Police Reforms in Pakistan: Federalism, Constitutionalism, and Institutional Change

By Tariq Mehmood Awan – Civil Servant, Punjab

Introduction

The police in any state are the visible expression of its authority and its capacity to enforce law, order, and justice. They are the guardians of public peace, the protectors of life and property, and the first point of contact between citizens and the coercive power of government. In every democracy, the quality of policing is directly connected with the quality of governance: where the police are professional, impartial, and responsive, the state itself is perceived as legitimate; where the police are arbitrary, corrupt, or oppressive, the very foundations of public trust erode.

Pakistan’s experience with policing has remained deeply problematic. At independence, the new state inherited a colonial police system created under the Police Act of 1861. This statute was never designed for democratic accountability or service delivery. Its primary objective was to safeguard imperial authority, suppress dissent, and ensure compliance of subjects with colonial rule. Unfortunately, despite numerous committees and commissions, the underlying structure of policing in Pakistan has not been transformed. Instead, cosmetic reforms, administrative adjustments, and periodic rebranding exercises have kept alive the same coercive apparatus under a new flag.

The tragedy of Pakistan’s police reforms lies in their failure to address the constitutional and structural dimensions of policing. Reforms have focused on procedures, on promises of “depoliticization,” or on increasing salaries of senior officers, while neglecting the core questions: Which level of government is constitutionally empowered to establish and control the police? How should police cadres be organized? What structures of accountability are required to ensure that police power is exercised lawfully? And how should the law itself be codified to reflect the principles of a federal democratic republic?

This paper argues that police reform in Pakistan cannot succeed without returning to the Constitution, to the principles of federalism, and to the imperatives of human dignity and rule of law. Reform requires a new legal framework, the creation of provincial police services, the abolition of arbitrary class systems within the force, and a re-orientation of policing as a public service rather than a political weapon. Only by restructuring the police as a constitutional, provincial, and professional service can Pakistan hope to ensure genuine security and justice for its citizens.

Theoretical Foundations of Policing

Policing has been studied and debated across disciplines of law, sociology, and political science. One definition, widely cited in contemporary literature, comes from the American sociologist Egon Bittner, who described the essence of police work as the capacity to use coercive force in non-negotiable situations. According to Bittner, the police are unique not because they maintain order or enforce laws, but because they hold the legal authority to impose coercion swiftly and conclusively when circumstances demand it. This monopoly of legitimate coercion is what distinguishes the police from other public or private actors.

Yet, coercion alone cannot define the police in a constitutional state. In democracies, police power is bounded by law, checked by independent institutions, and legitimized by public consent. The famous Weberian conception of the modern state — as the entity that holds a monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force — finds its practical expression in the institution of policing. But this legitimacy is conditional: the use of force is justified only when exercised in accordance with duly enacted law, proportionate to the threat, and subject to accountability.

Policing is also broader than law enforcement. It includes the regulation of public order, management of assemblies, investigation of crimes, licensing of certain activities, and protection of vulnerable groups. In the post-9/11 era, policing has also overlapped with counterterrorism and intelligence operations. This expansion of functions, however, has often blurred the lines between civil law enforcement and national security. The core of democratic policing must remain civilian in nature, focused on everyday safety of citizens, rather than militarized or politicized operations.

Globally, democratic theory of policing rests on three interlinked pillars: legality, accountability, and service. Legality demands that every police action must be rooted in law and subject to judicial review. Accountability ensures that police officers are answerable not only to their hierarchy but also to independent oversight bodies and, ultimately, to the public. Service requires that policing be oriented towards community needs, treating citizens as rights-bearing individuals rather than as subjects of control. These principles provide the intellectual foundation upon which Pakistan’s police reforms must be constructed.

Constitutional and Legal Foundations in Pakistan

The Constitution of Pakistan, adopted in 1973, provides a federal structure in which subjects of legislation are divided between the federation and the provinces through the Federal Legislative List and the provincial residuary powers under Article 142. The argument is being put forward post 18^th amendment and existing law regimes in 2025.  Policing, in both its establishment and operations, falls squarely within the provincial domain. Article 70(4) and Schedule IV confirm that law and order are not matters for the federation, except in narrowly defined areas such as defence, railways, or federal territories.

Further clarity is provided by Article 139, which directs that all executive actions of a provincial government are to be carried out in the name of the Governor, and by rules of business framed by each provincial government. In Punjab, for example, the Rules of Business 2011 explicitly place policing within the Home Department, and specify that all matters relating to police establishments, police rules, and police works are the responsibility of that department. This makes clear that the police are not an independent department of government, but a specialized agency of the provincial Home Department, answerable to provincial executives and legislatures. I have already contented that rules of business are mere procedures and require substantial law-making instruments by the relevant legislatures.

Article 240(b) of the Constitution gives provincial assemblies the power to legislate on provincial posts and services. By implication, it is the duty of each provincial assembly to create its own Provincial Police Service, structured in accordance with the constitutional scheme. It is pertinent to mention here that all posts from inspector general of police IG to constable are provincial posts. The existing arrangement, whereby the federally controlled Police Service of Pakistan (PSP) occupies provincial posts, lacks any constitutional basis. It is a legacy of colonial administration, preserved by executive rules but never sanctioned by legislation. The attempt to justify this arrangement by invoking Article 241 — the saving clause for pre-constitutional laws — is legally untenable, since no act of parliament ever created the PSP as a central service.

The constitutional obligation is therefore clear: the police must be raised, organized, and managed at the provincial level. The federal government may maintain police organizations for federal purposes, such as the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), the Islamabad Capital Territory Police, or the police services for the federal legislative list, but it cannot reserve provincial posts for federal cadres. To do so is to violate the federal distribution of powers, undermine provincial autonomy, and create administrative anomalies.

