Ahad Khan Wazir
This research article explains that a federal state must operate through a complete system of federalism that includes legislative federalism, fiscal federalism and administrative federalism. It establishes that jurisdiction is the foundation of federalism. It proves that the jurisdiction of each tier of government has three parts, the legislative part, the fiscal part and the administrative part. It further proves that in Pakistan these three parts of jurisdiction are already defined for the federation and the provinces, and that each part is constitutionally separate. It then shows that although legislative and fiscal federalism exist in the Constitution, administrative federalism has not been implemented. It then argues that this lack of administrative federalism has produced a unitary bureaucracy. It evaluates the impact of this unitary bureaucracy on legislative and fiscal federalism. It shows that the reservation of provincial posts for federal services is unconstitutional, unjustified and structurally incorrect. It establishes that federal civil servants are exercising provincial executive authority without being accountable to provincial law, provincial executives or provincial legislatures. It shows that this arrangement contradicts the basic structure of the Constitution after the Eighteenth Amendment. It shows that this arrangement contradicts the concept of independent jurisdictions for each level of government. It establishes that federalism cannot operate under a unitary bureaucracy. It proves that the administrative part of jurisdiction must be federalized in Pakistan just as the legislative and fiscal parts already are. It proves that all three parts of jurisdiction must operate within the same level of government or the system collapses. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate, through constitutional reasoning, administrative analysis and structural logic, that Pakistan must remove the anomaly of the unitary bureaucracy in order to function as a real federation. This article is written as an analytical judgment because the matter touches the basic structure of the state. The arguments are presented in sequential reasoning, using plain language and simple sentences with commas and full stops.
The Constitution of Pakistan creates a federation. A federation is a system where two levels of government operate with independent jurisdictions. Each level has its own domain. The federation has a jurisdiction. The provinces have their own jurisdictions. A jurisdiction is not an abstract political idea, it is a constitutional allocation of authority. The jurisdiction of a government has three parts. The first part is the legislative part. The second part is the fiscal part. The third part is the administrative part. Every government must have authority to legislate. Every government must have authority to raise and spend money. Every government must have authority to administer its laws through its own civil service. These three parts form one whole. They cannot be separated. They cannot be mixed between levels of government. They cannot be overlapped without destroying federalism.
Pakistan’s Constitution recognizes this structure. Schedule Four determines the legislative part of the federal jurisdiction. It lists the subjects on which the federal government can legislate. Every subject that is not listed belongs to the provinces. This is the classic rule of federal legislative separation. The federal legislative list has two parts. Part One contains fifty nine subjects. Part Two contains eighteen subjects. These subjects define what the federation can regulate. The provinces legislate on all other matters. The legislative boundary is clear. The legislative authority is exclusive. The legislative jurisdiction is independent. This is the first pillar of federalism in Pakistan.
The second pillar is fiscal federalism. The Constitution provides the mechanism for fiscal separation. The federation collects revenue. The provinces collect revenue. The National Finance Commission distributes revenue. The Constitution lays down principles. The NFC award allocates resources. The Provincial Finance Commissions decide provincial distribution. Fiscal jurisdiction therefore exists in parallel to legislative jurisdiction. The federation has fiscal authority. The provinces have fiscal authority. Each level is responsible for its own expenditure. Each level must deliver services within its own fiscal envelope. This is how fiscal federalism supports legislative federalism. This is the second pillar of Pakistan’s federal compact.
The third pillar is administrative federalism. This pillar appears in Article 240 of the Constitution. Article 240 states that the civil service of Pakistan shall be regulated by law. Article 240 also states that province shall regulate its own service. Article 240(b) clearly separates federal and provincial services. This is an explicit constitutional command. The federation must have its own civil service to execute federal laws. The provinces must have their own civil services to execute provincial laws. There is no confusion in the text. The administrative part of jurisdiction follows the legislative and the fiscal parts. This is the third pillar.
When the three pillars operate together, federalism is complete. When one pillar is missing or compromised, the federation becomes distorted. Pakistan has implemented the legislative pillar. Pakistan has implemented the fiscal pillar. But Pakistan has not implemented the administrative pillar. Pakistan still maintains a unitary bureaucracy. The federal services like PAS, PSP and PAAS remain dominant in the provinces. These services occupy provincial posts. These officers are employees of the federal establishment. They are promoted by the federation. They are transferred by the federation. They are disciplined by the federation. They remain part of the federal jurisdiction. Yet they occupy provincial posts. This arrangement creates an anomaly. It violates the separation of jurisdiction. It contradicts constitutional logic. It weakens provincial autonomy. It compromises the federation. It creates a structural imbalance.
