Tariq Mahmood Awan
The deadly suicide bombing that struck a BNP-M meeting in Quetta once again highlights the fragile and violent landscape of Balochistan. Claimed by the so-called Islamic State, the attack killed at least fifteen people and exposed the terrifying reality that the province is no longer facing a single front of militancy. Instead, it is confronted by a convergence of actors—Baloch separatists, remnants of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, and now the presence of IS. The fact that BNP-M chief Akhtar Mengal, PkMAP leader Mehmood Khan Achakzai, and other senior political figures survived was sheer fortune. But the ability of a suicide bomber to strike at a major political gathering, despite reported intelligence warnings, is a chilling reminder of the state’s weaknesses. Balochistan’s story is no longer just about separatist insurgency; it is about a province caught between unresolved federal grievances and escalating terrorist threats.
The persistence of violence throughout this year demonstrates the breadth of the crisis. From the Jaffar Express ambush in March to the Khuzdar school bus bombing in May, and from IED attacks on security personnel in Kech to repeated assaults on political rallies, the province is bleeding under a sustained militant campaign. While separatists maintain their armed struggle, the entry of IS introduces a new and more complicated dimension. Unlike local insurgents who draw legitimacy from political grievances, IS represents a global jihadist project that thrives on chaos. This means Balochistan is now vulnerable to both internal discontent and external extremist infiltration. It is precisely this duality that demands a fresh security and political strategy, one that recognises the province’s complexity and resists the temptation of a purely militarised response.
The federation has historically treated Balochistan as a security problem rather than a political question. Military operations, paramilitary deployments, and counterterrorist crackdowns have all been employed with intensity, yet the outcomes remain temporary. Militants regroup, violence resurges, and resentment deepens. What has consistently been missing is the genuine practice of federalism. The 1973 Constitution, particularly after the 18th Amendment, promises autonomy, resource control, and political participation to the provinces. Yet in Balochistan, these commitments remain unfulfilled in practice. The province continues to complain of economic marginalisation, lack of ownership over its gas and mineral wealth, and exclusion from national decision-making. It is this unaddressed alienation that fuels separatist sentiments and provides fertile ground for militants to recruit.
If citizens feel abandoned by the state, they will naturally gravitate towards voices that claim to defend their rights, even if those voices use violence. This is why federalism is not just a constitutional principle but a security necessity. Unless the federation builds trust by devolving power, sharing resources equitably, and recognising Balochistan’s political actors as legitimate stakeholders, no amount of counterterrorism will bring peace. The reality is that terrorism and political alienation are deeply linked. Militants exploit the lack of federal justice, while political exclusion weakens the ability of moderate forces to resist them. The recent attack on BNP-M is telling in this regard: it was not merely an act of terrorism, it was an attempt to silence one of the few nationalist voices still willing to operate within Pakistan’s constitutional framework.
Security in Balochistan cannot mean only securing cantonments, pipelines, and highways. It must also mean securing the democratic process. Civilian events—whether they are political rallies, religious processions, or cultural gatherings—deserve the same security cover that the state reserves for military installations. Otherwise, political life itself will become too dangerous to sustain. If politicians, clerics, and civil society cannot gather safely, the space for peaceful dialogue will collapse entirely, leaving only the militants to dominate the narrative. This imbalance reflects a larger problem: the state still imagines peace as something that can be imposed through force rather than built through inclusion. That approach has repeatedly failed, and it will fail again if it remains unchanged.
The international context makes this challenge even more urgent. Balochistan is no longer a remote province ignored by the world. It is the centrepiece of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and a strategic hub in the Indian Ocean region. Its stability—or lack thereof—directly impacts not just Pakistan’s economy but also regional geopolitics. External actors, particularly hostile intelligence agencies, have long sought to exploit Balochistan’s unrest. Now, with IS announcing its presence, the danger is that a local insurgency could morph into a global jihadist foothold. This would not only complicate counterterrorism but could also internationalise Pakistan’s internal crisis. The federation therefore has no choice but to address both fronts simultaneously: defeating the terrorists with precision and implementing federalism with sincerity.
The way forward requires a change in mindset. Security forces will naturally continue their operations against IS, TTP, and separatists, but these must be intelligence-driven, targeted, and restrained. Indiscriminate crackdowns that harm ordinary citizens will only deepen alienation. Alongside this, the federation must take visible steps to prove that federalism is not just a constitutional slogan. This means devolving control over natural resources, ensuring Balochistan receives its due share of development funds, and strengthening local governance structures so that decisions are made closer to the people. It also means protecting and empowering political parties like BNP-M, PkMAP, and others who, despite their criticisms, remain willing to work within Pakistan’s political framework. Silencing or marginalising these actors would be a grave mistake, for they represent the democratic alternative to militancy.
It is equally important to recognise that Balochistan’s youth require hope, not just security. The province suffers from poverty, unemployment, and educational deprivation far greater than the national average. Militants exploit this despair to lure young men into their ranks. A meaningful federal response must therefore include investment in education, vocational training, and economic opportunities tailored to local needs. This is the only way to close the recruitment pool for extremist movements. When young Baloch see that the federation values their future, they will be less susceptible to those who preach violence.
The Quetta bombing should thus be read as a wake-up call for the federation of Pakistan. It was not simply another tragedy in a long list of attacks; it was a stark reminder that Balochistan’s instability is growing more complex, not less. The presence of IS adds a new layer of danger, one that cannot be defeated by guns alone. The province’s grievances, rooted in decades of neglect and broken promises of federalism, remain unresolved. If the state continues to treat these grievances as secondary, it will find itself trapped in a cycle where each militant defeated is replaced by two more, each operation concluded is followed by another bombing.
In the end, peace in Balochistan is not only about defeating terrorists. It is about convincing the people of the province that the federation respects them, values them, and is willing to share power and resources fairly. Federalism is not weakness; it is strength. It binds diverse communities into one nation by giving them dignity and autonomy. For Pakistan, especially at a time when terrorism is evolving and external threats are growing, the implementation of federalism is not just desirable—it is critical. Without it, Balochistan will remain a battlefield. With it, the province can finally move from conflict to stability. The choice lies with the federation, and the time to make it is now.
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