines more and more people to support whoever is in opposition. As Abida Husain, a great Punjabi landowner politician, said to me candidly: 'You know, a normal Pakistani with a normal human heart can't be really pro-government no matter what the government is, because governments always look indifferent to the hardships of the people. This permanent mood of simmering mass irritation with government is

catalyzed by specific events or developments economic crises, especially gross instances of corruption or autocracy, foreign policy humiliations or all of them together.

### **1.7 WEAK POLITICAL PARTIES STRONG PERSONALITIES**

As far as most of the political parties are concerned, these do not exist in the form taken as the norm in the West. All the political parties are full of landlords' big business man and get the state patronage and dynastic in nature only religious parties and MQM had no landlords in it otherwise they also thrive on state machinery.

Because real political power is spread among so many local actors, and depends so heavily on patronage, this also places limits on the ability of the military to control things for long – because, as I've said, there just isn't enough patronage to go round. On the other hand, both civilian governments and the ISI have other means of influence, as sketched for me by Murtaza Jatoi, son of the caretaker chief minister of Sindh, in 1990. (Lieven, 2011; 212)

### **1.8 POLITICAL CLASSES THINKS STATE AS THEIR ESTATE**

The Pakistani system creates immense barriers to revolutionary change, including that offered by the Taliban and their allies; and these barriers are formed not just by the raw power and influence of 'feudal' and urban bosses, but also by the fact that, for a whole set of reasons, the system requires them to use at least some of that influence and patronage for the good of poorer sections of the population.



Their choice by the family is also an extension of the fact that in Pakistani ‘feudal’ families the political representative of the family was never necessarily the eldest son, but whichever son seemed fittest to be a politician. Thus, while the younger brother or even wife may stand for election, the elder brother or husband may keep a more secure and equally lucrative job as a civil servant, policeman or whatever.

The ideal Pakistani political family thus has its members in a range of influential occupations: a civil servant, a policeman, a lawyer, a businessman and, if possible, representatives in several different political parties. (Lieven, 2011; 218)

The Saifullahs, a leading business family of Peshawar, probably hold the record for this, placing different brothers, sons and nephews in mutually hostile political parties, while retaining an inexorable commitment to family solidarity and family collective advantage

In Sindh and southern Punjab, most of the important political families are old, with a minority of newcomers. In northern Punjab, it tends to be the other way round. However, in a great many ways these new families tend to merge into established ‘feudal’ patterns of power. Just as with the English aristocracy and gentry of the past, this is partly through intermarriage. Some of the greatest aristocratic families of Punjab turn out on examination to be intermarried with new business dynasties.

(Lieven, 2011; 220)

This does not just mean court cases, bank loans, police and civil service appointments, contract, and so on; but also most of social life – births and funerals are

very important events for political deal-making and alliance-maintenance, and, as for the arrangement of marriages, this is of course inherently political.( Lieven,2011; 224)

The sheer amount of time required to perform the necessary functions of a Pakistani politician – including those in office – may be one factor behind the poor quality of Pakistani government.

These dynasties have proved extraordinarily resilient. They have survived the violent deaths of their leading members, repeated failures in government, repeated failures to deliver on promises to the masses and, in many cases, the abandonment of whatever genuine ideology they ever possessed. (Lieven, 2011; 235)

The Sharifs' business origins and pro-business policies mean that businessmen favour their party. Indeed, every single one I have met has done so, irrespective of whether they have been secular or conservative in their personal culture. This link to business has given the PML (N) a clear edge over the PPP when it comes to economic policy and efficient government in general. As a leading industrialist in Lahore (one of the most cultivated and cosmopolitan figures (Lieven, 2011; 244)

## **1.9 PRIVITIZATION A SOURCE OF CORRUPTION**

. All the government sold these units to their cronies and friends on very low prices the assessment of their prices made by the bureaucrats which has also a lot of loop holes and corruption margin. Than at the time of privatization all the liabilities of these sick units are also bored by the government. In this way no actual recoveries made by the government by selling sick units as all the liabilities had to be paid from public money. Commission and advisors are also recruited for the privatization and

identification of sick units which are paid in foreign exchequer which again is a lot of financial burden on the public money.

### **1.10 SAME MENTALITY BUT DIFFERENT SOURCE OF POWER**

In most of rural Punjab the party's leaders are therefore close to those of the PPP in terms of social origin, and the PML (N)'s strategy for gaining and keeping support through patronage does not differ significantly from that the PPP.

In urban area politics Shariff focused more on cosmetics development and big projects and underhand deals whereas PPP is open and do corruption openly and more feudal in nature.

### **1.11 CONCLUSION**

Pakistan movement by local political society and culture, based on 'feudalism', kinship and conservative religion – an experience that was to be repeated under the administrations of Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and Musharraf. All, in their different ways, tried to bring about radical changes in Pakistan. All were defeated by the weakness of the Pakistani state and the tremendous undertow of local kinship networks, power structures and religious traditions.

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## **CHAPTER NO 2**

### **BUREAUCRACY THE STEEL FRAME**

In every country there are two kinds of executive, permanent executive and political executive. Civil service is that permanent executive of the country they are eyes and ears of the government. Bureaucracy was an off shot of industrial revolution and large national state. In our area it was first introduced by the British in our area and that day its working in the Indian subcontinent.

#### **2.1 FEATURE of BUREAUCRACY IN PAKISTAN**

The Pakistan bureaucracy have four different features these are the secretariat system, generalists prefers on technocrats, cadre system, and hierarchy.

##### **2.1.1 The Secretariat**

Every department in provinces and ministry in federal are headed by secretary which is a civil servant and responsible for all the affairs of the department. The secretary is a competent authority of every employee in the department and autonomous bodies attached to it.(Kennedy, 1988, 23). All the laws and regulation framed in the secretariat and all administrative matters relating to employee deal in secretariat as promotion, transfer and leaves punishment etc. Bureaucracy promotion is very fast and they work in different departments so their general knowledge is more than technocrats and bureaucracy has the actual power in their hands.



### **2.1.2 Generalists Preference on Technocrats**

The most of the civil servant selected through competitive exams have social sciences and art and literature backgrounds whereas the technocrats are doctors, engineers and they are not expert of any field. They only deals with general administration and civil service structure is such that it do not give an opportunity to become an expert in every field.

### **2.1.3 Cadre System**

There are different cadre groups in the civil service they cannot transferred to others cadre group. There are two levels of cadres one at provincial another federal cadre, since independence provincial and federal seats are occupied by the federal civil servants and group loyalty is one of the most important trait of civil servants and unity is strength is there slogans.

### **2.1.4 Hierarchy**

The employee are in Basic Pay Scales from 1-22 the civil servant are directly recruited in grade 17 and promoted till grade 22.

## **2.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUREAUCRACY**

### **2.2.1 Colonial Heritage**

When the East India Company arrived in India, its initial goal was to promote British commercial interests. The emerging industrial class in Britain wished to see the colonies as major consumers of manufactured goods and suppliers of raw materials to the mother country. Consequently, Whitehall allowed the East India Company absolute freedom to outline the rules of the game and operate to the

maximum advantage of British commerce. The administration of these newly acquired areas became the subject of two parallel streams, namely, trade and administration, the latter concentrating on revenue collection. This mix resulted in the emergence of new problems. At the middle and lower operational level, the Company's employees, classified as authors, factors, merchants, and senior merchants, carried out and supervised its trading activities. The higher echelons were gradually given added responsibilities in the sphere of administration of civil and criminal justice as well as municipal functions.(Chaudhry,2012;4)

Establishment contract with a number of disparate elements formerly owing allegiance to a now crumbling Mughal empire, the Company continued to expand territorially south-westwards towards Madras (now Chennai), and both west and eastwards in the direction of Midnapur and Chittagong. By the mid eighteenth century the British had secured a total stranglehold on what are now the province of West Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, and Madras in India, and Bangladesh. In each case, they secured from the Mughal emperor the right to collect revenue.

Initially, the towns of Calcutta (now Kolkata), Madras, and Bombay (now Mumbai) were designated as presidencies each functioned independently, directly under the control of the East India Company. The Regulating Act of 1773 provided for a more centralized and better coordinated administration. There was now a governor-general with a council headquartered in Calcutta with the presidencies of Madras and Bombay working under its control. This arrangement facilitated the setting up of an all India Civil Service.

The East India Company's commercial bureaucracy was labeled the Covenanted Civil Service (CCS). "Higher employees of the Company typically

signed agreements with their employer describing agreed upon terms and conditions of service. These agreements were known as “Covenants” and servants who held such came to be known as “Covenanted” servants” members of the CCS were appointed by the Court of Director of the company. “The officers appointed locally by the Fort William authorities belonged to the Un-covenanted Civil Service (UCS). They were engaged mostly for short term and for specific purpose and their salaries were nominal. (Chaudhry, 2012; 5) it was Cornwallis who laid the foundation of a professional civil service with attractive salaries and rule-based appointment, training, posting, and promotion criteria. The East India company Act, 1793 ensured that higher offices were only held by covenanted servants. Nevertheless,

By the time he left India, Cornwallis had put in place a well-structured machinery of government in Calcutta. Two boards operated under the governor general, namely the Board of Revenue and the Board of Trade. The district was the unit of administration in the field with its head performing the three functions of collector, district magistrate and chief executive. (Chaudhry, 2012; 6)

The First War of Independence in 1857 (referred to as the Indian Mutiny by the British) resulted in the dissolution of the East India Company and the assumption of authority by the British Crown through the Government of India Act 1858. In 1861, the Indian Civil Service Act was passed by parliament in London. This Act provided for reservation for ‘Covenanted civil servants of the Crown in India, all vacancies in posts specified in a Schedule appended to the Act,’ These included positions of secretaries, junior secretaries, under-secretaries, accountant general, civil and session’s judges, magistrates, members Board of Revenue commissioner, collectors and assistant collectors. In practical terms, the now constitutional arrangements did not alter the fundamental reality that the British would continue to exclusively man

the Indian Civil Service (ICS) and thus sustain a stranglehold on the administrative structure. (Chaudhry, 2012; 8)

Demands for increased Indianization of the civil service resulted in the appointment of a fifteen member Aitcheson Commission in 1886. The commission, which submitted its report in 1888, did not support the demands for holding the ICS examination in India. It was the considered view of this commission that the Statutory Civil Service had not achieved its objectives. The quality of its inductees was below expectations, it saw itself as inferior to the CCS and in any case it has caused discontent among Indians. In its stead, the commission recommended the creation of a Provincial Civil Service that would man posts rendered surplus from a reduction in reservations to the CCS. Resultantly, one-sixth of the posts reserved for the ICS were earmarked for the provincial Civil Service officers, who on appointment to these positions would be described as 'listed post holders', but would not be included in the cadre of the ICS. The commission also recommended the abolition of the CCS and UCS and 'the establishment of the Imperial Civil Service of India. The name of this cadre was modified by the Government of India to the Civil Service of India, though the initials ICS persist. Two groups of civil servants were placed below the ICS in the hierarchy. Posts among the upper ranks of the UCS were consolidated into the Provincial Civil Service. The specialized departments e.g. forests, irrigation, public works etc. were likewise compartmentalized into upper and subordinate sections. The commission recommended that 'in the special departments also, control should remain in the hands of members of the Imperial Civil Service so as to ensure that the operations of those departments should be in conformity with the principles governing the general administration. The administrative set up in India towards the end of the

nineteenth century saw the ICS at the apex of both the administrative and specialized services. (Chaudhry, 2012; 8)

### **2.2.2 Civil-Military Bureaucratic Nexus (1947-1973)**

After the partition the most established and powerful state institution was bureaucracy which was known as steel frame of British India. The norms of democracy was not established and politician did not know how to run the state so they heavily relied on civil bureaucracy which resulted into complete control of civil bureaucracy for the first decade of independence. Most of the leading politicians were migrated and had no base in Pakistan so they tactfully delayed the general elections. The career bureaucrats with administrative experience always preferred on the ministers, ministries were given to maintain loyalty not for good administration. The bureaucracy has strong group networking institutionalism and access to right information so they maneuvered the situation in their favour. (Kennedy: 1998, 4)

It was bureaucrat Ghulam Muhammad who for the first time used his powers as governor general and sent home the constitutional assembly to home. He also invited army for the civilian postings and help in political matters. Ayub Khan became defense minister while serving as Commander in Chief which was against the spirit of parliamentary democracy. Sikander Mirza invited Ayub Khan for the first military coup in the country.

The relationship between politician and bureaucracy was love hate relationship politician tried to use civil service to finish their old scores while

bureaucracy thought that politicians are inefficient to smoothly run the state affairs.  
(Afzal, 2005; 215)

After Ayub coup bureaucracy became the junior partner of the army but civil service strongly encouraged and supported Ayub Martial law in the country. Ayub Basic Democrat system were as such gave full powers at local levels to the civil servants. So the support and terms remained very high between military and civil bureaucracy during all this time.

### **2.2.3 Bhutto's Administration**

Bhutto changed the administrative system of the country and removed constitutional safeguards given in the constitution to the civil service of Pakistan the basic motive of reforms is to curb the power of bureaucracy which was rival to the politicians as they had love hate relationship between bureaucracy and politicians.  
(Kennedy: 1998, 74)

Bhutto removed 1300 civil servant on the charge of corruption and inefficiency. He also introduced lateral entry into the service. He changed the structure by finishing the CSP cadre and introduced grades and groups in the federal bureaucracy. All these groups recruited through competitive exam of FPSC. This was done to reduce the size and influence of the federal bureaucracy but soon DMG which was new group inherent by CSP captured all the power again.

### **2.2.4 The Civil Service under Zia-Ul-Haq**

Zia has started institutional role of army in civilian bureaucracy and gave 10% quota to the serving army man into bureaucracy groups that is DMG PSP and Foreign Service. He also finished the lateral entry into the civil service. Zia maintained the

same structure and heavily rely on federal bureaucracy. Like Ayub Zia also run local government with the help of civil service, the civil service has to lose their certain seats but they recovered their lost and damaged did to them by Z.A Bhutto.

### **2.2.5 The Bureaucracy under Civilian Rule 1988-99**

The democratic interlude of the 1990s saw Benazir Bhutto's PPP and Nawaz Sharif's PML-N each forming governments twice, but prevented each time from completing a full term by the military through its civilian proxy, the president, and in the case of Sharif's second government, through Musharraf's October 1999 coup. Bent on undermining each other, the PPP and the PML-N did little to bolster parliamentary democracy, instead entering into untenable alliances with the military to gain power. They also further eroded bureaucratic neutrality through large-scale postings and transfers of civil officials, at both the district and policy-making levels in the federal and provincial secretariats, with each change of government. "Bhutto and Sharif both had their own 'team' of civil servants who were patronized and promoted not on merit but on their perceived loyalty to their respective political masters", said a retired bureaucrat, who had served as federal secretary during the 1990s. Appointing senior officers known for their political affiliation rather than their professionalism, Bhutto and Sharif created "an atmosphere where the corrupt could get away with their schemes – be they politicians, tax-evading businessmen, or self-serving civil servants". The military exploited this perception of rampant corruption to justify its political interventions, masking the actual goal, to retain control over foreign and domestic policy. The democratic transition also saw Zia's local government scheme

gradually decompose: local bodies were dissolved in the NWFP in 1991, in Sindh in 1992, and in Punjab in 1993. The primary motivations were political, rather than the desire to improve governance and curb corruption. Wary of the electoral influence of local officials, who had served as willing clients of a military regime, elected governments opted to appoint administrators –regular federal and/or provincially appointed civil servants – to run local councils.

### **2.2.6 Bureaucracy under Musharraf Government**

The military role during the Musharraf's regime has been of very high profile. Musharraf has completed what Zia began-militarization of the State of Pakistan. The Zia regime had taken over a major part of the State power for the military and shared only a small portion of it with the civilian politicians and bureaucrats. The Musharraf regime on the other hand has taken over the entire state power for the military, with the civilian politics and bureaucrats assigned a small but subordinate role in the affairs of the state. No wonder that the Prime Minister and his cabinet could not take any major decision without the prior approval of Musharraf and his military junta. The real power vests with the military high command which includes chiefs of armed forces and the corps commanders who make all the major decisions, political or economic, for the country, all top civilian offices like the heads of statutory corporations were taken over by the serving or retired military generals. Even the educational institutions have not been spared. Important universities and civilian training institutions are now headed by the military generals.

## **2.3 THE CREATION OF POST OF SECRETARY GENERAL PARALLEL TO PRIME MINISTER OFFICE**



Chaudhri Mohammad Ali evolved a system of postings and transfers in a manner different from that employed in the ICS. In undivided India, ICS officers were allocated to a particular province and on posting to the central government their services were considered on loan. Chaudhri Mohammad Ali felt that if the same system was replicated in Pakistan, it would not prove beneficial in providing a national outlook to civil servants. On his recommendation, the Central Government decided to amalgamate the former cadres' into a single cadre that would meet the need of the provinces and of the nation as a whole.