This interpretation is reinforced by comparative constitutional jurisprudence. In India, the Supreme Court in Prakash Singh v. Union of India (2006) directed states to enact their own Police Acts, recognizing policing as a state subject under the Indian Constitution. If even in a union system with a concurrent list, policing is left to the states, then in Pakistan’s federal system — which has no concurrent list for policing after the 18th Amendment — provincial control over police is beyond dispute. Then, there is also a misunderstanding on article 142 b which provides concurrence on criminal law, criminal procedure, and evidence. Firstly, it is meant only for legislation, and secondly, it does not relate to create, establish and provide functions to police which is otherwise falls under article 142 c read with schedule IV and article 240 b of the constitution of Pakistan.

The judiciary in Pakistan has also weighed in on the legal obligations of police. In numerous judgments, courts have held that refusal to register a First Information Report (FIR) for a cognizable offence is a dereliction of duty, violative of citizens’ fundamental rights under Articles 9 and 10-A. These judgments underscore that the police are not masters of discretion but servants of law. The registration of crime, the protection of liberty, and the treatment of citizens are constitutional matters, not internal administrative policies.

Considering these provisions, the path to reform is constitutionally mapped: provinces must create their own police services, codify the law of policing in provincial statutes, and ensure that police operations are consistent with fundamental rights and judicial directions. Federal encroachment must be rolled back, and provincial legislatures must accept their responsibility to legislate comprehensively on the structure, functions, and accountability of their police forces.

History of Police Reforms in Pakistan

The history of police in Pakistan is inseparable from its colonial inheritance. At independence in 1947, Pakistan adopted the Police Act of 1861, enacted by the British Raj in the aftermath of the 1857 uprising. The Act was designed not for community service but for control: to maintain the authority of the Crown and suppress any challenge to its rule. Its spirit was authoritarian, its purpose coercive, and its vision bureaucratic. Rather than serving citizens, the police were meant to serve the state and its rulers.

The 1861 Act created a highly centralized police hierarchy, with power concentrated in the office of the Inspector General of Police. Local populations had no meaningful oversight over their police, while constables were treated as menial subordinates with no prospects of advancement. This was the legacy Pakistan inherited — and, tragically, preserved.

From the 1950s onward, various commissions were appointed to examine the deficiencies of the police. The Police Commission of 1951 recommended greater training and the need to insulate the force from political interference, but its proposals were shelved. The Justice Cornelius Commission of 1960 again underlined the colonial structure of the force and urged reforms, but little was implemented. The Justice Karamat Commission of 1972 followed the same trajectory: detailed recommendations but no political will to enforce them.

During General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime in the 1980s, the Police Rules of 1985 were framed to provide legitimacy to the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP). Yet these rules, being executive instruments, could not override the constitutional fact that policing is a provincial subject. The PSP itself had never been created by statute; it remained an executive creation, lacking legal foundation.

The most ambitious reform effort came under General Pervez Musharraf. In 2002, the Police Order was promulgated, replacing the 1861 Act in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then NWFP). The Order introduced new concepts: fixed tenures for senior officers, Public Safety Commissions at district, provincial, and national levels, separation of watch and ward functions from investigation, and greater transparency in appointments. It envisioned a citizen-centric model of policing with independent oversight.

However, the Police Order 2002 was never fully implemented. Public Safety Commissions remained on paper; fixed tenures were violated by successive governments; and political authorities continued to manipulate transfers and postings. In 2010, after the 18th Constitutional Amendment, policing was fully devolved to the provinces. Sindh and Balochistan reverted to the colonial Police Act of 1861, while Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa retained modified versions of the Police Order. The result has been a fragmented legal landscape: four provinces governed by different laws, none of which have addressed the constitutional requirement to create provincial police services under Article 240(b).

This history of reform reveals a consistent pattern: rhetoric without implementation, recommendations without legislation, and promises without structural change. Committees and commissions have spoken of “depoliticization” and “professionalization,” but the fundamental issues — provincial autonomy, cadre management, accountability, and codification of police law — have been ignored. The colonial model survives, wearing a democratic mask.

Structural Challenges in Policing

1. Centralization vs. Provincial Authority

The foremost structural challenge is the conflict between Pakistan’s federal Constitution and the actual organization of policing. Constitutionally, policing is a provincial subject. Yet in practice, senior positions in provincial police organizations are dominated by officers of the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP) — a federal cadre never established by any act of Parliament. This anomaly undermines provincial autonomy and creates dual loyalties. A provincial Inspector General, drawn from PSP, remains answerable to federal authorities rather than to the provincial assembly or cabinet.

This duality distorts accountability. Provinces cannot exercise full authority over their police forces when senior officers remain tied to federal career structures. Reform requires dismantling this anomaly through the creation of genuine Provincial Police Services (PPS), recruited, managed, and promoted under provincial laws.

• General Cadre vs. Specialized Cadres

Another deep flaw lies in cadre organization. Pakistan’s police have been treated as a generalist service, where officers rotate between operations, investigation, administration, and specialized wings with little regard for professional expertise. This dilutes efficiency and prevents the development of specialized skills.

In modern democracies, policing is divided into specialized cadres: investigation, prosecution, traffic, intelligence, forensics, community policing, and administration. Each requires distinct training and career progression. Pakistan’s adherence to a general cadre has resulted in poor investigations, weak prosecutions, and ineffective community policing. Reform must replace the general cadre with specialized cadres, allowing officers to build expertise and progress within their chosen domain.

• The Class System Within Police

The most corrosive structural issue is the class system within the force. At the top stand the PSP officers, recruited through the Central Superior Services, who enjoy rapid promotions, elite training, and privileged postings. Below them are most constables, head constables, assistant sub-inspectors, and inspectors, recruited provincially but denied any meaningful career path. Out of nearly 400,000 police personnel in Pakistan, only about 800 belong to PSP — yet the entire structure revolves around ensuring that each PSP officer reaches grade 22, while the careers of thousands of subordinates stagnate.

