Arshad Mahmood Awan
Since 2016, SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) has remained largely ineffective, largely due to the unresolved tensions between India and Pakistan. In this vacuum, India has taken steps to promote BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) as an alternative forum for regional cooperation. BIMSTEC includes seven countries, five of which are SAARC members: India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Nepal, and Thailand. Notably, Pakistan, which India accuses of blocking key regional connectivity projects within SAARC, is excluded from this group.
India has positioned the BIMSTEC Energy Centre (BEC) in Bengaluru as a central player in promoting regional energy cooperation among its member states. The Indian government signed a “host country agreement” to establish the BEC, which will manage a regional energy database, conduct feasibility studies, and promote energy security through grid interconnections, renewable energy development, and energy efficiency initiatives. Originally, the task of managing regional energy cooperation within SAARC was assigned to the SAARC Energy Centre (SEC) based in Islamabad. However, India now claims that the SEC failed to meet its objectives over the past 18 years, a significant part of India’s justification for shifting energy cooperation to BIMSTEC.
The initiatives being led by India through BIMSTEC, such as the development of a BIMSTEC Grid Interconnection Master Plan and the promotion of renewable energy and cross-border energy trade, essentially give India a dominant role in shaping the energy security of the region. This could lead to India having significant control over the energy resources of neighboring countries, especially hydropower resources in Bhutan and Nepal. India’s energy policy, particularly with Bangladesh, illustrates this growing influence. Bangladesh, which is heavily reliant on India for electricity, entered into a 25-year agreement in 2023 to source power from Indian plants, including from the Adani Group. This dependency has made Bangladesh vulnerable to price hikes and mounting debts. Despite a sharp increase in electricity costs—up to 63% higher than state-owned power rates in India—Bangladesh struggles to make payments to Indian companies, which have resorted to reducing power supply as a means to recover unpaid dues.
The BIMSTEC framework, while aimed at promoting regional cooperation, appears to serve India’s broader strategy of regional dominance. India’s approach of using energy agreements as leverage not only strengthens its position within South Asia but also marginalizes Pakistan, further isolating it from regional economic and diplomatic engagements. This strategy gained momentum after the 2016 SAARC summit, which was effectively abandoned by India, citing security concerns following attacks allegedly planned by Pakistan-based militants. India’s decision to isolate Pakistan from regional cooperation mechanisms within SAARC opened the door for BIMSTEC to flourish as a platform where India could assert its influence.
In a broader geopolitical context, India’s success in pushing Pakistan out of regional fora has been mirrored on the global stage as well. For instance, in the recent BRICS summit in Russia, despite support from China and Russia, Pakistan failed to secure membership, largely due to India’s opposition. Despite Pakistan’s strategic partnerships, such as hosting the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), India’s persistent opposition has hindered Pakistan’s ability to gain broader international support. Countries with lesser global influence than Pakistan, such as Bangladesh, have gained BRICS membership, further emphasizing Pakistan’s diplomatic isolation.
This geopolitical shift presents an opportunity for Pakistan to reassess its regional strategy, particularly in terms of its relationship with Bangladesh. With Dhaka facing mounting pressures from its reliance on India for energy and other resources, there is potential for Pakistan to strengthen its diplomatic and economic ties with Bangladesh. The current discontent in Bangladesh with India’s handling of energy agreements could open a window for Pakistan to position itself as a reliable partner for Dhaka, offering an alternative to India’s dominance in the region. This is a critical moment for Pakistan to rebuild its standing in South Asia, particularly by improving its diplomatic engagement with Bangladesh and pursuing economic collaborations that could help balance India’s influence.
In sum, India’s push to sideline Pakistan in regional energy cooperation, coupled with its growing control over neighboring countries’ energy resources, reflects its broader strategy of asserting dominance in South Asia. For Pakistan, this signals the need for a shift in diplomatic priorities. With Bangladesh now more open to alternative alliances, Pakistan must seize this opportunity to regain its geopolitical relevance and seek to counterbalance India’s regional hegemony.