## **2.4 QUAID-E-AZAM EMPLOYED BUREAUCRACY**

One possible reason was the fallout of a decision taken by the Quaid-i-Azam to assume the office of governor-general. Jinnah's appointment of himself to the office was to have an impact on Pakistan's political development. Though the Quaid was constitutionalist to the core, there appears to be a school of thought which contends that his faith in the merits of the parliamentary form of government was not abiding. If Sharifuddin Pirzada is to be believed, the Quaid, while jotting a note on the Danger of Parliamentary form of Government in July 1947, expressed the view that the system had not worked satisfactorily anywhere except in England and in consequence a presidential form of government was suited to Pakistan. Perhaps it was this conviction that persuaded the Quaid to appoint former ICS Englishmen as governors in three out of four provinces of Pakistan, Sir George Cunningham was appointed Governor of the NWFP; Sir Francis Mudie and Mr Ghulam Hussain Governor of the NWFP; Sir Francis Mudie and Mr. Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah

were assigned to West Punjab and Sindh respectively; and to East Bengal went Sir Fredrick Bourne. (Chaudhry, 2012; 31)

What was more; these governors were required to send periodic reports on political and other activities in their respective provinces to the governor-general. When the policy of appointing British governors was questioned in the Constituent Assembly, the prime minister had straightforward explanation. We needed experienced men and therefore, we employed a few Englishmen on temporary basis. But under the present Constitution, the man who has been vested with all powers is the Governor General. He can do whatever he likes.

Mudie also took on Mamdot directly. He informed the governor-general that administration was deteriorating rapidly as a very great deal of the corruption and maladministration in West Punjab is directly or indirectly due to him. Mudie was of the view that Mamdot was encouraging the dishonest allotment of refugee property and he all but requested the governor-general's intervention in the matter. (Chaudhry, 2012; 33)

Mudie stepped up his efforts once again and in January 1949 he wrote to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan Mamdot is thoroughly discredited, he is lazy, inefficient and a liar and that his main interest in the administration is to obtain possession of evacuee land... Mumtaz Daultana is a person everybody distrusts. He professes no desire to succeed Mamdot, content, so he says in the post of President of Provincial League. But a great many people disbelieve him. (Chaudhry, 2012; 34)

## **2.5 THE ROLE OF DEPUTY COMMISSIONER**

Deputy Commissioner was famous as a linchpin of the colonial system and all the power route through D.C he is at the same time deals with three main things a) Development and coordination of governmental activities, (b) revenue, (c) law and order. In colonial era the government controlled all the stake holders through D.C and same ruled followed by the different army and political governments in Pakistan.

## **2.6 AUTHORITARIANISM.**

Yet another factor contributing to an increase in the bureaucracy's powers after independence was the manner in which the district administration was organized in the so-called non-regulation provinces. As stated earlier, the British had introduced the position of deputy commissioner as head of the district administration in these provinces. The objective in combining the role of collector, district magistrate, and overall administrative head in one person was tailored to suit the particular requirements of North-Western India. In addition to the duties of collector and district magistrate performed in the regulated provinces, the deputy commissioner supervised a vast array of economic and social role of the politician for he could neither put forward vigorously the interests of his constituents, nor was much patronage available to him at the district level. The system in Non-Regulation Provinces was clearly paternal and authoritarian rather than legal and democratic. Given this tradition and the resulting lack of political consciousness in West Pakistan, the CSP ensured that the political forces were kept in check. In sum therefore, the desire of the CSP to continue playing the role of father figure in the district coupled with the strong bonds between the deputy commissioner and feudal interests ensured that the political forces were relegated to the background. A strong federal government and the ICS

provincial governors tried to ride rough shod over the provinces. They may have succeeded initially but the long-term damage of such an authoritarian attitude was enormous.

## **2.7 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SECRETARY AND MINISTER**

An institutional procedure governing relationships between senior civil servants and ministers that were inherited from the colonial regime. These procedures were established in 1921 when Indian ministers were appointed under the government act of 1919. The Indian ministers were appointed for the first time at the provincial level but they got only minor subjects. The idea of working under the Indian ministers was affront for the civil servants some of them also resigned in the protest. It was clear that civil servants teach the art of administration to the Indian ministers as well. The normal relationship between secretary and minister was reversed and the former could bypass the ministers and obtain the direction directly from the governor of the province. No concessions were made to the politicians and the bureaucrats retained the power and this practice was simply carried over into the post-colonial state. This state of affairs still present in today's Pakistan and that is why every party wants to appoint secretaries and bureaucrats who are in their favor and it started the new era of bi partisan in the Pakistani bureaucracy.

## **2.8 CAUSE OF STRENGTH OF BUREAUCRACY**

While the constitutional developments, or lack of them, may interest a legal mind or a student of political science, our interest is, by force of circumstance, confined to studying the manner in which the CSP moved from strength to strength. How did this come about? First and foremost an intense esprit de corps existed among members of the CSP. There were certain rules of the game respected by seniors and juniors alike. One of these was the seniority principle which meant that members aspiring to and succeeding in getting out of turn promotions were looked down upon with a degree of contempt. The seniority system is probably the single most effective technique employed by the CSP to prevent dissension among its membership. (Chaudhry, 2012; 39)

CSP officers were also quick to rise to the defense of a colleague in trouble. When Dr Khan Sahib, the chief minister of West Pakistan, decided to suspend Ata Mohammad Khan Leghari (ICS, 1938) when the latter gave him unpalatable advice, the CSP was up in arms. Under Section 10 of the Indian Independence Act, the terms and conditions of an ICS officer could not be changed to his detriment. Only the president, on the advice of the prime minister, could suspend him. The CSP association, headed by Justice M.R. Kayani (ICS, 1927), met the chief minister and had the suspension lifted. (Chaudhry, 2012; 40)

One advantage of Mirza's benevolent attitude was that the CSP was able to forge a link with the Pakistan army. What had started as an isolated instance of a warm relationship between General Ayub and Aziz Ahmed became institutionalized by the middle 1950s, as the CSP and the army both felt that for the moment at least, it was in their mutual interest to work and act together to ensure that the politicians did

not, in Mirza's words, make a mess of things. Initially, the relationship was tilted in favour of the CSP which felt confident enough to summon the army in times of crises, without too much about the danger of it oversteering. It was becoming increasingly evident that the CSP was beginning not only to demonstrate all the characteristics of its predecessor but also to work with the same institutional zeal. Such an attitude suited the plans of those who wanted to ensure that political culture did not take root in of those who wanted to ensure that political culture did not take root in the country. The process of recruitment and training was aimed to create a bureaucratic elite and it was but natural that it emerged as a dominant force in the governmental system and gradually restored the vice regal system. (Chaudhry, 2012; 30)

This is not a true reflection of the ground realities. The unfortunate fact is that from the very beginning the relationship between Pakistani public servants which the CSP in the vanguard, and the politicians was less than happy. The bureaucracy was not willing to surrender the powers it enjoyed before independence on the fallacious ground that better human resource ability gave it a more likely chance to deliver the goods. With the passage of time, the contempt with which the civil servant viewed the politician became increasingly evident. Civil servants had the audacity to publish articles in newspapers running down the political class as a whole. Mian Anwar Ali (IP), a senior police officer, asserted in an article on the role of the senior administrator, that ministers publicly berated government officials to enhance their own stature in the eyes of the general public. He went on to state that, they ruthlessly attacked and criticized conduct in public and thought that they ruthlessly attacked and criticized conduct in public and thought that they were doing a wonderful thing. The spoil system with all its attendant evils had come to establish itself. Within a couple of years of independence the CSP, established perhaps with the best of intentions, had

maneuvered itself into a situation where it became the chief implementer of an over centralized state apparatus.

## **2.9 SUMMARY**

- (1) Pakistan's bureaucracy has been deeply influenced by its institutional predecessors. The legacy of British antecedents is deep and persistent.
- (2) Pakistan's bureaucracy has perennially held a central place in the political processes of the state. Therefore, the characteristics of the bureaucracy have often been determinative of policy outcomes.
- (3) Pakistan's bureaucracy is greatly affected by the political environment of which it is a part. Bureaucracies are not neutral bystanders of the political process but rather are active participants. (Kennedy: 1998, 99)
- (4) After independence, the civil service of Pakistan continued the same system of colonial administration. It retained the same class structure, the same elite character and the same colonial pattern of administration. The All Pakistan Services consisted of various services, prominent among them being the Civil Service (called CSP) and Police Service (known as PSP). The CSP, regarding itself as the successor of the former ICS, retained its elite character and was the most pampered, patronized, and protected class of civil servants.
- (5) Pakistan, therefore, encouraged all Muslims in the erstwhile superior services of British India, whether serving or already retired, to opt for or come to Pakistan and fill in the administrative void. This situation gave an opportunity to senior civil servants who had opted for Pakistan not only to fill in higher administrative posts, but also to keep an eye on high political offices,

particularly since the Muslim League, which was more of a political movement, did not have a trained cadre to occupy high political positions in the area of finance and commerce.

- (6) The above situation led to the entry of higher civil servants into positions like that of finance minister to bureaucrats. Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, Malik Ghulam Muhammad, and Iskandar Mirza came into politics through that gateway. Once they got into cabinet positions, they had an opportunity through manoeuvre and intrigue to move into higher positions like those of Governor-General and Prime Minister. They could sense the weaknesses of the political party structure and political leaders, which opened a gate or bureaucratic intrigue and manipulation, particularly when there was internal cohesion amongst senior bureaucrats.
- (7) The bureaucracy has suffered significant decline during the Musharraf regime. It has been hit in more than one way. In the first place, nearly all the top positions in the civil hierarchy, particularly heads of the statutory autonomous corporations have been filled by serving and retired military generals. Even the training institution of the civil bureaucracy like Pakistan Administrative Staff College, National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA) and Civil Services Academy are now headed by retired army generals. In this way the civil bureaucracy has been deprived of its most coveted positions for which its members had worked for 25 to 30 years to attain. Secondly, the new local bodies system has shaken the established district administration system, going back to the colonial times, to its very foundations. The office of the Deputy Commissioner has been abolished.



- (8) After more than sixty-one years of independence, the bureaucracy continues to have the character of a ruling class neither responsive nor accountable to the people. The change it has undergone is only for the worse for it has ceased to be a professional, efficient, or dedicated outfit and has degenerated into a highly corrupt and inefficient force lacking in dedication and purpose, and is oppressive and callous in its approach. The bureaucracy in Pakistan has always believed and practiced the belief that it is meant to rule and not to serve the people.
- (9) Official machinery has often been used to influence the result in favour of the party in power. This means the involvement of the administrative machinery at all levels, particularly at the district level where it matters the most. Candidates with the government's blessings are given all kinds of facilities to obtain votes, including the assistance of the police, which deals leniently with those supporting the government candidate and severely with those opposing him. This goes to the extent of conjuring up false cases against the opponents and letting all supporters who have actually indulged in criminal activity. Deputy Commissioners and assistant commissioners provide similar facilities to government candidates at the district and sub-divisional levels. On and before the polling day, the district administrations extend help to government candidates by providing transport and other facilities to them. Tilted government departments are also deployed to facilitate party candidates. Electricity, water, and gas connections are provided in constituencies during the election campaign to win over votes for government-backed candidates. Opposition candidates are left to face considerable odds and inconvenience in these circumstances.

(10) Although, for some time judicial officers have been appointed as returning officers, the presiding officers and other staff at the polling stations are mostly drawn from the official cadre working under the district administration, who takes orders from the deputy commissioner and assistant commissioners rather than from the district judge and civil judges. There have been instances when presiding officers and polling officers have taken the result sheets of their respective polling stations to the deputy commissioners or assistant commissioners, where they were changed or interpolated before being submitted to the returning officers. Manipulation is allegedly done in the result sheets and there are instances when a candidate had won unofficially but was later declared unsuccessful after the result sheets were changed at certain polling stations. Even judicial officers who are appointed as returning officers are not all free from blame. Many of them are very ambitious and want to curry favour with the government in power. They are thus willing to cooperate with the government to achieve its desired ends.

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## **CHAPTER 3**

### **NEO-COLONIAL POWER OF PAKISTAN**

Pakistan is the country which inherent many problems out of which is the existence and fear of Indian Aggression to counter these threats army was made strong to tackle this problem. This policy increased the army budget many times, unaccountable and army transformed into most modern organized and sophisticated institution in the country. The army became most powerful institution as compare to its sister organization such as the political parties, the bureaucracy and even the judiciary. (Kohan, 2010; 11)

Pakistan army like any other army of third world emerged as the strongest institution of the country and powerful political actor. The conventional role of army is to safeguards the country borders from foreign aggression whereas in the case of Pakistan it played larger role than this and help civilian institution in case of any emergency like flood or any natural disaster. It also played role of securing the ideology of Pakistan.

#### **3.1 MILITARY A DOMINANT INSTITUTION**

The army of Pakistan is the largest political actor and capable of changing the direction of the country. Although military played the significance role during the colonial time but it remained subservient to civilian government. Military was called for any help during that era and helped civilian government. But after the partition army like civilian bureaucracy started interfering in the politics as democratic forces

were weak in the country. Army did military coup directly or run the country through their cronies in political parties. It also cultivated the culture of relying on the support of establishment instead of people for political elites. Pakistan army do three works 1) protect borders 2) They protect their own position in the country 3) strength the idea of country. (Cohan 1998, 54)

### **3.2 CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS**

The Army in Pakistan is most cohesive, sophisticated, disciplined, and task-oriented organization. It has large number of manpower which is loyal and self-disciplined, technology advanced and have lethal power of arsenals. The crisis in beginning of history like Kashmir issue, Indian threat and Afghanistan claimed for pakhtunistan created the need for large modern army. Than the cold war also triggered the need of great army and supported by capitalist block to train and modernized the institution. Large budgets were allocated for defense instead of development works .People of Pakistan love their army and has a lot of respect in the society. Pakistan army continued the custom of martial races given by the British and most of the army till today recruited from these races. Punjabi and Pakhtun are two ethnic groups which represents the army and their ratio is 65:35. The representation of Sindhies and Baluch are nominal.

The political sphere and army sphere are inter depended on each other and well-connected and its shape and relationship depends on political system. Army strength increases if it involve in civilian matters for longer period of time. Same happened with Pakistan army as it helps the government in administrative matters. From the beginning Pakistan army involved in each and every matters of state

building those are assistance to the refugees coming from India, the maintenance of law and order and tackling natural disasters, development works and helping civilian in administrative affairs. The image of the army improved as compared to political elites as common person thinks army as savior and well-wishers of common man. Growing stature of the military was in sharp contrast to the degeneration of the political machinery. The army top leadership with the help of senior bureaucrats learned the art of governance and strength in the state affairs.

The concept of military bureaucracy as a political neutral body may be valid to a larger extent to those countries where the institutions of democracy have evolved over the longer period of time. But it is fallacious to extend the same assertion to such bureaucracies in those countries which have acquired the political independence from colonial rule after the Second World War. In fact from the very inception of the Indian army it was trained to be the custodian of law and orders and to promote colonial interests at the cost of different indigenous and regional interests within the sub-continent.

### **3.3 THE MILITARY IN BRITISH INDIA**

During the colonial era, commander of the British army was also member of his Executive Council and participated in legislature. The legislature had no power to ask question about the defense expenditure and defense deals. It was an exclusive matters between viceroy and commander. Only in the end of rule 1946 defense minister was appointed for the first time and he replaced commander in chief in executive council.

. Although military played the significance role during the colonial time but it remained subservient to civilian government. But it had larger role than the common army as it helped in maintaining law and order in case of any emergency.

### **3.4 PATTERNS OF RULE IN PAKISTAN: 1947-2007**

Pakistan Army ruled the country for four times in form of martial law by four generals Ayub, Yahya, Zia and Musharraf. All these martial laws claimed that they would bring true democracy and free the country from corruption. Whenever army was not directly ruling the country it indirectly capturing the most of power of civilian authorities. In 1990s they managed it through president and sent four elected governments home this period is famous as ‘rule of troika’

### **3.5 BRIEF HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT OF ARMY**

The first decade of Pakistan history the political map was controlled by Civil bureaucracy which resulted into political instability. During all this time seven prime minister changed out of which one was Punjabi bureaucrat four governors general. Dominated by Punjabi Bureaucrats, Sikander Mirza had unique experience of civil and military bureaucracy. He invited Ayub Khan to do military coup who was already enjoying the post of defense minister while having C-in-C at the same time which was against the rule of business.

In first decade Army reinvented itself with the help of USA these defense pacts also signed on the advice of civil bureaucracy. SEATO and CENTO



helped to modernize and gave enormous strength to army and made it formidable institution of the country.

The huge budget and large military aid from USA made army large and most strong institution of Pakistan and at the same time Fauji Foundation was established in 1953 and started business in textile and sugar fields. The basic aim of the foundation was the welfare of army (Siddiqi 2003). The army had extended share in the administration of the country and worked for the redistribution of evacuee land. In this process most of the land was leased out to army person on 99 years lease which also strengthened army (Siddiqi 2008). These adventures made army industrialist and landlord at the same time so in future these two interests became the reasons of oligarchy between army and local elites.

Authoritarian always helpful to bureaucrats both military and bureaucracy this is the same reason for consolidation of interest of both institutes first coup on 8 October 1958, was done to restrain the democratic norms in the country and restore security and authoritarian culture in the country (Rizvi 2000:86). ). In addition, the regime amended Colonization of Land Act, 1912, in 1965 to allot land (approx. 100000 acres annually) to military (Siddiqi, 2008). Besides, the Fauji Foundation gathered assets worth Rs 152 million by the end of his rule (Siddiqi 2003).

The reforms introduced by Ayub khan had consent of bureaucracy and landed elites and they became the part of his party conventional Muslim league. Army got the strength in this period but all other stake holders' bureaucracy and landed elites also got their shares as well. Ayub policies was against the poor class and led to the rich-poor divide and all industrial policies helped rich people to become more richer and as per the report of Mehboob-ul-Haq only 22 families gained the most of the benefits.