This duality breeds resentment, discourages professionalism, and violates the principle of equality. A constable who spends thirty years in service may retire at the same rank he entered, while a PSP officer advances smoothly regardless of performance. Such a system is not only unjust but also unconstitutional, as it denies equal opportunity within public service. Reform must abolish this class system and create a unified, merit-based structure where progression is possible for all.

• Arbitrary “Transfer Culture”

Structural weakness is compounded by the practice of arbitrary transfers, especially of Station House Officers (SHOs). While PSP officers demand security of tenure for themselves, SHOs — who exercise actual statutory police powers — are transferred at will, often monthly, based on political pressure or internal manipulation. This has created what is commonly known as the “Arbitrary Transfer culture”: a police station where the SHO acts as a local power broker, beholden to patrons rather than to law.

Because the SHO is insecure in tenure, he seeks to extract maximum advantage during his brief posting — whether through bribes, favors, or misuse of authority. The lack of institutional oversight and the absence of financial independence at the station level reinforce this corruption. Reform requires legislating fixed tenures for SHOs, linked with performance evaluation, and granting police stations operational budgets with transparent audits.

• Resource Deficits and Capacity Gaps

Pakistan’s police also suffer from chronic underfunding. Despite being the third largest item in provincial budgets after education and health, police resources are consumed by salaries of senior officers and VIP security duties, leaving little for investigation, training, or community service. On average, Pakistan spends less than 1% of GDP on policing, far below international standards. The police-to-population ratio remains inadequate, with one officer for every 500–700 citizens, compared to the UN-recommended ratio of 1:222.

Equipment is outdated, forensic laboratories are insufficient, and training curricula remain archaic. At the same time, one-third of police strength in some provinces is diverted to non-core duties such as guarding politicians and elites. Without reallocating resources towards stations, investigations, and community policing, structural reform will remain hollow.

Five Rules of Civil Service Reform Applied to Policing

I have already proposed five rules of civil service reforms in my research paper on civil service reforms. Following is the gist of the five rules only to reform police services in Pakistan.

Rule One: Implementation of the Constitution

The starting point for any serious police reform in Pakistan must be fidelity to the Constitution. Article 240(b) expressly vests the authority to legislate on provincial posts and services in the provincial assemblies. Read together with Schedule IV and Article 142(c), this creates a constitutional obligation for each province to establish its own Provincial Police Service (PPS).

At present, the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP), a federally managed cadre, occupies positions within provincial home departments without any lawful foundation. This encroachment distorts federalism, weakens provincial autonomy, and renders police unaccountable to provincial executives. Reform therefore requires:

1. Creation of Provincial Police Services by provincial assemblies through legislation.

• Restriction of PSP to federal policing institutions such as FIA, Islamabad Police, or other agencies within federal jurisdiction.

• Clear division of tiers of policing: Federal Police for federal functions; All Pakistan Police for common subjects under the Council of Common Interests (CCI); Provincial Police for provincial domains; and District Police for local law and order.

The Constitution is explicit: law and order is a provincial subject, and any reservation of provincial posts for federal or even all pakistan cadres is ultra vires. Effective reform cannot proceed until this constitutional misalignment is corrected.

Rule Two: Ensuring Structural Alignment

A modern police service must be structured in accordance with the principles of functionality, accountability, and responsiveness. In Pakistan, however, the current structure reflects colonial centralization, arbitrary class divisions, and excessive supervisory layers with little value addition.

Structural alignment requires a bottom-up reorganization. The police station should be recognized as the core functional unit, adequately funded, and placed under officers with financial and operational independence. Supervisory offices (SPs, DIGs, IGs) should not merely consume resources but share investigative and operational responsibilities.

Furthermore, policing must be devolved. Just as the Constitution devolved functions from federation to provinces, provinces must devolve policing to districts. District Police Services should be created under provincial laws, with clear lines of accountability to elected district representatives. Only by aligning structure with democratic federalism can policing be brought closer to the people.

Rule Three: Cadre Specialization

Policing in Pakistan suffers from a generalist model. Officers rotate arbitrarily between investigation, operations, traffic, intelligence, and administration. This dilutes expertise and fosters mediocrity. Reform requires the creation of specialized cadres, each with its own recruitment, training, and career path.

For example:

1. Investigation Cadre: trained in forensics, evidence collection, and prosecution support.

• Operations Cadre: responsible for patrol, public order, and emergency response.

• Traffic Cadre: focused on road safety, regulation, and accident investigation.

• Prosecution Cadre: legally trained officers integrated with provincial prosecution departments.

• Community Policing Cadre: engaging directly with citizens, mediation, and preventive policing.

• Intelligence & Surveillance Cadre: monitoring organized crime and emerging threats.

• Administrative Cadre: Administration is also specialization. This cadre will ensure terms and conditions of services, financial and administrative management and policy and law support with Human resources management.

Specialization must replace the “one-size-fits-all” approach. This will not only improve professional competence but also dismantle the monopoly of PSP officers, whose generalist orientation undermines organizational performance.

Rule Four: Recoding the Laws

The legal framework governing policing is archaic and fragmented. The Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 and the Police Act of 1861 remain the foundation of criminal justice, despite being wholly unsuited to a federal democracy of the twenty-first century. Following steps are vital:

1. Codification is the solution. Each province must enact a comprehensive Police Code, harmonizing constitutional provisions, criminal law, and human rights guarantees. This Code should:

• Define policing functions clearly, separating civil law enforcement from national security.

• Codify rules of investigation, integrating modern forensic and digital evidence practices.

• Incorporate judicial precedents affirming citizens’ rights, especially on registration of FIRs and due process.

• Provide legislative clarity on accountability, both internal (disciplinary mechanisms) and external (independent oversight bodies).

Codification removes ambiguity, prevents arbitrary discretion, and ensures accessibility of law to both officers and citizens. A coherent Police Code would replace colonial remnants with a body of law rooted in Pakistan’s Constitution and democratic principles.

