Mudassir Rizwan
The government may be unlikely to heed Amnesty International’s recent criticism of Pakistan’s 27th Amendment, but the concerns raised by the global rights organization demand serious attention. The amendment, rushed through parliament last November, has profound implications for the constitutional promise of an independent judiciary, a cornerstone of any functioning democracy.
Amnesty International’s characterization of the amendment as the crescendo of a sustained attack on judicial independence, the right to a fair trial and the rule of law may sound harsh, but it reflects anxieties that have been consistently articulated by a broad coalition of voices. Legal practitioners, members of the superior judiciary when the bill was first introduced, opposition parties and civil society groups have all raised alarm about the embedding of executive influence in critical judicial processes. This development has fundamentally blurred the principle of separation of powers and eroded public confidence in both the courts and the broader constitutional order that underpins Pakistan’s democracy.
The concerns go far beyond abstract legal theory or political rhetoric. Amnesty International has identified structural problems in the amendment that strike at the heart of judicial independence. The most significant of these is the creation of the Federal Constitutional Court, a new institution that the rights body convincingly argues lacks the essential safeguards necessary to ensure true judicial independence. The FCC suffers from critical flaws, notably the weakening of judges’ security of tenure and provisions that effectively shield the president and other key officeholders from meaningful accountability.
The manner in which judges are appointed to this new court is particularly troubling. By granting the president and prime minister the power to appoint the court’s first chief justice and its initial bench of judges, the amendment has effectively entrenched executive influence in a forum now responsible for some of the most sensitive and consequential functions in the constitutional system. These include constitutional interpretation, enforcement of fundamental rights and adjudication of disputes between the federation and the provinces. These are precisely the areas where judicial independence is most critical, yet the amendment has ensured that executive dominance over judicial appointments and transfers gives the government considerable sway over how consequential cases proceed and are decided.
The implications of this executive control cannot be overstated. When those who appoint judges are also those whose actions and decisions those judges may be called upon to review, the potential for conflict of interest is obvious. The risk is that judges, conscious of how their appointments came about and mindful of who controls their future transfers and tenure, may feel pressure to rule in ways that please their benefactors rather than strictly according to law and constitution. Even if individual judges resist such pressure, the mere appearance of such influence is sufficient to undermine public confidence in the judiciary as an impartial arbiter.
The process by which the amendment was pushed through parliament compounds these substantive concerns. The legislation was bulldozed through both houses in a matter of just five days, with minimal opportunity for thorough debate or inclusive discussion. For legislation that so fundamentally transformed the entire architecture of the judiciary and comprehensively diminished the role the Supreme Court had long played in national life, such scrutiny was not merely desirable but absolutely essential. The absence of proper deliberation was always likely to invite public mistrust and raise serious questions about transparency and the true intent driving this so-called reform.
This haste is particularly troubling given the magnitude of the changes involved. The 27th Amendment represents a wholesale restructuring of how constitutional matters are handled in Pakistan. It removes significant powers from the Supreme Court, an institution that, despite its flaws and controversies, had established itself as a key player in national affairs. The creation of the FCC and the transfer of constitutional jurisdiction to this new body fundamentally alters the balance of power among state institutions. Such sweeping changes deserved extensive consultation with all stakeholders, including the legal community, civil society, opposition parties and the public. Instead, the amendment was rushed through with indecent haste, suggesting that the government feared that greater scrutiny might expose problems or generate opposition that could derail the project.
For any democratic polity genuinely committed to the rule of law, certain principles must be respected. While parliamentary authority remains paramount, the people’s elected representatives having the ultimate say in lawmaking, the judiciary must also retain both the mandate and the autonomy to ensure that parliament’s legislative work complies with the Constitution. This is not about judges overruling the democratic will, it is about maintaining the constitutional framework within which democracy operates. All institutions, including parliament, derive their authority from the Constitution and must function as that document envisages.
The 27th Amendment, by embedding executive influence in the Federal Constitutional Court from its very inception, arguably disrupts this delicate balance. The government should not be surprised at the criticism it now faces from international rights bodies like Amnesty International. Nor should it dismiss the profound questions being raised about judicial autonomy and the broader legitimacy of Pakistan’s constitutional framework. These concerns are not the product of partisan politics or bad faith, they reflect genuine alarm about the direction the country is taking.
As has been noted repeatedly, Pakistan’s institutional balance depends on each branch of the state respecting the limits of its authority while acknowledging and respecting the responsibilities of the other branches. This is not a matter of courtesy or tradition, it is fundamental to the system of checks and balances that prevents any single institution from accumulating excessive power and potentially abusing it.
For close to two years now, the ruling establishment has tested and arguably violated these boundaries. First came the 26th Amendment, and then the 27th, each reshaping the judiciary’s structure and authority in ways that weaken an already fragile system of checks and balances. These amendments have not strengthened Pakistan’s democracy, they have undermined it by concentrating power and reducing the independence of institutions meant to check that power.
The authorities should acknowledge the strain their actions have placed on the political system. Institutions are under pressure, public trust is fraying and the careful calibration of powers intended by the Constitution is showing dangerous cracks. Citizens increasingly question whether the courts can provide justice independent of political considerations. International observers worry about Pakistan’s democratic trajectory. Legal experts warn of long-term damage to constitutional governance.
Any far-reaching changes to the architecture of power require careful deliberation, transparency and genuine respect for institutional integrity. Rushing through amendments in days rather than weeks or months, concentrating appointment powers in executive hands, and weakening judicial tenure protections all point in the opposite direction. These are the actions of a government more concerned with control than with building durable, legitimate institutions.
The consequences of this approach extend beyond legal technicalities. When citizens lose faith in the judiciary’s independence, they lose faith in the rule of law itself. When the separation of powers is blurred, accountability suffers. When checks and balances are weakened, the potential for abuse of power increases. These are not abstract concerns, they have real implications for political stability, economic development, social cohesion and Pakistan’s standing in the world.
The government still has an opportunity to address these concerns, to engage with critics constructively and to consider reforms that might restore confidence in judicial independence while addressing whatever legitimate concerns motivated the amendments. But this will require humility, openness to criticism and a genuine commitment to democratic principles. The question is whether those in power possess the wisdom and integrity to change course before further damage is done to Pakistan’s constitutional order.