The primary argument of this article is that federalism cannot function when legislative and fiscal authorities belong to provinces but administrative authority is captured by the federation. Jurisdiction must be complete. Jurisdiction must be coherent. Jurisdiction must be aligned. The legislative part, the fiscal part and the administrative part must belong to the same level of government. If they are divided, the system fails because authority becomes fragmented. Governance becomes unaccountable. Democracy becomes hollow.
A province cannot legislate a law if it does not control the executive authority that will implement the law. A province cannot plan a budget if it does not control the officers who will spend the budget. A province cannot be accountable to its assembly and its people if its senior administrative leadership is answerable to the federal establishment. The entire chain of accountability collapses. The result is a unitary administrative apparatus under a federal legislative structure. This is contradictory. This is unstable. This is unconstitutional.
The reservation of provincial posts for federal officers is therefore not a matter of administrative convenience. It is a structural violation. It is a unitary instrument within a federal constitution. This is why the provinces cannot exercise their jurisdiction. This is why the federation oversteps its own jurisdiction. This is why legislative and fiscal federalism are compromised. This is why the provincial autonomy promised by the Eighteenth Amendment remains incomplete. This is why service delivery remains weak. This is why governance remains inefficient.
The idea that federal services must occupy provincial positions to keep the federation strong is incorrect. This argument has no constitutional basis. It has no administrative logic. It has no structural merit. If the federation believes that a subject is national and cannot be devolved, the solution is simple. The federation should place that subject in the federal legislative list. Once the subject becomes federal in legislation, fiscal resources will follow, and administrative authority will follow. The correct method is legislative alignment. The wrong method is administrative intrusion.
The concept of reservation of posts is therefore misplaced. Posts follow jurisdiction. Jurisdiction does not follow posts. If the post belongs to a provincial department, the officer must be a provincial officer. If the post belongs to a federal department, the officer must be a federal officer. There is no constitutional justification for a federal officer occupying a provincial executive post that executes provincial legislation and uses provincial funds. This defeats the entire constitutional architecture.
This anomaly becomes clearer when we consider democratic accountability. A federal officer occupying a provincial post is not accountable to the provincial chief minister. The officer is not accountable to the provincial cabinet. The officer is not accountable to the provincial assembly. The officer does not follow the provincial human resource discipline. The provincial political executive cannot promote the officer. The provincial assembly cannot hold the officer to account. The officer remains answerable only to the federation. Yet the officer exercises provincial authority, spends provincial funds and represents the province. This creates a constitutional contradiction where the province is represented by someone who is not part of the province.
This would be unthinkable in any functioning federation. No federal state in the world allows a federal civil servant to represent a province against the will of provincial government. No federation allows federal officers to implement provincial legislation. No federation assigns federal officers to spend provincial budgets. No federation places federal employees in positions that require accountability to provincial executives. Pakistan’s model is therefore exceptional only in its structural deviation. It is not a federal practice. It is an anomaly.
Pakistan’s provinces cannot represent themselves at federal forums when their own top executives are not provincial officers. The chief secretary is a federal officer. The inspector general of police is a federal officer. The accountant general is a federal officer. Many secretaries are federal officers. These officers represent provincial positions in federal coordination. But they are not accountable to the provincial governments they represent. This weakens the provincial voice. This dilutes the federal spirit. This creates a tilted federation where the centre dominates even devolved subjects.
The principle of separation of jurisdiction applies equally to administrative jurisdiction. Just as the federation cannot legislate on provincial subjects, the federation cannot administer provincial subjects through its own employees. Just as the federation cannot take provincial revenue, the federation cannot direct provincial officers who execute provincial budgets. Federalism is a complete package. It cannot be selective. It cannot be partial. It cannot be interpreted in isolation.
The Eighteenth Amendment strengthened legislative and fiscal federalism. But it did not reform administrative federalism. This omission created an incomplete federalism. It created a mismatch. It created a structure where provinces gained power but not control. The federal services continued to dominate provincial spaces. The provinces gained rights but lacked the administrative instruments to enforce those rights. This created frustration. This created inefficiency. This created contradictions.