Rule Five: Improving Terms and Conditions of Service

Finally, reforms cannot succeed without addressing the conditions of service for the majority of police personnel. At present, nearly 400,000 provincial police employees have no viable career path, while 800 PSP officers enjoy assured progression to grade 22. This duality is unjust, unconstitutional, and destructive of morale.

Reforms must include:

1. Abolish the class system and create a unified promotion structure of different cadres.

• Provide structured career paths for constables, head constables, and inspectors, allowing advancement based on merit, training, and performance.

• Improve welfare and working conditions, including housing, healthcare, insurance, and pensions.

• Ensure gender and minority inclusion, by creating supportive environments for women officers and minority communities.

• Improve the standards in recruitment, training, placements, promotions, retentions, and retirements.

The principle must be clear: if the state demands professionalism and integrity from police personnel, it must also provide fair terms, career security, and recognition of service.

Conclusion of the Five Rules

Together, these five rules form the skeleton of meaningful police reform in Pakistan. They are not cosmetic suggestions but constitutional imperatives and structural necessities. Without implementing the Constitution, aligning structures, creating specialized cadres, codifying laws, and reforming service conditions, Pakistan will remain trapped in a colonial policing model. With these reforms, however, policing can be transformed into a democratic service — accountable to the people, respectful of rights, and committed to justice.

Cadre Management in Police Services

One of the least understood yet most decisive elements of police reform in Pakistan lies in cadre management. Cadres define not only the distribution of posts but also the philosophy of an organization. At present, the police in Pakistan operate under a generalist cadre system, heavily influenced by the dominance of the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP). This structure allows officers to move horizontally between very different functions — investigation, operations, traffic, prosecution, and administration — without ever developing the specialized expertise necessary for modern law enforcement. A PSP officer may begin as an Assistant Superintendent of Police managing a district subdivision, then move to investigation, later be transferred to the intelligence wing, and eventually to administration, all without substantive training in each domain. This approach inevitably produces managers without mastery, generalists without depth, and institutions without specialization.

The alternative, and indeed the constitutional necessity, is the development of specialized cadres within the police service. These cadres must be organized around core policing functions: investigation, operations, prosecution, traffic regulation, forensics, and intelligence. Each cadre should have its own entry stream, training academy, and promotion ladder, allowing officers to grow vertically within their chosen field. This would mirror models in advanced federations where specialization has produced professional excellence — for instance, the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States is an investigative cadre distinct from local police, while state troopers, highway patrols, and local sheriffs maintain their own specialized domains. In India, too, the state police services have introduced specialized cadres post-Prakash Singh reforms, acknowledging that policing is too complex to be left to a rotating elite.

Cadre management must also address the problem of vertical mobility. Currently, constables and sub-inspectors — the real backbone of policing — face little chance of promotion beyond a narrow ceiling. A constable may spend his entire career without rising to a supervisory rank, regardless of merit or experience. This stagnation breeds frustration, corruption, and alienation from public service. In contrast, PSP officers enjoy assured promotions, with nearly every officer rising to grade 21 or 22. The system is unjust, corrosive, and unconstitutional. Police reforms must create transparent promotion pathways for all personnel, where advancement is based on performance, examinations, and specialized training rather than on cadre privilege. Without this, the rank-and-file, which constitutes over 95% of the police force, will remain demoralized, and reforms will fail at the ground level.

Moreover, cadre reform is critical for ensuring alignment with federalism. The persistence of a federal PSP cadre occupying provincial posts violates Article 240(b) of the Constitution. Provinces must legislate their own Provincial Police Services (PPS), ensuring that provincial posts are held by officers accountable to provincial assemblies and executives. The PSP may be retained for federal agencies like FIA, ANF, and Islamabad Police, but it cannot constitutionally dominate provincial policing. This encroachment creates a system of dual loyalty, where officers remain oriented towards federal authorities while serving in provinces. Such a model undermines democratic accountability and perpetuates the colonial logic of centralized control. Cadre management, therefore, is not simply an administrative adjustment but a constitutional obligation.

Supervisory Mechanisms and Accountability

The second major pillar of reform is the creation of effective supervisory and accountability structures. In every democracy, the police cannot be left as an autonomous body wielding coercive power without supervision. Yet in Pakistan, the collapse of supervisory institutions has transformed the police into an arbitrary authority. Historically, the Deputy Commissioner (DC) served as the District Magistrate, exercising oversight over the police and ensuring that coercive powers were exercised within legal bounds. With the separation of judiciary from the executive and the abolition of the magistracy in 2002, this supervisory role was dismantled. The Police Order 2002 attempted to replace it with District Public Safety Commissions, but these bodies were never allowed to function. As a result, the police at district level now operate largely unchecked, with Station House Officers (SHOs) wielding immense authority under little meaningful scrutiny.

The absence of supervision has produced a culture of arbitrariness. SHOs, transferred frequently under political pressure, act less as servants of law and more as agents of political or financial patrons. Senior officers, preoccupied with their own careers, rarely intervene to ensure legality at the police station level. Citizens who approach police stations often encounter extortion, harassment, or outright refusal to register cases. This breakdown of trust is directly linked to the lack of institutional accountability. Reform must reintroduce effective supervisory mechanisms to restore balance.

The question, however, is who should supervise the police. There are three possible models. The first is the administrative model, where district magistrates or deputy commissioners oversee police operations. This ensures bureaucratic accountability but risks reviving the colonial model of excessive executive control. The second is the political model, where elected district representatives supervise local police. This strengthens democratic accountability but risks politicization, especially in Pakistan’s fragile democratic culture. The third is the judicial-prosecutorial model, where prosecutors and magistrates exercise oversight of investigations, while independent commissions oversee policing policy. This aligns policing with the justice system and minimizes political manipulation.