Ayub rule ended with the disapproval of people but Ayub violated his own constitution and gave power to Yahya Khan the army chief. Ayub this act showed that there were no importance of constitutional and democratic norms in the country. Yahya period was actually continuation of Ayub but he implemented Legal Framework Order (LFO) and conducted first general election. This created split in the country and West Pakistan was left with overdeveloped civil-military bureaucracy' and influential landed-feudal class. The separation of Pakistan made frustrated Pakistan army so they receded to their barrack giving power to Z.A Bhutto.

Z.A Bhutto tried to reform the country but he was feudal lord and oxford graduate so he had the liability of his own group landed class so he also victim of his own background. He restructured the institution of the army and its command and regulatory structure. In addition, he abolished the civil service of Pakistan and unified all services though with military's consent (Haqqani 2005: 95). Baluchistan operation again gave the army an opportunity to regain its lost power and dignity. The emergence of PNA gave the opportunity to army as they called army to take the rein of the country so Ziaul Haq enforced martial law on 5 July 1977 on charges of corruption and mismanagement of economy by Bhutto. The latter was arrested and his policies reversed; the 1973 constitution was abrogated. Two years later, Bhutto was hanged by the military (Rizvi 2000:239). The international conditions changed as Russia attacked Afghanistan and USA need the cooperation in this area so Zia was very good choice available to them. New commercial adventures NLC and Bharia town established which increase economic power of the army many times as compare to past (Siddiqi 2008; 45). After the death of Zia Benazir Bhutto became elected prime minister international scenario was against Pakistan as Pressler amendment was enforced so her government was in stiff conditions. The 1990s was called rule of

Troika as due to 58-2B president had power to dismissed the elected governments in this period army remained powerful and indirectly controlled the resources of the country but in 1997 Nawaz sharif became president with 2/3 majority and amended the constitution and revoke the 8th amendment did by Ziaul Haq. Nawaz started exercising like kings and full commands of civilian on army which was not the custom of the Pakistan army who always exercised independence and freedom in every affair so it leads to many conflicts like Kargil Operation and relationship with India so army decided to take direct power at did coup on 12 October 1999. The military role during the Musharraf's regime has been of very high profile. Musharraf has completed what Zia began-militarization of the State of Pakistan. The Zia regime had taken over a major part of the State power for the military and shared only a small portion of it with the civilian politicians and bureaucrats. The Musharraf regime on the other hand has taken over the entire state power for the military, with the civilian politics and bureaucrats assigned a small but subordinate role in the affairs of the state. No wonder that the Prime Minister and his cabinet could not take any major decision without the prior approval of Musharraf and his military junta. The real power vests with the military high command which includes chiefs of armed forces and the corps commanders who make all the major decisions, political or economic, for the country, all top civilian offices like the heads of statutory corporations were taken over by the serving or retired military generals. Even the educational institutions have not been spared. Important universities and civilian training institutions are now headed by the military generals.

### **3.6 WHY MILITARY INTERVENE IN POLITICS**

Different political scientist has different views about the army interference in politics and they are all right up-to some extent.

#### **3.6.1 Hassan Askari Rizvi view**

According to him there are two major reasons of rise of armies as state rulers first reason is that the nation has a lot of differences and it lack unity. Secondly there is wide difference between western ruling elites and moor masses. Pakistan also faced the same problems as it lack unity and distrust among different groups. The leaders wanted to develop unity through force but not through accepting the right of every community living in the country, this process resulted into division of the country in 1971. Due to lack of democratic norms most of the leaders relied upon authoritarianism. Pakistan inherent colonial political culture in which agitation against the government was approved by people so the same culture retained by politicians so it created instability in the country. Pakistan movements revolved around certain personalities instead of institution of political party. So as leaders died its legacy also died with him and created gap among leadership and conflicts arose in the party. Pakistan is the country which inherent many problems out of which is the existence and fear of Indian Aggression to counter these threats army was made strong to tackle this problem. This policy increased the army budget many times, unaccountable and army transformed into most modern organized and sophisticated institution in the country. Political vacuum created by political elites filled by army which did extended role in the country.

### **3.6.2 Ayesha Sidequa View Of Military Involvement In Politics**

According to sidequa feudalism is the reasons and resulted into military domination in the country. In a similar way to other ruling elites such as the feudal landowners and large entrepreneurs, the military exploits resources for the advantage of its personnel. In feudal system state authorities are used to accumulate capital assets and then distribute them into their class.

The feudal structure thrives on the accumulation and distribution of capita and assets to those in authority, and leads them in turn to compensate their clients in return for their support and greater political power. Hence, the accumulation of capital or assets is not just to gather wealth but to buy additional power. Similarly army used state resources to increase benefits of its personnel. Army also find cronies in this process both of these thrive on one another.

Political power + economic power (military fraternity x cronies) = military's political capital.

### **3.6.3 Stephen P Cohan's Views**

Writers is of the view that Pakistan army is todays dominant due to these reasons

- 1) The culture of domination of uniform on civilian.
- 2) The foreign aid from USA made the army most sophisticated, modern and economically strong.

- 3) Writer is point of view that politician are inefficient and corrupt which created vacuum
- 4) Pakistan is a security state
- 5) Kohan is of the view it's to maintain Punjabi domination on the state.

### **3.7 ARMY INDUCTION INTO BUREAUCRACY**

In 1943, it was agreed that some appointments be made from those members of the armed forces who could possibly be an asset to the administration. Candidates were expected to be in the age bracket of 21-30 years and be university graduates unless they had joined the military after the intermediate examination. In all, thirty-one appointments were made, and in 1946 the scheme was discontinued. Pakistan inherited eleven including Abu Nasar Qaiser Ali Khan, Sheikh Manzoor Elahi (1943), Chaudhry Niaz Ahmed (1944), Hussain Haider, Riffat pasha Sheikh (1945), Syed Afzal Agha, and Hammed Razaq (1946). In sharp contrast to officers of the armed forces who were appointed to the CSP in 1960, 1961, 1962, and 1963, the War Service officers were graduates from the reputable Punjab Allahabad, and Lucknow universities. (Chaudhry, 2012; 15)

ICS officers expressed fears that were a provincial government to be so inclined, they could face retribution in the event of not coming up to the expectations of politicians. They demanded and got cast iron constitutional guarantees Under Section 52 of the Act, the viceroy and governors were given special responsibilities of safeguarding the rights and legitimate interests of such civil servants. (Chaudhry, 2012; 16)

Mention may be made here of the Indian Political Services (IPS) a cadre set up primarily to man the non-regulated provinces. The IPS drew its officers from the armed forces [66 per cent] and the ICS [33 per cent]. The former needed to have qualified in their promotion examinations, be below 26years of age and unmarried. (Chaudhry, 2012; 16)

After independence, Pakistan inherited some competent, though highly controversial IPS officers. One of them, Lt.-Col. Iskander Mirza (IPS, 1926) was inducted into the CSP, served as defense secretary, promoted himself to the honorary rank of major general, was appointed governor East Bengal, then governor-general and finally president of Pakistan. (Chaudhry, 2012; 17)

### **3.8 ARMY PRIORITIES**

Pakistan is the country which is always controlled through patronage and kinship the economy of Pakistan is not open that is why to safeguards economic interests of any class there is a need of political power. As a class army is the most loyalist and know how to protect their interests so to capture the economic power they always captured political power.

### **3.9 DILEMMA OF ARMY**

Ayub khan started ruling Pakistan in 1954 with the aim to get rid of old politician but soon he became comfortable with the old landed elites which were dominating the West Pakistan. Similarly different military regimes of Zia-ul-Haq

(1977-88) and Pervez Musharraf (1999-2007), also relied heavily on landed elites who provide their rules legitimacy and stability. Military provided them patronage and power in exchange to maneuver and control people at local level. Which strengthened the landed elites economically and their domination on countryside remained unbreakable. Not only Feudal lords gave legitimacy at local level but also at provincial and national level established political elites sided with the army to get the patronage. The bargain between army and landed classes renewed. The links of this group also strengthened through marriage, it was the way by which military bureaucracy oligarchy gathered their support and legitimacy. The technical superiority of the post-colonial military-bureaucratic state, in terms of its organizational capacity relative to non-state actors, and its ability to draw on external sources of support, allows it to both choose its partners in society, and legitimize itself through appeals to national security. As various military rule banned political parties so it paved way for the personification of Pakistani politics and became instrument in empowering landed classes in a way authoritarianism also increased both in military and civilian rule. (Waseem, 1994b, 145),



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## **CHAPTER 4**

### **STRONG WEB OF ELITE CLASSES**

#### **4.1 BUREAUCRACY MILITARY ALLIANCE**

After the partition the most established and powerful state institution was bureaucracy which was known as steel frame of British India. The norms of democracy was not established and politician did not know how to run the state so they heavily relied on civil bureaucracy which resulted into complete control of civil bureaucracy for the first decade of independence. Most of the leading politicians were migrated and had no base in Pakistan so they tactfully delayed the general elections. The career bureaucrats with administrative experience always preferred on the ministers, ministries were given to maintain loyalty not for good administration. The bureaucracy has strong group networking institutionalism and access to right information so they maneuvered the situation in their favour. (Kennedy: 1998, 4)

It was bureaucrat Ghulam Muhammad who for the first time used his powers as governor general and sent home the constitutional assembly to home. He also invited army for the civilian postings and help in political matters. Ayub Khan became defense minister while serving as Commander in Chief which was against the spirit of parliamentary democracy. Sikander Mirza invited Ayub Khan for the first military coup in the country.

The relationship between politician and bureaucracy was love hate relationship politician tried to use civil service to finish their old scores while bureaucracy thought that politicians are inefficient to smoothly run the state affairs. (Afzal, 2005; 215)

After Ayub coup bureaucracy became the junior partner of the army but civil service strongly encouraged and supported Ayub Martial law in the country. Ayub Basic Democrat system were as such gave full powers at local levels to the civil servants. So the support and terms remained very high between military and civil bureaucracy during all this time.

## **4.2 BUREAUCRACY AND ITS ALLIANCE WITH LANDED CLASSES**

The years followed by the occupation of Punjab, the provinces provided most of the military to the colonial power for the safe guards of their economic and strategic interests in this part of the world. The contribution of army personnel by this area is nearly equals to one third of the total strength as the total population of this area is one tenth of the total population of the subcontinent it means contribution was very significant and could not be overlooked. The increased in army recruitment also went parallel with more bureaucratization of Punjab and development of more infrastructure in this part of the subcontinent; it gives maturity and strength to the administrative system. The government gave significance importance to the landed elites/allies for the development of infrastructure in the province. The bureaucracy in Punjab and northern areas are most of the time consists of members of landed families and small portion was from the British himself. The masses were controlled through clan leaders and ziladari system as each villages were divided into units which were called zails. A zailadars selected among leading biradari of the agricultural families who also controlled Headman (lambardar) he is also selected from the leading families of agricultural backgrounds in this way landed classes were given formal role

in revenue system of the British the duty of the lambardar was to collect water rate and all the obligation due to the land to them. The person who was in this position had access to the colonial administrative system therefore can accumulate a lot of power and patronage furthermore these positions zalidars and lambardar are hereditary in nature and nontransferable. Government also give 5% share in the revenue collection to these officials, these positions were not the part of any formal system but a supplement to accommodate landed elites with in civil bureaucracy. Police and revenue Administration two were most important departments first allowed local landlords to maintain the law and order at the local level and the second was important to accumulate economic power in the local area. The recruitment of local in police and revenue system was not on merit basis but on loyalty based and to give strength to the landed allies so most of their family members are recruited in these two departments. Most of the ICS officers were from cities due to higher literacy rate in the cities but junior officers are all from these landed elites as they were encouraged to apply on these posts like Naib tehsildar and Sub Inspectors. The recruitment of landed classes into state machinery and their direct link with state increase their ability and power to influence peasants and subordinate agricultural classes and opponents of government. Landed capacity increased to influence peasants when they were given positions in the District Boards as these bodies had access to funds and this fund could be utilized on sanitation education and health and on infrastructure. These members of boards had duty to identify areas where fund to be utilized and whereas bureaucracy had the duty to implement this projects. These boards increased state patronage to dispose of government fund. In this way landed elites become more powerful and in position to influence Peasants and subordinate agricultural families. District Board became the instrument which brought landed

class and Bureaucracy in direct connection and their relationship became strong. This capacity increased kinship and tribal solidarity in the area today Pakistan comprised of.

#### **4.3.1 Land Owners and ICS Tradition**

Continuing the ICS tradition, the CSP established close ties with the landowning class. It is an undisputed fact that British civil servants perhaps took a liking to the landed gentry as a whole, and particularly the Muslims, for several reasons. For one thing, these landowners carried much of the cultured graces which allowed them to mix freely with the senior government functionaries. These leaders figured prominently in the local Durbars and hunting parties, which were arranged for visiting dignitaries like the Commissioner, the Governor, and on rare occasions dominated by large landlords who had much in common with the elite civil service. The landlord was normally on good terms with the district officer in his area usually a SP developed close and intimate links with the tribal leaders, in much the same way as the Indian Political Service had done before independence. Here again, this understanding worked to the mutual advantage of both; the tribal chiefs paid no taxes, engaged in large scale smuggling of contraband goods and succeeded in securing free utilities like electricity and water while the CSP officers claimed credit for having brought stability to the area. It would not be wrong to say that the CSP and the tribal leaders jointly ruled the area.

The CSP used the central and provincial secretariats as control devices. The central and provincial governments operated through Secretariats which comprised a number of ministries headed by a political figure, usually designated as the minister. Responsible, at least in theory, for taking major policy decisions, the minister was

assisted by a senior civil servant called the secretary to government. He had a hierarchy comprising additional, joint and deputy secretaries working under him. The CSP maintained a stranglehold on the Secretariat by occupying all the major ministries, including Cabinet and Establishment, and by keeping the technical officers of the ministry at a distance from the minister.

Dealt with the economy as they handled law and order problems during the period of the British raj; crises were solved as they appeared; long term solutions were applied when, in the eyes of the civil servants, the crisis warranted such handling. Decentralization was the second important feature of the model of economic management and control developed and practiced by the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan. The civil service's belief in the efficacy of decentralized management was applied in two different ways to promote economic development. The civil service supported the creation of public development corporations, and it favoured the grant of significant sums of money to the local administrations for development purposes. (Chaudhry,2012;43)

Carrot and stick approach was adopted. Collectors maintained a list of 'loyal' zamindars who acted as the eyes and ears of the government. The system of patronage through conferring of honours was another ploy used to reward individuals. (Chaudhry, 2012; 21)

#### **4.4 MILITARY AND LANDED ELITE ALLIANCE**

Ayub khan started ruling Pakistan in 1954 with the aim to get rid of old politician but soon he became comfortable with the old landed elites which were



dominating the West Pakistan. Similarly different military regimes of Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88) and Pervez Musharraf (1999-2007), also relied heavily on landed elites who provide their rules legitimacy and stability. Military provided them patronage and power in exchange to maneuver and control people at local level. Which strengthened the landed elites economically and their domination on countryside remained unbreakable. Not only Feudal lords gave legitimacy at local level but also at provincial and national level established political elites sided with the army to get the patronage. The bargain between army and landed classes was renewed by this act. The links of this group also strengthened through marriage, it was the way by which military bureaucracy oligarchy gathered their support and legitimacy. The technical superiority of the post-colonial military-bureaucratic state, in terms of its organizational capacity relative to non-state actors, and its ability to draw on external sources of support, allows it to both choose its partners in society, and legitimize itself through appeals to national security. As various military rule banned political parties so it paved way for the personification of Pakistani politics and became instrument in empowering landed classes in a way authoritarianism also increased both in military and civilian rule. (Waseem, 1994b, 145),

#### **4.5 LANDED ELITES AND BUSINESS ELITE COLLUSION**

The capitalism in developing society like Pakistan gave emergence of industrial class in the cities, most of the emigrants from India settled in cities of Pakistan and became able to get the advantage of the government which wanted to grow and establish industry in the country. But it did not change the economic equation of Pakistan so power of these capitalists specified to the large cities except

where landed classes turned into the industrialist specially agro industry to maintain their economic power intact. So the government during Ayub era also identified big landlord who might invest in industry so economic power in countryside remained to them. Industrialist also shakes hand with them to get the state patronage and benefits to their group.

#### **4.6 BARGAINING POWER OF LOCAL ELITES**

Army always need legitimacy after every coup so it conduct referendum and non-party based election in the country when army ousted political parties only local elite at their local level can give them electoral legitimacy in return they offered state patronage be continued in favour of local elites. In this way local elites became more strengthened and powerful now each political party gave tickets to the winning horses instead of their workers and loyalist. In a way the different military government continued the colonial policy to accommodate the agricultural biradaries of the country in generally and in Punjab in particular.

#### **4.7 MILITARY AND BUSINESSMAN ALLIANCE**

The most of industrial development in Punjab done by the feudal elites as others dont have the money to invest in the industry so this class particularly in Punjab are old landed class. The government of Ayub identified potential landlords and invited them to invest in the industry. The relationship between and business class always remained very high as army is also doing capital investments so there interests are same and business class thinks that army had most of the time political power in

their hand so they also help them. Nawaz Sharif emergence as a big businessman is the good example of this relationship.