Constitutional federalism requires exclusive competence. Exclusive competence means each government acts within its own jurisdiction without interference. The federation cannot intervene in provincial jurisdiction. The provinces cannot intervene in federal jurisdiction. The same rule applies administratively. The federal civil service cannot occupy provincial jurisdictional space. The provincial civil service cannot occupy federal jurisdictional space. Each level must operate independently. This independence is not isolation. It is constitutional discipline. It is institutional harmony. It is structural necessity.
Administrative federalism therefore becomes essential for the functioning of legislative and fiscal federalism. Without administrative independence, legislative independence is symbolic. Without administrative independence, fiscal devolution is ineffective. The civil service executes the law. The civil service spends the money. If the civil service is not aligned with the level of government that has legislative and fiscal authority, governance collapses. This is what has happened in Pakistan.
The federal civil services like PAS, PSP and PAAS were created in a different constitutional era. They were created when the system was closer to a unitary state. They were designed for central control. They were designed to rotate across provinces. They were designed to represent federal priorities. After the Eighteenth Amendment, the constitutional environment changed. But the administrative system did not change. The result is structural friction. The old administrative structure contradicts the new constitutional design.
The provinces now legislate on major sectors like health, education, agriculture, local government, police, social welfare, planning, and development. These are broad domains. These require expertise. These require continuity. These require local knowledge. These require alignment with provincial political priorities. These responsibilities cannot be fulfilled if the senior administrators belong to federal services that rotate frequently and lack sustained provincial affiliation. This weakens provincial performance. This weakens service delivery. This weakens governance.
Administrative federalism must therefore be federalized. This does not mean dismantling national cohesion. It means aligning the civil service with constitutional federalism. It means creating exclusive provincial services for exclusive provincial functions. It means creating exclusive federal services for exclusive federal functions. It means creating common services for common functions with proper governance by the Council of Common Interests. It means building professional provincial cadres. It means creating local government cadres. It means decentralizing authority consistent with constitutional jurisdiction.
A federalized administrative structure would strengthen the federation. It would reduce provincial grievances. It would clarify lines of accountability. It would improve policy implementation. It would enhance fiscal discipline. It would create ownership in the provinces. It would ensure that those who execute the law are part of the government that makes the law. It would ensure that those who spend the budget are accountable to the government that raises the budget. It would ensure harmony between structure and practice.
The fear that the federation will weaken if provinces control their own services is misplaced. The federation is not strengthened by administrative intrusion. It is strengthened by legislative authority. If the federation believes a matter is national, it must legislate. It must place the matter in Schedule Four. If the matter is not placed in Schedule Four, it belongs to the provinces. Once it belongs to the provinces, the federation has no administrative role. This is logical. This is constitutional. This is consistent with the separation of jurisdiction.
Pakistan cannot function as a federal state with a unitary bureaucracy. This is the central argument. Legislative federalism demands administrative federalism. Fiscal federalism demands administrative federalism. Provincial autonomy demands administrative federalism. A coherent federation requires that all three parts of jurisdiction operate at the same level. When two parts operate at the provincial level and one part is controlled by the federation, the system cannot function correctly.
The final conclusion is simple. Pakistan must choose. Either Pakistan openly adopts a unitary state model by constitutional amendment or Pakistan completes its federal design by federalizing the civil services. The first option would dismantle provincial autonomy. The second option would strengthen it. The spirit of the Constitution supports the second option. The Eighteenth Amendment supports the second option. The logic of jurisdiction supports the second option. Good governance supports the second option.
Therefore the reservation of provincial posts for federal services must end. Federal civil servants must serve in federal jurisdiction. Provincial civil servants must serve in provincial jurisdiction. Local government civil servants must serve in local jurisdiction. Common services must be governed jointly. This will align the administrative pillar with the legislative and fiscal pillars. This will complete Pakistan’s federalism. This will restore constitutional balance. This will strengthen the state. This will improve governance. This will bring clarity to jurisdiction. This will uphold the spirit of the Constitution. This will reflect the will of the people.
This article therefore holds that a unitary bureaucracy cannot exist in a federal state. It holds that administrative federalism is essential for legislative and fiscal federalism. It holds that the Constitution requires exclusive jurisdictions for all three parts. It holds that the reservation of provincial posts for federal services violates the logic of jurisdiction. It holds that this anomaly must be removed to complete Pakistan’s federal structure. It holds that federalizing the civil services will strengthen the federation. It holds that the separation of jurisdiction is the structural guarantee of both national unity and provincial autonomy. It holds that Pakistan’s future stability and governance require a complete federalism where legislative fiscal and administrative authorities operate within their constitutional spheres. This is the only coherent and sustainable model for a federal Pakistan.