In practice, Pakistan may require a hybrid model. At the district level, elected local governments should have an oversight role in budget allocation and priority setting, while prosecutors and magistrates supervise legality of investigations. At the provincial level, Home Departments must reassert their authority as the institutional parent departments of police, ensuring that senior officers remain accountable to civilian executives leading to political executives and finally to the legislature. Independent Police Commissions, with representation from civil society, retired judges, and legal experts, can provide external oversight on complaints of misconduct. Only by layering these supervisory mechanisms can Pakistan prevent police from becoming an unaccountable “state within a state.”

Accountability must also extend to internal disciplinary systems. Presently, police disciplinary proceedings are opaque, arbitrary, and often manipulated by senior officers. Complaints against SHOs or constables are ignored, while misconduct by senior PSP officers is shielded. Reforms should establish independent internal affairs units, staffed by officers from outside the accused officer’s cadre, with transparent procedures and public reporting. Moreover, whistle-blower protections must be legislated to allow honest officers to report corruption or abuse without fear of reprisal.

Finally, accountability cannot succeed without financial transparency. At present, police budgets are centralized and opaque, with little scrutiny at the station level. SHOs often lack even basic operational funds, forcing them to extract resources informally. Reforms must allocate station-level budgets, audited independently, to empower SHOs to perform their duties without resort to corruption. This would professionalize police stations as genuine service centres rather than centres of extortion.

Operational Functions of Police

The police are, at their core, a civil law enforcement agency. Their mandate is fundamentally different from that of the military or paramilitary forces. Whereas the armed forces are oriented toward external defence, and intelligence agencies operate in secrecy to safeguard national security, the police exist to serve the everyday needs of citizens within the framework of the law. Their essential functions include protecting life and property, preventing crime, investigating offences, enforcing laws, supporting prosecutions, and maintaining public order. These are not peripheral tasks but the very heart of civil governance. Without an effective police service, constitutional guarantees of security and liberty remain hollow.

Unfortunately, in Pakistan, the police have been burdened with a confused and overextended mandate. They are called upon not only to perform their traditional civil law enforcement functions but also to combat terrorism, protect political elites, enforce regulatory codes, and even manage disaster relief operations. This dilution of responsibilities has weakened their capacity to deliver on their core functions. For instance, while thousands of officers remain deployed on VIP security duties, ordinary citizens often find their local police station understaffed and unable to respond to emergencies. The expansion of the police mandate into areas better suited for specialized agencies has created inefficiency, diluted accountability, and allowed core services like investigation and community policing to atrophy.

A critical step in reform must therefore be redefining and prioritizing the functions of the police. Policing must be anchored in the civil domain: investigation of crimes, protection of rights, and regulation of public order. National security functions such as counterterrorism, though requiring police cooperation, should be primarily handled by specialized federal agencies operating under the Defence or Interior ministries. Regulatory functions, such as licensing of businesses or inspection of premises, should be streamlined to prevent the misuse of police authority for extortion. The police must return to being what the Constitution envisions them to be — a provincial civil agency for law enforcement, not a sprawling, unfocused institution stretched thin across incompatible domains.

Equally important is the quality of policing functions. Crime prevention requires proactive patrolling and intelligence-led policing rather than reactive firefighting. Investigation requires trained officers with access to modern forensic laboratories, evidence collection methods, and digital crime analysis. Prosecution support requires close coordination with prosecutors to ensure that cases presented in court are based on lawful evidence and respect due process. Community policing requires officers who are visible, approachable, and trusted by local populations. Without specialization and resources in these domains, the police cannot fulfil their mandate effectively.

The Central Role of Police Stations

The police station is the nucleus of policing. It is the first and often only point of contact for ordinary citizens seeking justice, protection, or assistance. Every criminal investigation, every registration of an FIR, every preventive action begins at the police station. Yet in Pakistan, the police station has been systematically neglected in favour of a top-heavy bureaucracy. Billions of rupees are spent annually on maintaining inspector generals, deputy inspector generals, and superintendents, while the ordinary police station operates in near destitution.

This structural imbalance has created what is commonly known as “thana culture.” Police stations, underfunded and overstretched, often resort to corruption to meet their basic operational needs. SHOs, who exercise statutory powers under the Criminal Procedure Code, are transferred frequently, sometimes within months, under political pressure. With insecure tenure and no operational budget, SHOs often turn to illicit means — demanding bribes for registration of FIRs, extracting rents from local businesses, or aligning themselves with political patrons. Citizens entering police stations frequently describe experiences of intimidation, extortion, or outright refusal of service. This has transformed the police station, instead of being a centre of protection, into a symbol of fear and injustice.

Meaningful police reform cannot succeed without restructuring and empowering the police station. The first step is financial independence. Each police station must be allocated an operational budget sufficient to cover fuel, maintenance, investigation costs, and community outreach. These budgets should be audited transparently by independent provincial audit bodies, not controlled by senior officers who currently centralize resources at the top. This would free SHOs from dependency on illicit funds and allow them to function as service providers rather than rent-seekers.

The second step is tenure security. Just as senior officers demand fixed tenures for themselves, so too must SHOs be guaranteed a minimum term — at least one year — unless removed for misconduct through a transparent process. This would create stability in leadership at the station level, allowing SHOs to build relationships with local communities and take responsibility for outcomes in their jurisdictions.

The third step is professionalizing the police station as a service centre. Citizens must be able to access services without harassment. This requires computerization of FIR registration, establishment of front desks staffed by trained civilian staff, CCTV monitoring of interactions to prevent abuse, and community liaison officers who maintain open communication with residents. International models, such as community precincts in the United States or “beat policing” in the United Kingdom, demonstrate how decentralized, citizen-friendly stations can transform public trust.

Finally, the role of the SHO must be redefined. At present, the SHO bears enormous discretionary authority without adequate support. He is expected to manage crime prevention, investigation, intelligence gathering, and community relations simultaneously, often with minimal training. Reform must create a team-based structure within police stations, with dedicated officers for investigation, operations, and community policing, led by the SHO as coordinator. This specialization at the station level would enhance professionalism and reduce arbitrary discretion.