#### **4.8 BUREAUCRACY AND BUSINESS CLASS RELATIONSHIP**

The allocation of industrial licenses and credit was guided by considerations of patronage. Financial viability has frequently been ignored as a criterion in the sanctioning of a loan or credit. The nexus between corrupt industrialists and nepotistic bureaucrats has consolidated the elitist strains in the Pakistan economy. Finally, the economic and industrial structure of Pakistan has remained decidedly oligopolistic, market reforms notwithstanding. The barriers to entry into a large majority of industries have remained quite high. Room for new entrepreneurs has been scarce. The economy-wide policies of liberalization, on the other hand, have been conducive to the expansion of small-scale industry in the last two and half decades. Unfortunately, this policy regime set the foundation for rent-seeking by Pakistani businessmen. The flourishing of the black market in import licenses, and the need for political connection to ensure access to cheap credit and fiscal incentives, paved the way for a private-public sector relationship where clienteles' and patronage predominated. Rent-seeking behaviour was legitimized throughout the economy, and a class of industrialists was created who made huge markups for themselves and their families, but the spillovers to the rest of the economy were at best marginal. The state's capacity to tax these profits was virtually no-existent as the institutions had not been put into place.

## **4.9 MARRIAGE**

The elite classes used the institution of marriage as link and patronage among themselves now it is difficult to disguise one elite class from others as the members of the same class are part of landed class. Business class bureaucracy and army. this network is became so complex in these days if one member is out of power the other will be part of power by part of any administrative elite or political elites.

## **4.10 LAND AS PATRONAGE**

The most of industrial development in Punjab done by the feudal elites as others don't have the money to invest in the industry so this class particularly in Punjab is old landed class. The government of Ayub identified potential landlords and invited them to invest in the industry. The relationship between and business class always remained very high as army is also doing capital investments so there interests are same and business class thinks that army had most of the time political power in their hand so they also help them. Nawaz Sharif emergence as a big businessman is the good example of this relationship. (Alavi 1998b, 29–30).

All the military and civil government distributed land to the powerful groups of Pakistan i.e. bureaucracy army and others landed classes which supported the regime the governments used pro-colonial policy to appease and get support/loyalty from the local elite classes. These lands are distributed under various schemes still the policy granting land to army under gallantry award prevails. According to Anti-Corruption report in Ayub era 104522 Acre land was distributed among

Provincial/National level bureaucrats and among members of three armed forces that is Army, Air force and Navy.

#### **4.11 CONCLUSION**

Inside Pakistan's Military Economy offers two explanations why democratic or political leaders did not challenge military coup. It has given and take relationship between army and local elites, local elites give legitimacy to army rule where as in return they get their economic and political interest safeguarded. Resultantly both plundered with national exchequers without any accountability.

This was the beginning of crystallization of the establishment at the centre being dominated by the military and supported the feudal politicians, civil bureaucrats, judges and business interests. This establishment was designed to be hostile to the people of Pakistan and their democratic aspirations. When the people of East Pakistan spoke with one Voice in the elections of 1970 and demanded real power to be transferred to the political party having won the majority in the National Assembly, the establishment in West Pakistan did not do so. It deliberately allowed the country to break up because the establishment regarded the people of East Pakistan as democratic nuisance and a threat- to its monopoly of power. It chose to retain the western part of the country, which they regarded as politically pliable and weak, for its future adventures and dominance. The post 1971 history is of the gradual dominance of the military over the political power of the state reducing other elements in the establishment to a subordinate and subservient position.

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## **CHAPTER 5**

### **STATE AS ESTATE (NO GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT)**

The ruling elite considered state as their estate that is why they always remained in power to secure their economic interests and their kinship group and patronage. the ruling elite has no morality to minimize the problems of people but they are busy in plundering the state resources for their personal uses that is why service delivery is low and poor governance prevailed in the country.

#### **5.1 HOW ELITES CAPTURED STATE RESOURCES AND DEPRIVED MASSES**

In last chapter we discuss how the administrative elites and political elites joined together to capture the power now we will go into the details how the elite uses state resources as their own resources and considered state as their estate.

#### **5.2 INDIRECT RULE AND MANEUVERING OF FEUDAL LORDS**

The landlords of contemporary Pakistan retain control not only over the village punchiat but also over the instruments of the modern state. Hence, to gain access to the organs of the social services, law and order, or other concerns, villagers have to mostly go through the landlords are able to retain a despotic status in relation to the peasants by maintaining monopoly control over modern state institutions. At the time of independence, Pakistan had a land tenure system in Punjab and Sindh

dominated by zamindars and jagirdars possessed large tracts of land and practiced an exploitative system in which peasants were without legal protection and the forum of settlement of disputes was heavily based in favour of the zamindars. Landownership was highly concentrated and the Gini-coefficient was as high as 0.64 in 1950.

Unlike East Punjab, no serious attempts were made to limit land holdings. Instead, exemption from income tax, favorable output prices and input subsidies, concessional credit from public institutions, diversion of scarce irrigation water from the share of small farmers, generated large economic rents for the landlord class. The feudal relationship and economic power was soon translated in domination of political scene and the shifting loyalties of the landlord's class sowed the seeds of political instability in the country.

### **5.3 RETAINING OF COLONIAL LEGACY**

Patron-Client Relationship Among Political And State Elites: The power relationship in Pakistan has been characterized by a 'feudal' mind-set and behaviour. The 'feudal', or the narrow class of ruling elites that moved in and out of power at various intervals of time, captured most of the rents for themselves and their families.

This inherited structure of land tenure has played a powerful role in shaping the country's political system, institutions, and societal norms. The influence of the feudal system—a purely agriculture sector phenomenon—has spilled over into the industrial and bureaucratic spheres of life and reinforced the elitist growth model, with serious consequences for the country's transition to a modern state. The

subsequent periods of Pakistan's economic history should thus be examined in this context. (Hussain.1989;63)

This class of elites, which includes politicians, big businessmen, bureaucrats, military officers, and landlords, was attuned to the patron-client relationship. The economic rents created through import licensing, industrial permits, foreign exchange allocations, credit by government development banks or nationalized commercial banks, discretionary tariff concessions, award of contracts, subsidized agriculture credit, cheap urban land, evasion of taxes, and a host of other government policies in fact widened the discrepancy between private and social profitability. The primary argument is that the mentality of the westernized ruling elite of Pakistan has steadily regressed into its per-British form in its ways of exercise power. Thus, the state has become to be treated as a personal estate by the rulers whereby the servants of the powerful members of the executive. This arbitrary exercise of power has reemerged members of the executive. This arbitrary exercise of power has reemerged as a dominant norm and undermined the institutional and psychological principles and practices inherited from the British Empire in India.

It is further substantiated by living memory which, though rarely enamored of British rule, concedes that the kind of routine oppression, financial corruption and violation of the law that now characterizes the exercise of power at all levels in Pakistan did not characterize British India to the same extent. Pakistan was a state in 1947 it gradually became the estate of the ruler and their officials much as the pre-British empires were estates of their imperial elites pre-British empires were estates of their imperial elites. The roles of the political leadership vis-a-vis the state apparatus, the higher bureaucracy and judiciary, the law and order and financial administrations, the military interventions is the state apparatus and its relations with

the other arms of the executive and American –inspired tutelage on the culture of power and governance of Pakistan act a important empirical markers.

Empirical and describes the actual exercise of power by the ruling elite through the administrative institutions and instruments. The third assesses the impact the exercise of power by the elite has upon the effective, quality and ethos of the state apparatus, as well as reaction of society. The political considerations in the sanctioning of loans have not rewarded the most financially and economically viable industrial projects, and the bias in the allocation of credit towards new units has not made proper use of the economies of scale of existing units.

The allocation of industrial licenses and credit was guided by considerations of patronage. Financial viability has frequently been ignored as a criterion in the sanctioning of a loan or credit. The nexus between corrupt industrialists and nepotistic bureaucrats has consolidated the elitist strains in the Pakistan economy. Finally, the economic and industrial structure of Pakistan has remained decidedly oligopolistic, market reforms notwithstanding. The barriers to entry into a large majority of industries have remained quite high. Room for new entrepreneurs has been scarce. The economy-wide policies of liberalization, on the other hand, have been conducive to the expansion of small-scale industry in the last two and half decades. (Hussain,1989;135).

#### **5.4 STATE SERVANTS AS PERSONAL SERVANT**

In this environment policy making is far removed from realities on the ground and a high level of cynicism prevails alongside intolerance of original thinking

and criticism (Naiz, 2008; 48). Those who aspire to rule the new creation are not typically actuated by altruism. More often, it is the hunger for power, acute insecurities opportunism, cynicism and at best, enlightened self-interest that guide such endeavors. In an age of public opinion. Aspiring elites may employ religious or ideological rhetoric to give their public pronouncements emotional resonance amongst the people in whose interest the great national liberation project is launched.

## **5.5 OVER CENTRALIZATION VS. FEDERALISM**

It was felt that the provincial governments were generally not up to the task of making policy in their own sphere of competence and too prone to confusing politics with administration to supervise and execute policies made either by themselves or by the centre. This was unfortunate because practically everything that materially affected the well-being of the citizen, ranging from law and order and land revenue, to health, education, local govt., and public works, was supposed to be under control of the provincial govt. as the crises continued and the centre became The provincial governments control over their administrations as most of the officers even from the purely provincial cadres who were being appointed and transferred by the centre ‘did not pay so much regard to the Provincial administration as Extraordinary promotions combined with illegal demands for patronage by politicians, who had the power of transfer over officials and could inflict significant harm on the peace of mind and finances of subordinates, led to serious problems. Sometimes pressure was applied in order to victimize other politicians.

## **5.6 POLITICAL PATRONAGE AND TRANSFER POSTING/PROMOTION**

Engage in the politics of patronage. It was most dangerous for the politicians to be consistently demonstrated as intellectually for the politicians to be servants of the state with whom they were in intimate contact and to whom they were supposed to provide leadership.( Naiz,2008;98)

A politically connected subordinate could easily overpower his superiors while the insecurity of the senior servants affected their impartiality and professionalism in dealing with both politicians and administrative subordinates. In the disciplinary code no mandatory inquiry into alleged misconduct was enquired if the investigating officer so determined. (Naiz,2008;112).

While arbitrary dismissals, appointment, and transfers, reduced the higher into a quasi-medieval instrument, the formal changes in the structure of the services their remuneration, nomenclature, shattered its flexibility and adaptability. Members of the national and provincial assemblies 'were allocated their own quotas for jobs' leading to unabashed cronyism at the middle and lower levels. The already serious problems of delinquency, incompetence and pliability spiraled out of control while 'a clique of corrupt countries' enveloped those exercising power in Pakistan's increasingly 'medieval ruling culture. These influence peddlers 'became the link between the rulers and the ruled and were embedded in the 'networks of patronage, arising out of an electoral system that was, and is, 'basically clannish'. In the face of unrestrained political patronage. The 'persistent interference from the elected representatives' in the transfers and promotions of officials high and low allowed 'unscrupulous and dishonest bureaucrats 'to rise and reinforced a pervasive 'culture of corruption. Such

arbitrary acts eroded to a very considerable extent the ‘autonomy of all departments’ and adversely impacted the district administration. While elected representatives eagerly ‘helped themselves to public funds and assets’ and ignored, any rule of law or moral probity, the administrative machinery became ineffective. Across the length and breadth of the country ‘authority seems to have eroded under the weight of the prolonged politicization, of the higher bureaucracy the state’s failure ‘in its most basic and minimal task: providing security of life and property to its citizens.

Senseless removal of officers from posts rendering them officers on special Duty (OSD) for long periods. Out of turn promotions to personal favorites.

Two-fold in that individuals who should not have been trusted with important positions were given a free hand while those who could have served properly gained relatively little exposure. Thus most of Pakistan’s capable civil servants do not know how to run the administration for lack of experience while the servile sycophants who are often entrusted with important offices have no little inclination or aptitude for serving the state.

## **5.7 CONSTITUENCY POLITICS AND MINISTERS**

Pakistan’s share of this military was fixed at one third, or one hundred and fifty thousand men, of whom ninety thousand were already deployed in its territory. Due to the concentration of recruitment areas in the Punjab, which contributed six-tenths of the combatant strength of the British Indian armed forces in 1927, the Pakistani military was well-placed to replenish and expand its numerical strength. The



critical shortage was in the officer crops were of the four thousand officers needed about half were available.

Muslim made up only one-fourth of the total strength of the officer crops of the British Indian military on the eve of independence. Pressure was effectively exercised by the politicians to secure the recruitment of large members of constables who duly processed to become a public nuisance and administrative seemed oblivious to the reality that it was 'far better to have 50 men well trained, well equipped and in perfect to have 50 men well trained, well equipped and in perfect health than 500 men trained indifferently and housed indifferently.

## **5.8 POLITICAL PATRONAGE AND VOTING SYSTEM**

Our voting system is based on caste/baradari, our voter does not think on the integrity of the politician and his work he only considers his caste and baradari that candidates belong to our baradari so he will vote him and furthermore he knows if his candidates wins he may use state operators in his favour and against his enemy. MPA/MNA whose work is to make legislation always involved in daily administration of tehsil and police station and posted officers of their choice so that they accommodate their patronage group.

## **5.9 ACCELERATED PROMOTION AND EFFICIENCY OF SENIOR CIVIL BUREAUCRATS**

As a temporary measure about five hundred British officers were retained. The pace of recruitment was increased and accelerated promotions given so that majors

and colonels rose to senior command positions in a few years' time. Short-term commissions were also given against vacancies while voluntary retirement was restricted.

## **5.10 ARMY AND GOVERNANCE AND ITS SHARE IN STATE RESOURCES**

Such rapid change was being accomplished without significant harm to efficient which was defined 'as the ability of the Armed Forces to defend the borders of Pakistan against aggression from neighboring countries. (Naiz, 2008; 143) An army is strange organism. At a functional level it aspires to be a highly efficient technocracy of violence, trained and equipped with the latest methods and weapons its country can afford. At a tactical level an army appears, at least to an untrained observer, to be a vast agglomeration of feudal castes and martial tribes with each fighting unit animated by an acute sense of honour, ever sensitive to the weight of its past performance, and exuberantly idiosyncratic. At a strategic level, however, it is the unity of command and a culture of obedience to its dictates that ensures order within the mass. A military officer is thus a technocrat in the sense that he possesses highly specialized skills that can only be acquired through years of effort and practice. But because the ultimate task is to apply these skills in conditions of extreme stress or violence he is drilled into believing in his own superiority, the wisdom of his commanders, and the loyalty of his subordinates. A conscious effort is made by his trainers to harness what Plato described in the republic as thymos-a spirited but irrational pride and desire for recognition that can overcome the fear of death.( Naiz,2008;147) Hundreds of military officers were deputed to civilian positions and

the higher bureaucracy was utterly marginalized: Musharraf's objective was to establish unity of command that would enable the praetorian centre to exercise direct control at the local level circumventing politicians and assemblies.

Through enormously wasteful, confusing and corrupt, the devolution scheme enabled for the first time the sustained penetration of local administration by the military. (Naiz, 2008; 150) Musharraf attained the unity of command through the decapitation and demoralization of the higher bureaucracy and the undermining of the provincial and national assemblies. The provinces and local government could both be controlled through fiscal centralization. The insertion of 3500 military people into civilian bodies [usually in important positions] at the national, provincial, divisional and district levels. The Pakistani military has an enemy and while this animosity has facilitated the military's rise to prominence it also places practical limits on its capacity for political intervention. The military can ill-afford permanently to engage a substantial portion of its serving troops and officers in civilian duties.

That the ability of officers to rise depends upon their demonstrable competence until the very senior levels when political considerations may play a role circumscribes the prospects of politicization of the officer corps. The Pakistani military has an enemy and while this animosity has facilitated the military's rise to prominence it also places practical limits on its capacity for political intervention. The military can ill-afford permanently to engage a substantial portion of its serving troops and officers in civilian duties.

That the ability of officers to rise depends upon their demonstrable competence until the very senior levels when political considerations may play a role circumscribes the prospects of politicization of the officer corps. About two hundred

military officers were given land in cantonment areas by 1952 and some two hundred more acres were readied for lease. In 1954, the provincial authorities in the Punjab were tasked with the reservation of one thousand acres of land for navy personnel. To begin with the rule was one plot per officer but as senior commanders secured the authority through the defense housing societies to 'autonomously allocate plots in the cantonments' multiple plots in different schemes enabled officers to build considerable urban landholdings at throwaway prices in Pakistan's urban centers.

In Sindh some three hundred thousand acres were thus acquired and distributed. 4 May 1955, his proposals for the distribution of the hundred thousand acres. No one was to get more than two hundred and fifty acres; about fifteen thousand acres were reserved for officers and eighty-five thousand for JCOs and other ranks (Naiz, 2008; 155). Ayub was trying to quite transparently create a personal base of support in the military through the distribution of patronage amongst the officers and men 'policy of appeasement of the Army by giving them lands, increased pay and pension benefits and other venues of employment after retirement' In addition to the quotas for introduction of serving and retired servicemen into the support staff of civilian departments, Ayub stripped the business community of its autonomy, such as it was, and reinforced the patron-client relationship: In March 1969, Ayub Khan's family was one of Pakistan's two dozen richest with an estimated worth of as much as twenty million dollars (in 1969 currency) (Naiz, 2008; 156). On the agricultural side the military had become a medium through which members of the educated middleclass and lower-middleclass could become landlords, industrialists, and urban proprietors extraordinaire.