The future of policing in Pakistan hinges on whether the police station is reimagined as a genuine service hub. If reforms bypass the station and focus only on elite officers, they will remain cosmetic. If, however, resources, accountability, and professionalism are redirected to the police station, the culture of policing can be transformed at its roots.

Terms and Conditions of Service

The terms and conditions under which police personnel serve are not merely an employment matter; they are central to the effectiveness, integrity, and legitimacy of policing as an institution. In Pakistan, these conditions remain grossly inadequate, especially for the lower ranks who constitute the overwhelming majority of the force. Constables and sub-inspectors, who form the operational backbone of policing, often work long hours in dangerous conditions, with little rest, insufficient pay, and minimal welfare provisions. Their housing is substandard, their healthcare entitlements limited, and their insurance coverage negligible. In many cases, families of police officials killed in the line of duty are left to navigate bureaucratic hurdles for compensation. Such conditions inevitably produce demoralization and, in turn, foster corruption and misconduct. When officers feel exploited and insecure, they cannot be expected to uphold the dignity of the law.

Reforms must therefore begin with a restructuring of pay scales and service benefits. A constable or inspector who risks his life daily deserves not only adequate compensation but also dignity in service. This requires aligning police pay with comparable professions, ensuring that the risks of policing are matched by appropriate financial recognition. Beyond pay, reforms must institutionalize welfare packages: housing allowances, medical insurance, education benefits for children, and pensions for families of those who die in service. These measures are not charity; they are investments in the professionalism and loyalty of the force. Without them, the state continues to demand sacrifices without offering security in return.

The Persistence of Class Barriers

The police system in Pakistan remains shackled by a rigid class hierarchy. At the top sit the PSP officers, recruited through the Central Superior Services, who enjoy fast-track promotions, exclusive training opportunities, and prestigious postings. Below them are hundreds of thousands of provincial police employees — constables, ASIs, SIs, and inspectors — who enter through provincial recruitment but are systematically denied vertical mobility. The structural outcome is a two-tiered police system: an elite corps assured of progression to grade 21 or 22, and a mass of subordinates consigned to stagnation.

This duality is not merely inequitable; it is unconstitutional. Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees equality before the law, and Article 27 prohibits discrimination in public service. Yet the class system entrenches precisely such discrimination. A constable who enters service at the age of 20 may retire 30 years later at the same rank, regardless of performance or merit, while a PSP officer of the same age may ascend effortlessly to the highest grades. This has bred resentment, fostered patron-client relationships, and created a gulf of mistrust within the force. More dangerously, it undermines accountability: when subordinates are denied prospects of advancement, they often resort to illicit practices to secure financial survival, while senior officers operate with impunity.

Police reform must abolish this class system. The force must be reorganized into a unified service, where progression from constable to senior ranks is possible through transparent examinations, training, and performance evaluation. Provincial Police Services must be empowered to provide career mobility to all employees, while PSP officers should no longer monopolize provincial posts. Such a shift would democratize policing from within, fostering a culture of merit and professionalism rather than hierarchy and privilege.

Human Resource Reforms

Beyond pay and promotion, comprehensive reform must address human resource management. Recruitment in Pakistan has historically been tainted by nepotism, corruption, and political manipulation. Constables are sometimes appointed on political quotas, while postings are sold or traded for patronage. This corrupts the force from its inception. A modern police service requires recruitment based on merit, psychological aptitude, and physical fitness. It also requires training that goes beyond drill and discipline to include human rights, community engagement, investigative techniques, and modern technology.

Training, however, must not be confined to entry-level. Continuous professional development is essential. In advanced democracies, police officers undergo periodic training throughout their careers, updating skills as laws, technologies, and social contexts evolve. In Pakistan, once an officer leaves the training academy, opportunities for further learning are rare. This perpetuates outdated practices and leaves officers ill-equipped to deal with cybercrime, organized networks, or community conflict resolution. Reform must institutionalize career-long training programs, with specialized academies for investigation, forensics, traffic management, and intelligence.

Another critical area is gender and minority inclusion. Pakistan’s police remain overwhelmingly male and insufficiently representative of religious and ethnic minorities. This has limited the force’s legitimacy among marginalized groups, who often view police not as protectors but as instruments of exclusion. Reform requires proactive recruitment of women, minorities, and underrepresented communities, coupled with the creation of supportive work environments. Women’s police stations, while useful, are insufficient unless women are fully integrated into mainstream policing with equal opportunities for leadership. Only a representative police force can claim to serve the entirety of society.

Finally, human resource reform must include psychological and health support. Policing is inherently stressful, with officers exposed to violence, trauma, and constant public scrutiny. Yet in Pakistan, psychological services for police are virtually nonexistent. Officers often cope through unhealthy means, including corruption, aggression, or substance abuse. Institutionalizing mental health support, counseling services, and stress management programs would not only improve the well-being of officers but also enhance the professionalism of their service delivery.

Towards a Professional Police Workforce

The cumulative effect of these measures — fair terms of service, abolition of class barriers, and comprehensive human resource reform — would be the creation of a professional police workforce. Such a workforce would be motivated not by survival or patronage but by a sense of duty, professional pride, and public service. This transformation is not utopian; it has been achieved in other federations where policing was once plagued by corruption and inefficiency. The key is political will and constitutional fidelity.

Pakistan must recognize that police reform is not about increasing privileges for an elite cadre; it is about empowering the men and women who interact with citizens on a daily basis. Until constables, inspectors, and subordinate ranks are provided with dignity, career prospects, and professional training, no reform will take root. A reformed police service is therefore not only a legal or administrative imperative but also a moral obligation of the state to those it sends daily into the most challenging and dangerous circumstances to uphold the rule of law.