### **5.11 MILITARY BUSINESS ADVENTURES**

The Fauji foundation (1953) was worth one hundred and fifty-two million rupees in 1970, through, by 1982 the same foundation had total assets of two billion rupees inclusive of twenty-nine industrial projects. Zia the neo-mansabdari system gained ground at an accelerating rate as a military govt. Found itself in possession of billions of rupees in nationalized industrial and commercial assets. De-nationalization of some of these assets of a Pakistani general are at present estimated in the range of two to five million US Dollars. (Naiz, 2008; 158)

### **5.12 MUSIC CHAIR OF CHANGING RULE BETWEEN ARMY AND CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT**

Pakistan is trapped in a cycle of instability with the military and civilian political leadership destabilizing each other. The military leadership is intolerant of even the pretense of civilian control over its finances, weapons procurement, and its conduct of foreign policy. The civilian political leadership perceives the military as a potential instrument of their own arbitrary rule and wants a servile military leadership. The transfer of military pensions to the civilian side of the budget, the summoning of prime ministers and senior state officials to ‘brief’ or ‘meet’ the president and crops commanders at military headquarters of the army chief’s camp office indicate an approach to politics comparable to a military brass band’s performance of classical European music (Naiz,2008;160) Musharraf’s reforms have also brought the quality and effectiveness of the civilian higher bureaucracy to their nadir. This means that the

most important instrument for containing the military's ability to dominate the state apparatus is no longer able even to manage itself.

### **5.12 FOREIGN FUNDED REFORMS IN CIVIL SERVICE**

American advice, ranging from the Harvard Advisory Group of the 1960s to the present day devolution plan, has practically annihilated the capacity of Pakistan's westernized elite to think rationally about its own predicament. (Naiz, 2008; 161) One must bear in mind that successive military rulers were forced out by the actions of their immediate Subordinates which, potentially, could have led to violence.

### **5.13 SELF SERVING ELITES AND INSTABLE ECONOMY**

The impact of this instability is felt in term of the decline of the rule of law and the collapse of the state of order. (Naiz, 2008; 162) The first was the introduction of parliamentary financial control and regular budgeting and accounting procedures. The second was the low ratio of taxes to GDP and the underlying changes to India's sources of revenue. And the third was the remarkably high proportion of what would today be called development expenditure. (212) In 1994, defense received 26 per cent of the budget while health, education, and capital outlay accounted for 31 per cent of the budget for the most part and the total expenditure on per cent of the administration fell from 24 per cent in 1900 to 15 per cent in 1946. Between 1952 and 2006, Pakistan's tax-to-GDP ratio ranged between 8 and 15 per cent with an effective median range of 10to 12 per cent. Within the taxes about four-fifths of tax revenues came from indirect taxes such as customs, excise, sales tax and withholding taxes

(WHT) technically counted as direct taxes but effectively indirect and regressive in operation. Income and corporation taxes which accounted for 16 per cent of total revenues in 1952-1953 had, by 1988, fallen to about 10 per cent of total revenues. It is fascinating that when these words were written Pakistan's tax-to-GDP ratio was 13 per cent while government spending stood at 25 per cent of GDP. (Naiz, 2008; 214)

As of June 2006 Pakistan, had one and half million income tax payers (population one hundred and sixty million) and one hundred and seventeen thousand sales tax payers. Direct taxes were estimated at 30 per cent of the seven hundred and twelve billion rupees (\$12 billion at the exchange rate prevalent at the time) This dismal fiscal performance has contributed to Pakistan's ungovernableness and is the consequence of the structure and ethos of the financial administration. (Naiz ,2008; 215)

#### **5.14 CENTRALIZATION/AUTHORITARIANISM IN REVENUE COLLECTION**

This coalition is drawn from all the ethnic and regional groups and has come together, at different points of time, purportedly to protect the interests of their respective constituencies that are 'threatened' by the excesses of the state or the excesses of one ethnic group or the other. Military dictatorships came to power to 'save' the country or Islam, the popular forces struggling to overthrow the military rulers were to 'save democracy' from the excesses of authoritarianism.(Hussain,1989;355)

The central government in Pakistan collects 90 per cent of all revenues. The one dynamic source of revenue the provinces had in the form of the sales tax was

taken from them in 1948 to meet the challenges of the state of siege. One of the fundamental imbalances in Pakistan's financial administration is that while almost everything that materially affects the quality of life of the average citizen, such as health, education, law and order, municipal services, and conciliation, falls under the statutory purview of provincial or local governments, almost the entire allocation and spending is done through the central government. The wastage that an over-centralized, often incompetent, and utterly unaccountable financial administration engages in is enormous. Revenues are raised through indirect taxes on consumption, which punish the poor and middle classes, or through withholding taxes and taxes on savings which, again, hit the lower income groups the hardest. The rich get away with minimal taxation and to make up the difference between its tax revenue and expenditure the government borrows from any and all sources and prints money thus fuelling price inflation that again crushes the urban poor and middle classes and rural wage labourers. Since the borrowed amount has to be paid back through tax revenues, it effectively means that the poor will be taxed disproportionately to raise the requisite funds. The borrowed funds are often allocated for development spending and projects intended for the benefit of the poor. Most of the money spent by the centre on development 'has either lined the pockets of the consultants, contractors, and engineers or has simply been wasted. Central expenditures and transfers for development represent a terrible hemorrhage of largely borrowed funds that the Pakistani poor will have to repay through the indirect taxation pitilessly visited upon them and the direct taxation imposed on the middleclass professionals who operate in the formal sector. Leakage at as high as 80 or 90 per cent but hardly anyone would be prepared to admit in private to more than a third of development funding actually reaching the intended beneficiaries (Niaz,2008-217). The beneficiaries of this largesse



were trader- merchants such as the Adamjees, Dawoods, Saigols, Lsphahanis, Karims, etc., who were first given industrial assets out of the evacuee pool or built by the PIDC and then patronized by the state through protective barriers and special treatment in order to convert them into industrial capitalists. Later rulers resorted to cruder devices such as the issue of special temporary exemptions on customs duties on individual items or industries. In this manner temporary reductions on duties along with the intended beneficiaries given adequate forewarning were granted for luxury cars, sugar, computer parts and scrap metal during the 1990s. Those who stood up to the rulers ‘had to pay a price’ in terms of transfers and circumvention and the executive’s consistent effort since the 1950s was to place ‘handpicked officers in key positions in the tax administration to get their work done.( Naiz,2008;222) Corruption is a social activity. In an administrative state it is not possible for the rulers be they elected politicians or military dictators to engage in the privatization of public funds and assets, the violation of laws and procedures, and the arbitrary use of power without the collaboration of a large number of civil servants, subordinate officials, or military and intelligence personnel. (Naiz, 2008; 245) Unfortunately, this policy regime set the foundation for rent-seeking by Pakistani businessmen. The flourishing of the black market in import licenses, and the need for political connection to ensure access to cheap credit and fiscal incentives, paved the way for a private-public sector relationship where clienteles and patronage predominated. Rent-seeking behaviour was legitimized throughout the economy, and a class of industrialists was created who made huge markups for themselves and their families, but the spillovers to the rest of the economy were at best marginal. The state’s capacity to tax these profits was virtually no-existent as the institutions had not been put into place.(Hussain,1989;6)

## **5.15 POLITICAL CORRUPTION**

Corruption has taken many forms in Pakistan, so much so, that it can be studied under different heads. Electoral corruption is one of its various forms. It refers to corrupting of the electoral process ever since the general elections in 1935, and the elections of 1988 in particular. In the party-less elections of 1985, it was imperative for a candidate to spend millions of rupees to get elected to a seat in the National or the Provincial Assembly. There were cases where tens of millions were spent for a seat in the National Assembly. There were stories circulating about briefcases full of cash being left at the offices or residences of influential in the allotment of party tickets. What happened in the general elections of 1988 was repeated with greater intensity in the general elections of 1990 and 1993. Campaign expenses simply skyrocketed. In some constituencies, the candidates were rumored to have spent as much as fifty million rupees; some of them having spent from their own pockets to build roads, make electrical connections, and indulge in other ad hoc developmental work. This situation was at its worst during the Benazir government from 1988 to 1990, with a hostile provincial government headed by Nawaz. The PPP was making all efforts to win over the loyalty of members in the Punjab Assembly so as to tip the balance in its favour and destabilize the Nawaz government. The PPP, with the help of then President Ishaq, was trying to win over members supporting the PPP government at the centre and in the province of NWFP. The methods employed were no secret. Loyal members were kept captive in places like Murree, Changa Manga, and other resorts to avoid their being bought over by the other party. The PPP promised expensive plots of land in Islamabad and Karachi to keep their own members in line while the 111 government promised expensive plots in Lahore to buy the loyalties of members supporting the PPP at the centre and in the NWFP. It was

rumored that a Senator from I I was sent to Peshawar with a lot of cash in briefcases to bribe members of the NWFP Assembly and destabilize Sherpao's government. The Senator was carrying on with his negotiations when his room was forcibly entered by thugs sent by the Sherpao government who made away with the briefcases in his room. in one day in Murree, twenty plots of land in the LDA scheme were said to have been allotted to members of the NWFP Assembly to win over their loyalties. During the no-confidence motion against Benazir in 1989, some MNAs from the government crossed the floor and opposed the motion of their own party; they were .later rewarded with minister ships or parliamentary secretary ship. There are allegations that money was diverted to pay off the members of the National Assembly en her to buy their loyalty or keep them in line. After the dismissal of the Nawaz government at the federal level in April 1993, Pakistan witnessed its worst example of horse trading in the Punjab Ghulam Haider Wyne, a loyalist of Nawaz. seas not popular with a number of members of the Punjab Assembly and Manzoor Watson, Speaker of the Punjab Assembly at that time, pounced upon this opportunity and managed to get a motion of no-confidence passed against Wyne in a rather unusual and hurried manner. This was followed by Wattoo getting himself elected as Chief Minister of the Punjab. The situation changed on the restoration of the Nawaz government by the Supreme Court on 26 May 1993. Nawaz was obliged to the Chaudhris of Gujrat and wanted their nominee, Parvez to be elected as Chief Minister. In any case, he did not trust 'Nation. Who had taken undue advantage of his ouster from power? He came into action and launched a campaign to win over a majority of the members of the Punjab Assembly for Parvez Elahi. With Nawaz in the saddle as Prime Minister and Shuiaat Husain as Interior Minister, and above all backed by big money, the position of Wattoo started sagging and large scale defections took place

from his camp. The majority shifted against him and a vote of no-confidence was imminent. He, therefore, advised the Governor to dissolve the Assembly to avoid facing a motion for a vote of no-confidence. While the dispute over the validity of dissolution of the Assembly remained pending before the High Court, a majority of the members of the Punjab Assembly were virtually kept as guests, or captives of Parvez Elahi, in a five star hotel in Islamabad in the hope that the Assembly would be revived by the Court and that these members would go to Lahore to pass a motion of no-confidence against Wattoo and to vote for Parvez Elahi as chief minister. This never happened because of the dissolution of all the assemblies on 18 february 1993, although a majority of the members of the Punjab Assembly enjoyed the hospitality of Parvez Elahi in five star hotels of Islamabad and Bhurban for weeks together. (Khan, 2005; 528)

A nether incidence of horse trading was the overthrow of the provincial government of the N W FP headed by Sabir Shah. Some of the members of the assembly were won over and later made ministers by Sherpova, who became the chief minister as a result. Even the Supreme Court failed to prevent such blatant horse trading. The practice of horse trading and floor crossing became a challenge for the Constitution and polity in Pakistan which the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution tried to rectify but without much success. Musharraf's regime too indulged in horse-trading and floor crossing in order to enable his party, PM L(Q), to form governments at the centre and the province of Sinn, kept Article 63A of the Constitution relating to floor crossing deliberately suspended till such time that central and provincial governments were formed, (Khan,2005;529)

Thus, corruption and coercion in politics has continued unabated regardless of the government in power, whether military or civilian. Democracy and democratic dispensation have been sacrificed at the altar of lust for power, Privilege and pelf.

## **5.16 CORRUPTION AS COERCION**

Dictatorial regimes are more prone to these aberrations because there is little accountability in such regimes. Democratic regimes are expected to be less prone to corruption and coercion because of the transparency of the system of governance. The stipulations of the Constitution and a free press are meant to expose all elements of misgovernment and keep them in check. The health of a constitution and the system of government that it provides are determined from the system of checks and balances it contains between the various organs of the state and various state functionaries. This has been the eternal dilemma of constitution makers everywhere because the Constitution creates and regulates state power and we all know that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. It is, therefore, imperative that the power conferred on any functionary should not be absolute but circumscribed. The rationale of the concept of 'separation of powers is to ensure a balance between various institutions of the state thus checking, limiting, and containing one another. In the monarchical system, the king had absolute power. He was the chief executive, the lawgiver and the supreme judge. Historical evidence suggests that concentration of all power in one hand tends to create tyranny and corruption of the worst kind, witnessed during the period of the Roman and Byzantium empires. It was thus considered by political philosophers like Montesquieu, Locke, and Rousseau, to be imperative For a healthy state that these

three basic state functions he divided and given into different hands so that they may keep an eye on one another and create a balance of state power.(Khan,2005;523)

It started with Ayub. He can be regarded as the pioneer of political corruption and coercion in Pakistan. With the declaration of martial law, he started picking on the politicians and was not above personal rancour. One of his first acts was to arrest and detain Ayuh Khuhro on a false charge, primarily, to avenge his (Khuhro's) attitude as defense minister towards him (Ayub) as Commander-in-Chief. It is said that Khuhro, as defence minister, used to make Ayub wait outside his office for hours. He then gave a Draconian law, Elective Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO), for excluding those politicians from political life whom he did not eye with favour. Under this law, several national politicians like Suhrawardy and Qayyum Khan, were disqualified for seven years (till 31 December 1965). The matter did not stop there. His sons and relatives like General Habibullah, whose daughter was married to Ayub's son, became big time industrialists during the Ayub regime and took full advantage of the name and influence of Ayub to become industrial tycoons. His sons resigned from the army to become industrialists by obtaining big loans from government banks. One of them, Gohar Ayub, became a leading industrialist and even tried his hand at politics. After the controversial victory of Ayub in the presidential polls of 1965, he went on a rampage in Karachi along with his political cronies to teach the city a lesson for supporting Fatima Jinnah rather than Ayub at the polls. Gohar and his lackeys indulged in excesses which were deeply resented by the people of Karachi. Ayub, a man with a humble background, grew very rich while in power. His government is also known for repression of student unions through the University Ordinance of 1963 and its strangulation of the press through the Press and Publications Ordinance, 1963. His self-righteous airs and holier-than-thou attitude did

not make him realize that he was indulging in coercion and corruption. He justified the enrichment of his family by saying that his sons had right to go into business and industry and to obtain loans.

Yahya, another military man in politics, is discredited for taking steps that led to the breakup of Pakistan. He was notorious for being a drunkard and a womanizer who behaved irresponsibly in his public statements and at international gatherings and summits. Despite his other faults, he and his associates are not known to have indulged in financial improprieties. He is not known to have left any sizeable fortune behind. (Khan, 2005; 524)

Then came Bhutto. His government has a very poor human rights record. Repression of political opponents was something common in his days in power, All his political opponents suffered detention, involvement in false criminal cases, and personal humiliation. He allowed his political underlings like Mustafa Khar and Mumtaz Bhutto to victimize their political opponents and encouraged the use of torture and harassment to subdue any dissent within party ranks. Some of (he members of his cabinet were known to be thoroughly unprincipled. Corruption in public life became widespread in his regime and industrial and commercial licenses, public offices like ambassadorships, and even depots Iabour rationing of essential commodities were used as tools of political bribery. His government also dealt heavy-handedly with dissenting lawyers and journalists.

Then came Zia, whose government took coercion and corruption to new heights. He was an ardent believer carrot and stick policy and oppressed political rivals, particularly those who belonged to the PPP. The jails were full of political prisoners. But Zia would also offer public offices, lucrative business licenses, and

expensive plots of land to lure others to his side. He allowed his generals to grow rich overnight by making shady land deals and by accepting big commissions and kickbacks. Some of his generals were so corrupt that they could put the Byzantine regime to shame. Sonic international magazines called them the richest generals in the world and with justification (Khan, 2005; 525)

Even the civilian government of Junejo was not free from corruption. Every politician decent and honest man, had to indulge in political corruption to keep himself in power. He introduced political bribery to the members of Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies by allocating development funds to them on a yearly basis. Junejo knew all too well that these so-called development funds would be misappropriated and swindled anyway, but he sanctioned them as political bribery to keep members of Parliament loyal to him. During his government, commercial and residential plots were used as political bribes.