The Urgency of Codification

Law is the backbone of policing. Without a clear, accessible, and comprehensive body of law, the police cannot function effectively, and citizens cannot hold them accountable. Pakistan’s current legal framework for policing is an outdated patchwork. Much of it still rests on the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 (CrPC), the Police Act of 1861, and a series of executive orders and rules issued during military regimes. These instruments were drafted for a colonial administration that prioritized control over service. They were never designed for a federal republic governed by democratic principles and constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights.

Codification is the process by which scattered, inconsistent, and outdated legal rules are consolidated into a single, coherent framework. In civil law systems, codification is a hallmark of legal modernization. In common law systems like Pakistan’s, codification provides clarity, reduces judicial and administrative discretion, and ensures accessibility of law to both citizens and state institutions. For Pakistan, codification of police law is no longer a matter of choice — it is a constitutional necessity. Without codification, the police remain governed by contradictory orders, ambiguous discretion, and arbitrary practices that weaken the rule of law.

Constitutional Parameters for Codification

The Constitution itself lays down the parameters for codification of police law. Article 142(c) grants provincial assemblies exclusive power to legislate on matters not enumerated in the Federal Legislative List, which includes policing and law and order. Article 240(b) requires each province to legislate on posts and services connected with provincial affairs. Schedule IV makes clear that law enforcement, barring certain federal agencies, is a provincial subject. Together, these provisions oblige provinces to enact their own comprehensive Police Acts that define the establishment, structure, and functions of their police services.

Yet, despite this constitutional clarity, provinces have failed to discharge this obligation. Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa continue to rely on modified versions of the Police Order 2002, while Sindh and Balochistan have reverted to the colonial Police Act of 1861. None of these instruments address the constitutional requirement of creating Provincial Police Services under Article 240(b). Nor do they provide a coherent codification of police powers, duties, and accountability mechanisms. The result is legal fragmentation and administrative confusion. Reform requires provinces to move decisively towards codified provincial police legislation that reflects the spirit of federalism and modern democratic policing.

Re-coding Criminal Procedure

A central element of codification must be the modernization of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898. This century-old statute continues to govern how crimes are investigated, how suspects are arrested, and how cases move through courts. Its procedures are outdated, cumbersome, and inconsistent with constitutional guarantees of due process under Articles 9, 10, and 10-A. For example, the FIR system, while essential, is frequently abused as a tool of harassment, because the Code gives SHOs enormous discretion without effective oversight. Bail provisions are ambiguous, leaving citizens vulnerable to arbitrary detention. Investigation timelines are unrealistic and often ignored, leading to endless delays in justice.

Reforms must re-code the CrPC to reflect modern principles. Investigations should be governed by clear statutory timelines, with sanctions for delay. Arrest powers must be strictly tied to necessity and proportionality, with judicial authorization required in most cases. Bail provisions must be rationalized to prevent prolonged pre-trial detention. Digital evidence, forensic reports, and victim testimony must be explicitly recognized under statutory law, removing the dependence on outdated evidentiary practices. Such codification would align Pakistan’s criminal procedure with constitutional rights and international human rights obligations, while also reducing arbitrary police discretion.

Defining the Scope of Police Functions

Another major gap in existing law is the uncertainty around the scope of police functions. The police are simultaneously described as crime investigators, regulators, protectors of public order, and, increasingly, counter-terrorism operatives. This overlapping mandate creates both inefficiency and abuse. For example, when police are used to enforce municipal regulations or collect revenue arrears, their credibility as a criminal law enforcement agency is compromised. When they are tasked with counterterrorism, their civil character is diluted, and they drift towards militarization.

Codification must clearly demarcate the functions of the police. Civil policing — prevention of crime, protection of rights, and investigation of offences — must be separated from national security functions, which should be handled by specialized federal agencies. Regulatory functions must be confined to areas where police intervention is truly necessary, such as licensing of firearms or traffic regulation. The law must state explicitly that police are a civilian agency of the provincial government, distinct from military or intelligence institutions. Without this legal clarity, the police will remain vulnerable to role confusion and politicization.

Embedding Accountability in Law

Codification must also embed accountability mechanisms into the legal framework. At present, police accountability is scattered between internal disciplinary rules, occasional judicial interventions, and ineffective oversight commissions. Citizens have little clarity on how to file complaints, how those complaints are processed, and what remedies are available. The absence of codified accountability procedures perpetuates impunity.

Reformed police laws must establish independent police complaint authorities, with statutory powers to investigate misconduct, summon officers, and recommend disciplinary or criminal action. These bodies must include representatives of civil society, retired judges, and human rights experts to ensure impartiality. Internal affairs units must be created within police departments, mandated by law to investigate corruption and abuse, with annual reports published for public scrutiny. Judicial oversight must also be formalized, ensuring that magistrates and prosecutors play a consistent role in supervising investigations. Embedding these mechanisms in law would end the culture of arbitrariness and bring police under the rule of law.

Harmonization with Fundamental Rights

Finally, codification must ensure that all police powers are exercised in conformity with fundamental rights. Article 9 guarantees the right to life and liberty, Article 14 guarantees dignity of man, and Article 10-A guarantees fair trial. Yet in practice, police frequently operate in ways that violate these rights — through torture in custody, denial of legal counsel, illegal detentions, and fabricated evidence. These practices persist because the law has failed to operationalize constitutional rights in the context of policing.

Codified police law must therefore prohibit torture explicitly, require the presence of counsel during interrogation, mandate medical examinations for detainees, and create remedies for violations. It must regulate use of force, establishing clear rules on proportionality, necessity, and reporting of incidents. It must protect the rights of women, children, and minorities in interactions with police. Most importantly, it must align all police procedures with Pakistan’s obligations under international human rights treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Pakistan is a signatory.

Codification of police law is not a technical matter; it is a transformation of the relationship between state and citizen. By replacing colonial-era statutes with modern, coherent, and rights-based codes, Pakistan can redefine policing as a service grounded in law, accountable to the people, and consistent with constitutional federalism. Without codification, reforms will remain cosmetic; with codification, they can reshape the culture of policing at its roots.