Even after the death of Zia, his shadow looms large over the political culture of Pakistan. The governments of Benazir and Nawaz that followed became models of political corruption. Both these governments pulled out all the stops on corruption. The Sharif family became industrial tycoons and billionaires while in power. The Binatos and Zardaris were not far behind. Regardless of the bitter political rivalry between Benazir and Nawaz, their methods were identical and their objectives similar. They did not oppose one another in terms of different visions for the future of the country but for personal gain. Those out of power lamented the loss of handsome amounts every day that they could have made by way of bribes, commissions, or kickbacks. The scale of corruption of these two governments alone was mind-boggling. Huge amounts were deposited abroad and national wealth plundered. Expensive properties in England and Europe were purchased with the funds



misappropriated from the public treasury in Pakistan. In addition, they had adopted a royal style of government. These regimes imported fleets of Mercedes and other expensive cars for their use and bought aero-planes for the prime minister and chief ministers. Nawaz Sharif illegally occupied seventy-two kanals of public land around his private residence in Lahore. Similarly, land around Bilawal House in Karachi had been occupied through questionable means. These leaders, their families and relatives, and close associates regarded themselves above the law and this poor country as their personal fiefdom. (Khan, 2005; 527)

The corruption in the Musharraf regime will only be known after its fall. There is no transparency regarding the working of NA 13; its officials wield unfettered and unchecked powers and there are strong rumours about corruption in its ranks. Its political corruption has already been exposed by the way it went about helping Musharraf in building his own political party. There is no transparency about defence purchases. The purchase of Boeing 777 the PIA at an exorbitant price while much cheaper planes were available have raised many eyebrows. The lust for acquisition of land and speculation of its prices at the hands of military officers is common knowledge. It is no secret that in this process many army officers, serving or retired, have enormously enriched themselves. Lavish spending on foreign tours, most of them being unnecessary and unproductive, by Musharraf and his prime ministers is the order of the day. In nutshell, nothing changed during the Musharraf regime and tax money is being squandered mercilessly by the rulers.

### **5.17 CORRUPTION AS BOND OF ELITE CLASSES**

Pakistan is the country of greedy generals' lustful politician and hungry bureaucrats made a complex web of corruption which engulfed the country from top to bottom. Bank loans are not given on merit but based on links and borrowers have no inclination to repay the debts. These plundered money is dumped into the western banks and properties most of the time. In past the British during colonial era plundered and looted the money and sent it to their colonies now the elite classes doing same with zeal and zest. it started with the policy of the government to keep some export money abroad in 1950s then politicians, generals and senior bureaucrats started sending their illegal money abroad. As per one estimate that \$ 60-100 billion went to abroad mainly by two families Bhutto and Shareefs and army which is real power in Pakistan kept silent as same is done by military top brass as well.

### **5.18 ARBITRARY CULTURE OF POWER AND CORRUPTION**

The 'root-cause of all corruption' represented by the combination of abuse of power and privatization of state resources in the subcontinent was the regions 'arbitrary culture of power' formed over millennia of anarchy, warlordism and despotism. In the subcontinent the wielders of power perceived it as 'a personal acquisition and prerogative' while those subjected to its exercise saw power as residing in the person of high officials' and not in such artificial colonial-era trivialities as laws, procedure, or constitutionalism. The rulers sought arbitrary power while the people wanted this power to be used to advance their own personal or sectional interests. (Naiz, 2008; 247) Insofar as the private sector was concerned, it's

most successful members though corruption ‘useful and necessary’ for the generation of profits, evasion of taxes and quick disposal of cases. (Naiz, 2008; 259) Privatization, like nationalization, became a major vehicle of corruption while arbitrariness in decision-making multiplied delays and inefficiency. After 1972, so great was the increase in the levels of corruption that it could be declared an industry. (Naiz, 2008; 261)

The behavior is ultimately self-defeating for the ‘arbitrary culture of power among the ruling elite destroys social solidarity, promotes internal chaos and ‘invites external aggression. (Naiz, 2008; 266) Heedless By using the administrative institutions to secure personal and political ends, elevating bureaucrats such as Ghulam Muhammad to cabinet posts, and recklessly pushing forward with the nationalization of the armed forces, which led to the rise of Ayub Khan to the post of army chief in 1951, the politicians opened the door to the ascendance of a governing corporation of mandarins, praetorians, guardians, and diwans.

### **5.19 PLAYING WITH FOREIGN AID**

The establishment of Karachi’s Sindh Industrial and Trading Estate (SITE), Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC), the Village Agricultural and Industrial Programme (V-AID), the Rural Works Programme, were a manifestation of this trend. It must of course be recognized that it was CSP officers who were appointed to head these and a large number of other such organizations. The third feature of the bureaucratic model was its adaptability to the whims and wishes of politicians in command. Finally, the civil servants were not able to mobilize domestic resources for development, the civil service turned to loans from foreign countries,

which were available in large amounts most of the time. Over a period of time, a certain category of CSP officers were able to develop close contacts with middle management in the Bretton Woods's institutions and act as conduits between an increasingly dependent Pakistan government and those institutions. While Pakistan may or may not have benefited from such doses of foreign aid, some CSP officers certainly did (Chaudhry, 2012;24).

The CSP artfully guided its mentors, Iskander Mirza, Ghulam Mohamad, and Ayub Khan into a closer military relationship with the United States. It was as early as 1951 that General Ayub Khan had become convinced that Pakistan must have a strong and reliable friend to strengthen her defense. It was Ayub who persuaded the political leadership to go into SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, and it was he who advocated greater military cooperation with the United States. Ayub was in constant touch with Admiral Arthur Radford, the US Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, and often wrote to him directly about Pakistan's defense requirements. The civil servants also eagerly looked forward to processing cases for large arms purchases for obvious reasons. (Chaudhry, 2012; 45)

## **5.20 ANNUAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME AND CORRUPTION**

The politician used ADP to get kickback and percentage as per estimate every tender pay 20% as bribery this is the reason that politician are not in favour of local body elections. Similarly all the development authorities are used for corruption and no tender is awarded without kickbacks to the ruling parties, bureaucrats and army.

## **5.21 INSUFFICIENT TRAINING, LOW PAY AND CORRUPTION**

Civil servants untrained for the management of productive assets found themselves in charge of cotton processing plants, shipping, banks and insurance companies. In the meanwhile, their remuneration, discipline, and autonomy, were undercut on a vast scale by ‘democratization’ of the pay scales, inflation, and politicization through arbitrary appointments, dismissals, and transfers. Statutory guarantees were not incorporated into the 1973 Constitution (Naiz,2008;279) Faced with the prolonged inability of Pakistan rulers, be they politicians, bureaucrats, or soldiers, to understand the imperatives of structural and operative autonomy, the resultant dysfunction has steadily undermined the ethos, esprit de corps, and professional integrity of the state apparatus. From the constable and the Patwari, to the local council and lower courts, bribes must be paid in order to get the machinery to move at all. Even then, it moves slowly and ineptly and often needs further inducements. With the officers they party to this corruption or simply unable to perform the supervisory tasks expected of them, the subordinate staff is a disorganized, turbulent, and anarchic mass of the incompetent, the corrupt and the malevolent. The response of individuals in society has been to try and take advantage of the phenomenon for their personal benefit even as they complain about the menace of corruption. The dissolution of public morality, the growth in the social acceptability of corruption and enveloping contempt for the law and state are some of the responses to the ‘disease’ (Naiz,2008;284)

## **5.21 DECAY OF INSTITUTION AND DISCRETIONARY POWERS**

In Pakistan, on the other hand, social relationships have been used by a small elite to control and acquire publicly owned resources for private enrichment, and to exclude the majority of the poor from the benefits of development (Hussain,1989;364)

## **5.22 WEAK ELECTION SYSTEM**

The composition of the Election Commission much to the desired, although the Chief Election Commissioner is generally appointed tiff a fixed term, the Election Commission itself is not a permanent body. It is constituted only when general elections to the national and provincial assemblies are to be held. This gives the government a lot of leverage in influencing the composition of the Election Commission. In addition to the Chief Election Commissioner, two judges (now four) of Bligh Courts were appointed to the Commission and the government in power generally ensures that they are favorably predisposed. In any case, the Election Commission is too small a body to control the conduct of elections throughout the country and has to fall back upon the administration which is already party to the manipulation of results. The Election Commission is helpless in trying to prevent malpractices or to punish the transgressions. In the general elections held in February 1997, the law completely prohibited the affixation of hoardings, posters, or banners of any size, or wall chalking, as a part of the election campaign candidate. This provision of law was openly and blatantly flouted by candidates of the PPP and the PMIAN) and done so with impunity. Similarly, the law also restricted election expenses for

national and provincial assembly candidates, but this was also openly flouted. It is an open secret that candidates of the two parties spent many times the amounts legally prescribed on the expenses of the Election Day alone. False returns of the expenses were filed before the returning officers but no action has been taken against anyone, Transportation of voters to the polling stations by the candidate is a corrupt practice under election laws, but this was openly indulged in.

### **5.23 LACK OF LOCAL BODY SYSTEM OR INCONSISTENCY IN ITS ELECTION**

Every civilized/developed country has strong local government system which worked under the leadership of local elected politicians which manage their day to day affairs as these bodies are political in nature so they know the real need of the area and plan and work accordingly. Legislators have no role in local government system as it is not their domain. In Pakistan most of the time local bodies remained under the bureaucrats where as in developed word it's vice versa. In Musharaf era Nazim system was introduced in which nazim is the head of the city and bureaucrat DCO was his principal accounting officer. The system failed only and only due to lack of coordination of bureaucrats who are part of the state elites and intention of the military government which was not to provide relief to the people and service delivery but to get political base which support army rulers. The system also lack constitutional back up as the federal government without devolving its powers devolves the power of the provinces to the district and dysfunctional the role of states and also controls the local government through federal government

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## **SAMPLE SURVEY**

Sample was conducted to substance my hypothesis and my opinion which I deduce from my research, literature review and data already written on the subject by different writers and secondary data available in the government reports and planning. the sample was chosen from Punjab out of which random sampling is done to choose three districts which came as Multan, Sahiwal and Khushab. The data of all government officials were gathered as of civil servant, Police EDOs of the district, all the supporting staff and academicians working in these district, out of these 100 peoples sample is randomly chosen and simple questionnaire consisting of ten simple close ended question (MCQs) is given to them they have to provide their name, education and designation and to fill these ten simple question. Questions are remain simple and less so that these should be understandable to those who do not have much knowledge on the subject. The response of the sample survey was marvelous and people appreciated the effort to understand the problem of the Authority Structure in Pakistan. Questionnaire is annexed in the end, now we discuss the question one by one.

### **Question No.1**

The authority in Pakistan lies in the hand of which institutions?

A) Army


B) politicians

C) Bureaucracy

D) People of Pakistan

E) A,B,C

**Figure.2**



a)	Army	28%
b)	Politicans	24%
c)	Bureaucracy	12%
d)	People of Pakistan	3%
e)	Army, Politican and Bureaucracy	33%

## **INTERPRETATION**


The aim of this question was to get the opinion of the people about Authority Structure in Pakistan to whom they think authority lies. Five option was given to them as already mentioned above, one option was given as PEOPLE OF PAKISTAN which came is minima as 3% it means people of Pakistan think that the authority not lies with them but with the Elite Classes of Pakistan those are ARMY, POLITICAIN and BUREAUCRACY. 33% person responds that authority lies with these three Classes, 28% responds that authority lies with Army which is the second largest percentage in this question, 24% responds in favour of Politicians it is third largest percentage it means people of the view after Army, Politician is the second powerful group of Pakistan. 12% persons responds in favour of the Bureaucracy, it means total 97% people in Pakistan think that Authority lies with the Elite classes not with the people of Pakistan.

### **Question No.2**

Which is the most powerful institution of Pakistan?

- A) Army                      B) politicians                      C) Bureaucracy
- D) Political Parties                      E) None of the above

**Figure.3**



a)	Army	78%
b)	Politicians	3%
c)	Bureaucracy	16%
d)	Political Parties	3%

## **INTERPRETATION**

The aim of the second question is to determine with the people about most powerful institution of Pakistan, 78% responds that Army is the most powerful institution of Pakistan. in democracy political parties have to be most powerful institution not Army and Bureaucracy which is second powerful institution of Pakistan. As the result already determined that Army has replaced colonial power and become neo-colonial power in the country.




### **Question No.3**

Why Army become very strong in Pakistan

- A) Weak Political Parties                      B) U.S military Aid                      C) Naked Power
- D) Highly Organized and Modernized institution of Pakistan   E) All the Above

**Figure.4**



a)	Weak Political Parties	21%
b)	US Military Aid	14%
c)	Naked Power	11%
d)	Organization and Modernized	36%
e)	All the above factors	18%

## **INTERPRETATION**


The aim of this question was to find out what is the cause of strength of Pakistan Army and why it achieved the status of neo-colonial power the people of the view that Army is the most powerful institution of Pakistan because it is the most organized and modernized institution of Pakistan we may deduce from this result that others classes are weak and not organized as Politician are in dis-array and divided into regionalism ethnic and interest based, Bureaucracy which was once steel frame of British India now in decay and politicized and in-efficient whereas Army has no such problems. second important factor according to people is weak political parties 21% people of the view that weak political parties is the main reason of strength of Army as we already deduce that Pakistani politics is based on personification not on strong political parties and every constituency has strong hold of one or two families especially in rural areas of Pakistan so they joined that party which they felt strong in winning election even they joined Army government when army conducted election in their rule it means they have no party loyalty but they want to remain in power in every government. third factor according to the people is U.S Military Aid 14% people think that military aid which came to Pakistan first during in cold war era than Russian War and War against terrorism, the pact like SEATO and CENTO strengthen army un-precedent and other institution remained less developed and deprived. Naked power means power of the gun 11% people of the view that gun made army strong its on lower side it means as per people opinion to have gun in hand is not such strength that makes army so strong as it is today.

#### **Question No.4**

Why the feudal lords strong at local level in their constituencies?

- A) Beradari                      B) Large Land holding   C) Strong Political Parties  
D) Political Ideologies       E) Both A & B

**Figure.5**



a)	Biradari	17%
b)	Large Land Holdings	29%
c)	Strong Political Parties	5%
d)	Political Ideologies	5%
e)	Both A&B	44%

## **INTERPRETATION**


The aim of this question is to determine the cause landlord which was so strong and part of in direct government in colonial era remained strong in their constituency as per people Biradari and Large Land Holding both are one of the largest cause of their retaining of power at local level and no thing since inception changed their status. In Pakistan three time land reforms were made but failed to get the result the landed classes which was given lands by the British remained intact as large land owner till today even the government from time to time used land as patronage and given to Landed Classes, Bureaucrats and Army generals. Army is still getting land in gallantry Awards. second important factor is also land holding with 29% and Biradari as 3rd with 17% the British made a class in today's Pakistan landed class which gave them revenue loyalty and army jawans (soldiers) so they were rewarded in return these landed class have strong network and biradari not only in landed classes through common interest and marriage and also non landed classes gave them support to get their due rights got down from civil servant and remain part of patronage system. This system of colonial era remained intact after freedom so the feudal remained powerful in local area

### **Question No.5**

How Local Politician maneuvered the condition in their favour?

- A) Through Local Bureaucrat      B) Annual Development Program
- C) Family Patronage                  D) Political Program                  E) A,B & C

**Figure.6**



a)	Through Local Bureaucrats	30%
b)	Annual Development Programme	18%
c)	Family Patronage	12%
d)	Political Programme	1%
e)	A, B&C	39%

## **INTERPRETATION**


The aim of this question is to determine how feudal lord maneuvered the condition in their favour, as per people view that local feudal lords used local bureaucrats as Assistant Commissioner, Deputy Superintendent of Police Tehsildar and S.H.O. All transfers and posting in Pakistan is based on Politicians especially after the reforms of Z.A Bhutto after that their tenure and constitutional safeguards finished. The officers who came through competition on BPS 17 and junior all recruitment based on politicization and not on merit. so politician tried to recruit their relatives on these slots. The competitive people also soon joined the web of politics and corruption netted artfully by Politician in local area to get his tenure maximized and to do bribe. so bureaucrats do all the illegal works of local area politicians to please politicians and to increase personal gains. second important factor according to people is Annual Development Programme which according to them 18% reasons of their strong holds during colonial era these landed classes remained the members of district board which is a powerful tool to fulfill patronage-client relationship during state and landed elites also it is the tool to keep the people loyal through landed classes as the people remained loyal their urban facilities available otherwise they will be deprived of it after independence the same tradition remained continued as local bodies election is not conducted on regular base and conducted during military rule only. so local politician as MPA and MNA are given ADP on which they give their scheme and these schemes are implemented through bureaucrats. In this way strong hold of politician remained in area and Bureaucrats remained strong at district level and their corruption also continued for both groups. Third factor is family patronage which is also discussed in biradari in details as jobs, FIR and land is distributed in family to please and increase their economic benefits. In democratic countries political programme is always strength of the candidates and politicians but as per people political programme only played 1% role in controlling their local area.

### **Question No.6**

How Business Class become rich in short time

- A) Links with Army                      B) Links with Bureaucracy
- C) Professional expertise and resources      D) Market Mechanism
- E) Both A & B

**Figure.7**



a)	Link with Army	18%
b)	Link with Bureaucracy	19%
c)	Professional expertise and resources	23%
d)	Market Mechanism	7%
e)	Both A&B	33%

## **INTERPRETATION**

This question is asked to know that how people of Pakistan think that business class become rich in Pakistan. It is evident from the literature review and secondary source of data that at the time of emergence of Pakistan, the country lacked industrial base and had only two big industrial units and 33 small units as this area was raw material producing and agriculture belt of Indian-Subcontinent and dominated by Landed class. After inception Quaid-Azam asked Muslims of India who were working in different areas of India to migrate to Pakistan and invest in the industry, various families migrated and started business and established industrial units in Pakistan. During Ayub era the country started a policy to increase investment in Pakistan and to increase its industrial base. PICIC and other public organizations were established to facilitate people and investors as these organizations headed by the senior bureaucrats and Army were in rule, the Patron-Client relationship was developed to accommodate business class in the country. Import and export licenses were given on this basis and merit was neglected. Loans were also given to the industry on flexible conditions but same policy was also adopted in giving loans. According to Mehboob Ul Haq report that only 22 families benefited from this policy and government model of trickle-down effect badly failed. The gap between haves and have-nots not increased, also poverty in the country. As per survey people are of the view that business class became rich in short time due to the links with bureaucracy and Army 33% given their opinion in favour and 19% people say that only bureaucracy linkage worked for the businessman to become rich and 18% people opined that Army alone is the reason of business class domination. In capitalism Market Mechanism is the sole criteria of development of private sector as per liberal market economy but only 7% favoured this factor for the development of the business class in Pakistan. 23% favoured that professional




expertise and resources is the base of richness of business class. here an example of Sharif Family is very relevant when Nawaz Sharif in Zia era joined Punjab government as Finance minister the family of 30 people have only one company with the name of Ittefaq Foundry and in 1999 he has 30 companies in Pakistan and various companies abroad with the name of NESCO and NICLOS.

### **Question No.7**

Why Army needs Local feudal Lords and Business Elites while in Power

- A) Legitimacy                      B) Political Culture                      C) People Participation  
D) Good Governance              E) None of the above

**Figure.8**



a)	Legitimacy	48%
b)	Political Culture	30%
c)	Peoples Participation	17%
d)	Good Goverance	5%

## **INTERPRETATION**

The aim of this question is to find out why Army needs the favour of feudal landlord and local business elite when they are in government? It is the great question as it proves the link of all the elite classes of Pakistan. As from literature review and secondary data it is proved that Army is a neo-colonial power in the country but when they are in government they also linked with these local elites, the local elite has only aim to remain in power and to retain/increase its economic and social status so they clubbed with every government either democratic or dictatorship. Army needs their favour as and when army came into power they think lack of legitimacy and people felt detachment with the government.


So the bargaining power of these local elites with army lies with their say in people to give legitimacy to the Army and move people in their favour as the time needed. Every Army government conducted referendum to show their approval from people and also conducted local bodies and national election and same faces win election in either form of the government. Political culture in Pakistan is every other person entered into the public office with Safarish and corruption red-tapism are rampant in the country so people felt ignored and family and Bardari patronage started sinking. As per people opinion 48% army need local elites for their legitimacy of power. 30% thinks that it is due to the political culture of Pakistan army clubbed local elites for this reason. Good governance which is the prime priority of every government in the world but army also not want good governance in the country but tried to prolong their government on one pretext or the other. Army as an institution always worked for the welfare of its class and increase perks and privileges to officers cadres by giving them civilian posts, bank loans, business permits and agriculture land. As per people opinion 5% people says that Army linked with local elites for the sake of good governance.

### **Question no 8**

Why corruption prevails in Pakistan

- A) Low income                      B) Political Interference in promotion and transfers
- C) Poor Resources of the Country    D) Political culture                      E) A, B & D

**Figure.9**



a)	Low Salaries	46%
b)	Political Interference	18%
c)	Poor Resources of Country	1%
d)	Political Culture	12%
e)	A, B&D	23%

## **INTERPRETATION**


Corruption is wide spread in Pakistan and no institute is free from it, before inception of this country corruption was not prevalent in the Indian subcontinent because salaries were high and civil servant were not mixed with the common people grants were given to the landed class with the approval of the British government. After creation of Pakistan salaries were not increased as per the dearness of things and inflation which provoke the public servant to indulge in corruption. As all stake holders are corrupt the government officials do corruption with impunity and without fear. No government ever punished for misusing of government resources and corruption. Civil service is politicized to the maximum and junior staff is recruited on political basis so civil servant do every wrong thing to please its political bosses while doing this he fill his own pockets with bribery and used his discretionary power which are abundance, law of the land is complex and confused so the officers has a lot of room to manipulate things in its favour or in favour of his political bosses. As per sample survey 48% people answered that corruption in Pakistan is due to the low salaries. Low salaries is always beneficial for the political elites as corruption and redtapism prevailed so people linked with them got their work done through MPA/MNA which is a parallel power in the district and tehsils with district administration and in this way their biradari and families interest protected and increased. 18% people blamed corruption is due to the political interference in the administrative work. 12% thinks that our political culture is the reason of the corruption. 23% is of the view low salaries. Political culture and political interference are equally contributing to the corruption in the country. Only 1% blames poor resources of the country for corruption so we may deduce Pakistan is not a poor country but poorly managed.

### **Question No.9**

Why service delivery is weak in Pakistan

- A) Weak infrastructure                      B) Retaining of colonial legacy of in-direct rule
- C) Discretionary Power                      D) No voice of People                      E) B, C & D

**Figure.10**



a)	Weak Infrastructure	20%
b)	Colonial Legacy	27%
c)	Discretionary Power	30%
d)	No Voice of People	0%
e)	B, C&D	23%

## **INTERPRETATION**


Service delivery is the basic function of the government, as in case of Pakistan service delivery is very weak and a lot of application of minor magnitude took years to solve and resources of the people. The basic aim of this question is to find out the reason why service delivery is weak in Pakistan either it is due to the weak infra-structure or any other reason of it. Discretionary power is always given to the public servant so that they make decision as per the need of the hour. But in Pakistan Discretionary Power is used to accommodate elite classes and to fulfill patron-client relationship and to get personal interest of the officers fulfilled. In colonial era indirect form of governance introduced in the Subcontinent which is still intact in our region ' main sathar 70 murabah di malik hain kursi mari Kuchari ach hay' its Punjabi proverb which means i owned 70 Murabah and i have say in courts. As per people view 80% is the reason of poor service delivery is due to the Discretionary Power, Retaining of Colonial Legacy of Indirect rule and no voice of people. And 20% is due to the weak infra-structure.

### **Question No.10**

Why the institution of local government weak in Pakistan

- A) Due to National level Politicians      B) Bureaucracy      C) Army  
D) Weak Political Parties      E) A & B

**Figure.11**



a)	Due to National Provincial legislative members	35%
b)	Bureaucracy	23%
c)	Army	3%
d)	Weak Political Parties	12%
e)	Both A&B	27%



## **INTERPRETATION**

In Pakistan local government institution remained weak which is the main pillar of the government as most of the problem solved at this level. State/Provincial government and National government should have minimum role in the general and common affairs of the people. This tier of the government deliberately kept weak and dysfunctional in the country. If it is restored during Army rule the aim was not to provide services at the door step of the people but to prolong ones government and get legitimacy. Local government if becomes functional it affects two classes one national and provincial members of legislatures who use Annual Development Programme and other is the Bureaucracy who is ruling the local government since inception of the country. As bureaucrats became subservient to the local elected people so they are reluctant to shun their power at the local level. During Musharaf Devolution plan first time bureaucracy became subservient to local elected Nazim bureaucracy showed high level of resentment for it. As per people view these two factors are stumbling block in way of the reforms at local level and smooth running of local government these two factors individually and collectively played 85% role. Then as we know our political parties are weak and politics is personified so they are also reluctant to conduct local bodies election if these are conducted in the history of the country it is always based on non-party base in which local bardaries and ethnic group played major role as compare to the political Ideologies and Political parties, 12% is of the view weak political parties are also one of the main reason of the not establishing effective local government system in Pakistan.

## **CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS**

Pakistan had inherited the colonial system of indirect system of governance in which Imperial power used every tactic to plunder the economic resources of this country. To safeguards the interests of British they formed the administrative system and local elites which helped the colonial power and in return got personal benefits. Local Elites also responsible for providing army man for the wars and army. After partition the same forces captured the direct control of the state resources but the culture of personal gains remained same. Political elites and administrative elites both army and civil bureaucracy made an oligarchy and protecting one another interests since independence. The interests of ruling elites are directly opposite to the interests of common man therefore service delivery and governance is weak. Since independence this oligarchy remained in power and music chair of power shifting remained between these groups. Army is the strongest institution of Pakistan which gained power and resources during cold war due to the military pact with USA those are SEATO and CENTO so now they are in commanding position in the country. Political parties remained weak all the history and controlled by few personalities. It can be concluded from the whole analysis that there is no difference between military and political rule as both are authoritarian and part of the same oligarchy and in any kind of rule, they are the part of it.

Unlike more successful bureaucratic states, including example as diverse as Singapore, Malaysia, France, and Japan, the rulers of Pakistan and their administrative acolytes failed to realize that in such states it was and is the intellectual and moral quality of the servants of the state that determine, above all else, the quality of order and the capacity for progress.

The study suggests that Pakistan inherent faulty system of indirect governance from British India we continued with the old system is not the solution of Pakistan

ills. We may simply say that Pakistan is a continental bureaucracy so boasting the moral standards of civil servants we cannot establish good governance in the country. First step toward good governance and sustainable development will be depoliticizing the civil service and police and create institutional balance, it means every institution should do its own work without interfering into the matters of others institutions. All the selection posting and tenure should be on merit as merit is very subjective term the government try to make an outline and make it objective. The pays of the civil servant are very low and not up to international standards. Due to this very reason they plundered state resources because they have a lot of discretionary power in their hands with no accountability. An able, autonomous and motivated higher bureaucracy is also the key to gradually and peacefully restoring overall civilian supremacy over the state apparatus, reducing the level of corruption.

The second suggestion is to make political parties democratic in their outlook and decrease of personification in the parties. Now a day's Pakistan main political parties are controlled by one families and politics became dynastic. It is very harmful for the democratic transition of the country and welfare of the people. Party leader should not be head of the government and head of the government elected through election within the parties same goes with the party leadership. Election commission should be strengthened and have independent body with permanent head and powers. The cost of contesting election should be checked so that middle class and lower class should participate in the elections.

The role of army should be curtailed only by politician understandings and change in political culture in the country. The culture of kinship and patronage should be changed by merit transparency and accountability. The personal interests should be sacrificed for national interests. It needs rigorous and genuine land reforms for the provision of level playing field to all in the political arena

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**LIST OF MNAs WITH CONSTITUENCY**  
**AND THEIR OCCUPATIONS**

<b>Sr. No.</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Profession</b>	<b>Constituency</b>	<b>Party</b>
1	Ghulam Ahmed Bilour	Business	NA-1	ANP
2	Hamid Ul Haq	N/A	NA-2	PTI
3	Sajid Nawaz	Agriculture/Business	NA-3	PTI
4	Ghulzar Khan	Retired Civil Servant	NA-4	PTI
5	Imran Khattak	MBBS/Property Owner	NA-5	PTI
6	Siraj Muhammad Khan	Retired Teacher	NA-6	PTI
7	Maulana Muhammad Gohar Shah	Mudarsa	NA-7	JUI(F)
8	Aftab Ahmed Sher Khan Sherpao	Agriculture	NA-8	QWP(S)
9	Amir Haider Khan	Nill	NA-9	ANP
10	Ali Muhammad Khan	Advocate	NA-10	PTI
11	Mujahid Ali	Agriculture	NA-11	PTI
12	Usman Khan Tarrakai	Agriculture	NA-12	AJIP
13	Aqibullah	Agriculture	NA-13	PTI
14	Shehryar Afridi	No Professonal	NA-14	PTI
15	Nasir Khan Khattak	N/A	NA-15	PTI
16	Khial Zaman	Business	NA-16	PTI
17	Muhammad Azhar Khan Jadoon Dr.	Professonal	NA-17	PTI
18	Murtaza Javed Abbasi	Business	NA-18	PML(N)
19	Omar Ayub Khan	Business	NA-19	PML(N)
20	Sardar Muhammad Yousaf	Agriculture	NA-20	PML(N)



21	Muhammad Safdar Capt.(Retd.)	Agriculture	NA-21	PML(N)
22	Qari Mohammad Yousif	Religon	NA-22	JUI(F)
23	Sarzameen	N/A	NA-23	PML(N)
24	Molana Fazal Ur Rehman	Mudarsa	NA-24	JUI(F)
25	Dawar Khan Kundi	N/A	NA-25	PTI
26	Akram Khan Durrani	Politics	NA-26	JUI(F)
27	Aminullah Marwat	Retired Army	NA-27	PTI
28	Sher Akbar Khan	Agriculture	NA-28	JI
29	Murad Saeed	N/A	NA-29	PTI
30	Salim Rehman	N/A	NA-30	PTI
31	Ibadullah	Politics	NA-31	PML(N)
32	Shahzada Iftikhar Uddin	Professonal	NA-32	APML
33	Sahibzada Tariq Ullah	Agriculture	NA-33	JI
34	Sahibzada Muhammad Yaqub	Business	NA-34	JI
35	Junaid Akbar	Agriculture	NA-35	PTI
36	Bilal Rehman	Social Worker	NA-36	Indep- endent
37	Sajid Hussain Turi	Agriculture	NA-37	Indep- endent
38	Post Poned	Agriculture	NA-38	
39	Syed Ghazi Gulab Jamal	MBBS/ Social Worker	NA-39	Indep- endent
40	Muhammad Nazir Khan	Business	NA-40	PML(N)
41	Ghalib Khan	Politics	NA-41	PML(N)
42	Muhammad Ul Din	Mudarsa	NA-42	JUI(F)
43	Bismillah Khan	Agriculture/Business	NA-43	Indep- endent
44	Shahab Ud Din Khan	Agriculture	NA-44	PML(N)

45	Alhaj Shah Jee Gul Afridi	Business	NA-45	Independent
46	N/A		NA-46	
47	Qaisar Jamal	Professional	NA-47	PTI
48	Asad Umar	Professional	NA-48	PTI
49	Tariq Fazal Choudhary Dr.	Professional/Agriculture	NA-49	PML(N)
50	Shahid Khaqan Abbasi	Business	NA-50	PML(N)
51	Raja Muhammad Javed Ikhlas	Agriculture/Business	NA-51	PML(N)
52	Nisar Ali Khan Ch.	Politics	NA-52	PML(N)
53	Ghulam Sarwar Khan	Agriculture/Business	NA-53	PTI
54	Malik Ibrar Ahmed	Politics	NA-54	PML(N)
55	Sheikh Rashid Ahmed	Business	NA-55	AML
56	Imran Khan	Agriculture	NA-56	PTI
57	Sheikh Aftab Ahmed	Business	NA-57	PML(N)
58	Malik Ihtebare Khan	Agriculture/Civil	NA-58	PML(N)
59	Muhammad Zain Ellahi	Agriculture/Business	NA-59	Independent
60	Tahir Iqbal Major (Retd.)	Politics	NA-60	PML(N)
61	Sardar Mumtaq Khan	Agriculture	NA-61	PML(N)
62	Choudhary Khadim Hussain	Agriculture	NA-62	PML(N)
63	Malik Iqbal Mehdi Khan	N/A	NA-63	PML(N)
64	Pir Muhammad Amin Ul Hasnat Shah	Religion	NA-64	PML(N)
65	Mohsin Shah Nawaz Ranjha	Law/Business	NA-65	PML(N)
66	Choudhary Hamid Hameed	Agriculture/Business	NA-66	PML(N)
67	Zulfiqar Ali Bhatti Dr.	Agriculture/Business	NA-67	PML(N)
68	Sardar Muhammad Shafqat Hayat Khan	Agriculture	NA-68	PML(N)

69	Malik Muhammad Uzair Khan	Agriculture	NA-69	PML(N)
70	Malik Shakir Bashir Awan	Business	NA-70	PML(N)
71	Obaid Ullah Shadi Khel	Agriculture/Business	NA-71	PML(N)
72	Amjad Ali Khan	Business	NA-72	PTI
73	Abdul Majeed Khan	Agriculture	NA-73	
74	Muhammad Afzal Khan Dhandla Dr.	Professional/Agriculture	NA-74	PML(N)
75	Ghulam Rasool Sahi	Agriculture	NA-75	PML(N)
76	Muhammad Tallat Choudhary	Advocate/Business	NA-76	PML(N)
77	Muhammad Asim Nazeer	Business	NA-77	PML(N)
78	Rajab Ali Khan Baloch	Agriculture/Business	NA-78	PML(N)
79	Choudhary Muhammad Shahbaz Babar	Business	NA-79	PML(N)
80	Mian Muhammad Farooq	Business	NA-80	PML(N)
81	Nisar Ahmad	Agriculture	NA-81	PML(N)
82	Ranal Muhammad Afzal Khan	Professional	NA-82	PML(N)
83	Mian Abdul Manan	Business	NA-83	PML(N)
84	Abid Sher Ali	Business	NA-84	PML(N)
85	Haji Muhammad Akram Ansari	N/A	NA-85	PML(N)
86	Qaiser Ahmad Sheikh	Professional	NA-86	PML(N)
87	Ghulam Muhammad Lali	Agriculture	NA-87	PML(N)
88	Ghulam Bibi Bharwana	Agriculture	NA-88	PML(N)
89	Sheikh Muhammad Akram	Business	NA-89	PML(N)
90	Shahbzada Mohammad Nazir	Agriculture	NA-90	PML(N)
91	Najaf Abbas Sial	Agriculture	NA-91	PML(N)
92	Choudhary Khalik Javaid Warraich	Business	NA-92	PML(N)

93	Muhammad Junaid Anwaar Chaudhry	Agriculture	NA-93	PML(N)
94	Asad Ur Rehman Ch.	Agriculture	NA-94	PML(N)
95	Usman Ibrahim	Landlord/Agriculture	NA-95	PML(N)
96	Khuram Dastgir Khan Engineer	Professional	NA-96	PML(N)
97	Choudhary Mehmood Bashir Virk	Agriculture	NA-97	PML(N)
98	Mian Tariq Mehmood	N/A	NA-98	PML(N)
99	Rana Umar Nazir Khan	Business	NA-99	PML(N)
100	Azhar Qayyum Nahra	Agriculture	NA-100	PML(N)
101	Iftikhar Ahmad Cheema Jusitce (Retd.)	Agriculture	NA-101	PML(N)
102	Saira Afzal Tarar	Politics	NA-102	PML(N)
103	Mian Shahid Hussain Khan Bhatti	Agriculture/Business	NA-103	PML(N)
104	Nawabzada Mazher Ali	Agriculture	NA-104	PML(N)
105	Pervaiz Ellahi Ch.	Agriculture	NA-105	PML
106	Jaffar Iqbal Ch.	N/A	NA-106	PML(N)
107	Abid Raza Ch.	Agriculture/Business	NA-107	PML(N)
108	Muhammad Ijaz Ahmed Choudnary	Agriculture/Business	NA-108	PML(N)
109	Nasir Iqbal Bosal	Agriculture/Business	NA-109	PML(N)
110	Khawja Muhammad Asif	Business	NA-110	PML(N)
111	Choudhary Armghan Subhani	Agriculture/Business	NA-111	PML(N)
112	Rana Shamim Ahmed Khan	Agriculture	NA-112	PML(N)
113	Syed Iftikhar Hussain	Agriculture	NA-113	PML(N)
114	Zahid Hameed	N/A	NA-114	PML(N)
115	Mian Muhammad Rasheed	N/A	NA-115	PML(N)
116	Daniyal Aziz	N/A	NA-116	PML(N)

117	Ahsan Iqbal	Professional	NA-117	PML(N)
118	Muhammad Riaz Malik	Agriculture	NA-118	PML(N)
119	Mian Muhammad Haza Shehbaz Sharif	Professional	NA-119	PML(N)
120	Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif	Agriculture/Business	NA-120	PML(N)
121	Mehar Ishtiaq Ahmed	Landlord/Property	NA-121	PML(N)
122	Sardar Ayaz Sadiq	Business	NA-122	PML(N)
123	Muhammad Pervaiz Malik	Professional/Tech	NA-123	PML(N)
124	Sheikh Rohale Asghar	Business	NA-124	PML(N)
125	Khawja Sadd Rafique	Business	NA-125	PML(N)
126	Shafqat Mehmood	Politics	NA-126	PTI
127	Waheed Alam Khan	Business	NA-127	PML(N)
128	Muhammad Afzal Khokhar	Agriculture	NA-128	PML(N)
129	Shazia Mubashar	Business	NA-129	PML(N)
130	Sohail Shaukhat Butt	Business	NA-130	PML(N)
131	Rana Afzaal Hussain	Agriculture	NA-131	PML(N)
132	Rana Tanweer Hussain	N/A	NA-132	PML(N)
133	Mian Javid Latif	Business	NA-133	PML(N)
134	Sardar Muhammad Irfan Dogar	Agriculture	NA-134	PML(N)
135	Muhammad Barjees Tahir	Advocate.	NA-135	PML(N)
136	Ch. Bilal Ahmed Virk	Agriculture	NA-136	PML(N)
137	Rai Mansab Ali Khan	Advocate/Professional	NA-137	PML(N)
138	Salman Hanir	N/A	NA-138	PML(N)
139	Wasem Akhtar Sheikh	Business	NA-139	PML(N)
140	Malik Rashid Ahmed Khan	Agriculture	NA-140	PML(N)

141	Rana Muhammad Ishaq Khan	Agriculture/Business	NA-141	PML(N)
142	Ranal Muhammad Hayat Khan	Agriculture	NA-142	PML(N)
143	Nadeem Abbas Rebaira	Advocate	NA-143	PML(N)
144	Muhammad Arif Choudnary	Business	NA-144	PML(N)
145	Syed Muhammad Ashiq Hussain	Agriculture	NA-145	PML(N)
146	Rao Muhammad Ajmal Khan	Agriculture	NA-146	PML(N)
147	Muhammad Moeen Wattoo	Advocate/Agriculture	NA-147	PML(N)
148	Malik Abdul Ghaffar Dogar	Agriculture/Business	NA-148	PML(N)
149	Makhdoom Muhammad Javaid Hashmi	Agriculture	NA-149	PTI
150	Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Hussain Qureshi	Agriculture	NA-150	PTI
151	Sikandar Hayat Bosan	Agriculture	NA-151	PML(N)
152	Syed Javed Ali Shah	Agriculture	NA-152	PML(N)
153	Dewan Ashiq Hussain Bukhari	Agriculture	NA-153	PML(N)
154	Muhammad Siddiqui Khan Baloch	Agriculture	NA-154	PML(N)
155	Abdul Rehman Khan Kanju	Agriculture	NA-155	1
156	Muhammad Raza Hayat Hiraj	Agriculture	NA-156	PML(N)
157	Muhammad Khan Daha	Agriculture	NA-157	PML(N)
158	Aslam Bodla	Agriculture	NA-158	PML(N)
159	Choudhary Iftikhar Nazir	N/A	NA-159	PML(N)
160	Syed Imran Haider Shah	Advocate	NA-160	PML(N)
161	Choudhary Muhammad Ashraf	Agriculture/Advocate	NA-161	PML(N)
162	Rai Hasan Nawaz Khan	Agriculture	NA-162	PTI
163	Choudhary Muhammad Munir Azhar	N/A	NA-163	PML(N)
164	Sardar Mansib Ali Dogar	Advocagte/Agriculture	NA-164	PML(N)

165	Syed Muhammad Athar Hussain	Agriculture	NA-165	PML(N)
166	Rana Zahid Hussain Khan	Agriculture	NA-166	PML(N)
167	Choudhary Nazir Ahmed	Agriculture	NA-167	PML(N)
168	Sajid Mehdi	Agriculture	NA-168	PML(N)
169	Tahir Iqbal Ch.	Agriculture	NA-169	PML(N)
170	Saeed Ahmed Khan Manais	Agriculture	NA-170	PML(N)
171	Sardar Muhammad Amjad Farooq Khan Knosa	Agriculture	NA-171	PML(N)
172	Hafiz Abdul Kareem	Agriculture/Business	NA-172	PML(N)
173	Sardar Awais Ahmed Khan Laghari	Agriculture	NA-173	PML(N)
174	Sardar Muhammad Jaffar Khan Leghari	Agriculture	NA-174	PML(N)
175	Hafeez Ur Rehman Drishak Dr.	Agriculture	NA-175	PML(N)
176	Malik Sultan Mehmood	Agriculture	NA-176	
177	Ghulam Rabani Ghar	Agriculture	NA-177	PPPP
178	Jamshed Ahmed	Labour	NA-178	Independent
179	Makhdoomzada Sayed Basat Ahmed Sultan Bokhari	Agriculture	NA-179	PML(N)
180	Ashiq Hussain Khan		NA-180	PML(N)
181	Shahbazada Faiz Ul Hassan	Agriculture	NA-181	PML(N)
182	Pir Muhammad Saqlain Shah Bukhari	Agriculture	NA-182	PML(N)
183	Makhdoom Sayed Ali Hassan Gilani	N/A	NA-183	PML(N)
184	Mian Najibuddin Awaisi	Agriculture	NA-184	PML(N)
185	Muhammad Balgh Ur Rehman	Business	NA-185	PML(N)
186	Mian Riaz Hussain Peerzada	Agriculture	NA-186	PML(N)
187	Tariq Bashir Cheema Ch.	Agriculture/Business	NA-187	PML
188	Syed Muhammad Asghar Shah	Agriculture	NA-188	Independent

189	Alam Dad Laleka	Agriculture	NA-189	PML(N)
190	Tahir Bashir Cheema	Agriculture/Business	NA-190	PML(N)
191	Muhammad Ijaz Ul Haq	Professonal	NA-191	PML(Z)
192	Khwaja Ghulam Rasool Koreja	Agriculture	NA-192	PPP
193	Sheikh Fayyaz ud Din	Business	NA-193	PML(N)
194	Makhdoom Khusro Bakhtiar	Agriculture	NA-194	PML(N)
195	Makhdoom Sayed Mustafa Mehmood	Agriculture	NA-195	PPPP
196	Mian Imtiaz Ahmad	N/A	NA-196	PML(N)
197	Muhammad Arshad Khan Laghari	Agriculture	NA-197	PML(N)
198	Nauman Islam Shaikh	Agriculture	NA-198	PPPP
199	Syed Khurshid Ahmed Shah	Agriculture	NA-199	PPPP
200	Ali Gohar Khan	Agriculture	NA-200	PPPP
201	Ali Muhammad Khan Mahar	Agriculture	NA-201	PPPP
202	Aftab Shahban Mirani	Agriculture	NA-202	PPPP
203	Ghous Bux Khan Mahar	Agriculture	NA-203	PML(F)
204	Muhammad Ayaz Soomro	N/A	NA-204	PPPP
205	Nazir Ahmed Bughio	Agriculture	NA-205	PPPP
206	Mir Amir Ali Khan Magsi	N/A	NA-206	PPPP
207	Faryal Talpur	Agriculture	NA-207	PPPP
208	Aijaz Hussain Jakhrani	Agriculture	NA-208	PPPP
209	Mir Shabbir Ali Bijarani	Agriculture	NA-209	PPPP
210	Ihsan Ur Rehman Mazari	Agriculture	NA-210	PPP
211	Ghulam Murtaza Khan Jatoti	Agriculture	NA-211	NPP
212	Asghar Ali Shah	Agriculture	NA-212	PPPP



213	Azra Fazal Pechaho Dr.	Agriculture	NA-213	PPPP
214	Syed Ghulam Mustafa Shah	Agriculture	NA-214	PPPP
215	Nawab Ali Wassan	Agriculture	NA-215	PPPP
216	Pir Sadaruddin Shah	N/A	NA-216	PML(F)
217	Syed Kazim Ali Shah	Agriculture	NA-217	PML(F)
218	Makhdoom Muhammad Ameen Fahim	Agriculture	NA-218	PPPP
219	Khalid Maqbool Siddiqui Dr.	Professional	NA-219	MQM
220	Syed Waseem Hussain	Professional	NA-220	MQM
221	Syed Amir Ali Shah	Agriculture	NA-221	PPPP
222	Syed Naveed Qamar	Agriculture/ Buisness	NA-222	PPPP
223	Abdul Sattar Bachani	Agriculture	NA-223	PPPP
224	Sardar Kamal Khan Chang	Agriculture	NA-224	PPPP
225	Fehmida Mirza Dr.	N/A	NA-225	PPPP
226	Pir Shafqat Hussain Shah Jilani	Agriculture	NA-226	PPPP
227	Mir Munawar Ali Talpur	Agriculture/Business	NA-227	PPPP
228	Nawab Muhammad yousif Talpur	Agriculture	NA-228	PPPP
229	Faqir Sher Muhammad Bilalani	Agriculture	NA-229	PPPP
230	Pir Noor Muhammad Shah Jeelani	Agriculture	NA-230	PPPP
231	Malik Asad Sikandar	Agriculture/Land	NA-231	PPPP
232	Rafique Ahmed Jamali	Agriculture	NA-232	PPPP
233	Imran Zafar Leghari	Agriculture	NA-233	PPP
234	Pir Bux Junejo	Agriculture	NA-234	PML(F)
235	Shahzia Mari	Agriculture	NA-235	PPPP
236	Roshan Din Junejo	Agriculture	NA-236	PPPP

237	Shamas Un Nisa	Business	NA-237	PPPP
238	Syed Shafqat Hussain Shah	Agriculture	NA-238	Independent
239	Muhammad Salman Khan Baloch	Advocate.	NA-239	MQM
240	Sohail Mansoor Khawaja	Professional	NA-240	MQM
241	Syed Akhter Ul Iqbal Qadri	Professional	NA-241	MQM
242	Mehboob Alam	N/A	NA-242	MQM
243	Abdul Waseem	Professional	NA-243	MQM
244	Sheikh Salaudin	Professional	NA-244	MQM
245	Muhammad Rehan Hashmi	Professional	NA-245	MQM
246	Sardar Nabeel Ahmed Gabol	Business	NA-246	MQM
247	Safyan Yousaf	Business	NA-247	MQM
248	Shah Jahan Baloch	Business	NA-248	PPPP
249	Muhammad Farooq Sattar Dr	Politics	NA-249	MQM
250	Arif Ur Rehman Alvi	Professional	NA-250	PTI
251	Syed Raza Abidi	Business	NA-251	MQM
252	Abdul Rashid Godil	Ex-MNA	NA-252	MQM
253	Muhammad Muzammil Qureshi	N/A	NA-253	MQM
254	Muhammad Ali Rashi	Advocate.	NA-254	MQM
255	Syed Arif Hussain	Professional	NA-255	MQM
256	Iqbal Muhammad Ali Khan	Business	NA-256	MQM
257	Sajid Ahmed	Teacher	NA-257	MQM
258	Abdul Hakeem Baloch	Agriculture	NA-258	PML(N)
259	Memood Khan Achakzai	Politics	NA-259	PKMAP
260	Abdul Rahim Mandokhail	Politics	NA-260	PKMAP

261	Moulvi Agha Muhammad	Mudarsa	NA-261	JUI(F)
262	Abdul Qadir Khan Wadan	Business	NA-262	PKMAP
263	Molana Ameer Zaman	Mudarsa	NA-263	JUI(F)
264	Molana Mohammad Khan Sherani	Mudarsa	NA-264	JUI(F)
265	Mir Dostain Khan Domki	Professonal/Agriculture	NA-265	PML(N)
266	Mir Zafar Ullah Jamali	N/A	NA-266	PML(N)
267	Khalid Hussain Magsi	Agriculture	NA-267	PML(N)
268	Sardar Kamal Khan Bangulzai	Agriculture	NA-268	NP
269	Molana Qamar Ud Din	Madarsa	NA-269	JUI(F)
270	Jam Kamal Khan	Business	NA-270	PML(N)
271	Abdul Qadir Baloch Lt. Gen. (Retd.)	General Retired Social Service	NA-271	PML(N)
272	Sayed Essa Nori	Agriculture	NA-272	BNP

## **QUESTIONNAIRE**

**Topic : Authority structure in Pakistan and its impact on governance and development**

**Research Ph.D (Political Science)**

***MUHAMMAD KALEEM***

**Roll # 02**

**Bahauddin Zakariyya University Multan**

**Name of the Answering Person.....**

**Education of the Answering Person.....**

**Designation of the Answering Person.....**

**Q.No.1: The authority in Pakistan lies in the hand of**

A	B	C	D	E
Army	Politicians	Bureacrcy	People of Pakistan	A,B,C,

**Q.No.2: Which is the most powerful institution of Pakistan?**

A	B	C	D	E
Army	Politicians	Bureacrcy	Political Parties	None

**Q.No.3: Why Army become very strong in Pakistan?**

A	B	C	D	E
Weak Political Parties	U.S Military Aid	Naked Power	Highly Organized and Modernizd institution of Pakistan	All A,b,c,d

**Q.No.4: Why the feudal lords strong at local level in their constituencies?**

A	B	C	D	E
Beradari	Large Land holding	Strong Political Parties	Political Ideologies	Both A & B

**Q.No.5: How Local Politician maneuvered the condition in their favour?**

A	B	C	D	E
Through Local Bureaurat	Annual Development Program	Family Patronage	Political Program	A, B & C

**Q.No.6: How Business Class become rich in short time?**

A	B	C	D	E
Links with Army	Links with Bureaucracy	Professional expertise and resources	Market Mechanism	Both A & B

**Q.No.7: Why Army needs Local feudal Lords and Business Elites?**

A	B	C	D	E
Legitimacy	Political Culture	People Participation	Good Governance	None

**Q.No.8: Why corruption prevails in Pakistan?**

A	B	C	D	E
Low Income	Political Interference in promotion and transfers	Poor Resource sof the Country	Political Culture	A, B & D

**Q.No.9: Why service delivery is weak in Pakistan?**


A	B	C	D	E
Weak Infrastructure	Retaining of colonial legacy of in-direct rule	Discretionary Power	No voice of People	B, C & D

**Q.No.10: Why the institution of local government weak in Pakistan?**

A	B	C	D	E
Due to National/ Provincial level Politicians	Bureacracy	Army	Weak Political Parties	A & B

## **POPULATION DYNAMICS OF PAKISTAN**

**Figure.12**



## **SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS**

Un-employment Rate % per annum	7.8
Crude Birth Rate Per 1000 Person	28.7
Crude Death Rate Per 1000 Person	8.2
Infant Mortality Rate Per 1000 Person	85.0

## SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

### EDUCATION

**Primary Schools000 Nos. 149.1**

Male - - - 93.8

Female - - - 55.3

**Middle School - - - 26.8**

Male - - - 14.0

Female - - - 12.8

**High S hools - - - 15.1**

Male - - - - 10.4

Female - - - 4.6

### SECONDARY /VOCATINAL

**Institutions Nos. - - 607.0**

Male \_\_\_\_\_ 638.0

Female - - 239.0

**Literacy Rate Percent - - 50.5**

Male - - 65.7 - -

Female - - 41.4 - -

**Expenditure on Education**

**As % of GNP - - 1.9**



**Expenditures on Health**

**As % of GDP – 0.7**

Population Growth Rate (Percent) 2.05 2.03 2.00

**Life Expectancy (Year)**

Females - 66.5

Males - 64.6

**Source:**

Planning Commission of Pakistan, National Institute of Population Studies  
(NIPS)