Comparative Perspectives: Why Look Beyond Pakistan

No police reform in Pakistan can be complete without examining how other federal democracies have addressed similar challenges. Policing is not unique to Pakistan; every federation must balance the need for central coordination with respect for provincial or state autonomy. While Pakistan inherited a centralized colonial model, federations such as the United States, India, and Germany have built policing systems that reflect their constitutional structures, histories, and democratic values. Studying these systems reveals both the dangers of centralization and the opportunities created by decentralization. More importantly, it demonstrates that effective policing is inseparable from constitutional fidelity.

The United States: State and Local Policing as the Norm

In the United States, policing is overwhelmingly a state and local function. Each of the fifty states maintains its own police structures, ranging from state police or highway patrols to county sheriffs and municipal police departments. The federal government does maintain agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), but these agencies are narrowly focused on specific federal crimes or interstate matters. The FBI cannot replace or control state police forces; it can only supplement them.

This model reflects the American Constitution, which reserves general police powers to the states under the Tenth Amendment. Local accountability is also a defining feature: sheriffs are often elected by county residents, and municipal police chiefs are appointed by mayors or city councils. This direct accountability ensures that policing remains responsive to community needs. It also means that citizens can hold their local police leadership responsible through elections or municipal oversight.

The American model demonstrates the strength of decentralization. By dispersing police authority across thousands of local jurisdictions, the system avoids creating a centralized police elite detached from ordinary citizens. While this leads to variation in policing standards, it strengthens the bond between police and community. For Pakistan, the lesson is clear: provinces must own their police, and districts must play a central role in police accountability. Concentrating authority in a federal cadre, as Pakistan has done, runs contrary to the very logic of federalism.

India: Between Central Control and State Autonomy

India provides another instructive example, though one much closer to Pakistan’s own history. Like Pakistan, India inherited the Police Act of 1861. However, over time, Indian states have developed their own police laws and cadres. The Prakash Singh judgment of 2006 by the Indian Supreme Court was a turning point, directing states to enact new police acts that established State Security Commissions, fixed tenures for police leadership, and separated investigation from law-and-order functions. While implementation has varied, many Indian states have legislated their own police frameworks, thereby asserting state ownership over policing.

At the same time, the Indian Union maintains significant central police forces — such as the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Border Security Force (BSF), and Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) — which often operate in states, particularly in counterinsurgency or terrorism contexts. This dual structure has created tensions between central and state authorities, with accusations that central agencies are used for political purposes.

The Indian experience offers two lessons for Pakistan. First, even in a union with a strong central government, states must be allowed to legislate and manage their own police forces. Without this, federalism becomes hollow. Second, excessive centralization of policing breeds conflict and politicization, as seen in disputes over CBI interventions in state matters. Pakistan must avoid this pitfall by ensuring that federal policing agencies remain confined to federal subjects, while provinces exercise exclusive authority over law and order within their boundaries.

Germany: A Federal Republic with Localized Policing

Germany represents perhaps the most decentralized policing model in Europe. Under its Basic Law (Grundgesetz), policing is primarily the responsibility of the Länder (states). Each Land maintains its own police service, funded, managed, and supervised by its state government. There is no federal police elite occupying state posts. Instead, the federal government maintains limited agencies, such as the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), which handles serious cross-border crime, and the Bundespolizei (Federal Police), which manages border protection, railways, and airports.

Coordination between federal and state police is achieved through cooperative mechanisms rather than hierarchical control. For example, information sharing between Länder and federal agencies is institutionalized, but federal officers cannot command state police. The German model shows how a federation can achieve both provincial autonomy and national coordination without undermining constitutional boundaries.

For Pakistan, the German example underscores the importance of provincial police ownership. Provinces must not only legislate their own police services but also manage recruitment, promotions, and accountability. Federal coordination can occur through the Council of Common Interests, but this must never translate into federal occupation of provincial posts.

Lessons for Pakistan

When these comparative models are viewed together, the conclusion is unavoidable: Pakistan’s current arrangement is an anomaly. Unlike the United States, where local accountability is paramount; unlike India, where states legislate their own police laws; and unlike Germany, where provinces exercise exclusive control over policing, Pakistan persists with a centralized Police Service of Pakistan that violates its own federal Constitution. This system reflects neither democratic principles nor comparative best practices.

The lesson for Pakistan is not to replicate any foreign model wholesale but to restore fidelity to its own Constitution. Policing must be recognized as a provincial function under Article 142(c) and Article 240(b). Provinces must create their own police services, abolish the federal occupation of provincial posts, and legislate comprehensive police codes. At the same time, coordination at the federal level can be achieved through specialized agencies for federal crimes and through cooperative mechanisms under the CCI. This balance of autonomy and coordination is the essence of federalism.

Conclusion

Comparative experience demonstrates that the most effective federations are those that respect the constitutional boundaries of policing. Centralized models breed alienation and politicization; decentralized models foster accountability and legitimacy. For Pakistan, the choice is stark: continue clinging to a colonial framework of central control, or embrace the federal structure its Constitution demands. Only the latter can produce a police service that is professional, accountable, and trusted by the people.

The Fiscal Foundations of Police Reform

No reform of policing can succeed unless it is grounded in financial realism. Policing is resource-intensive: it requires trained personnel, modern equipment, vehicles, forensic laboratories, communication systems, and functional infrastructure. Yet in Pakistan, police budgets have historically been treated as an afterthought, determined not by operational needs but by bureaucratic convenience. While education and health often receive political attention, police allocations are largely left to routine line-item budgeting within the Home Department. This has created a situation where the police, despite being the third-largest recipient of provincial funds after health and education, remain chronically under-resourced at the operational level.

The most glaring paradox is that while billions are spent annually on police organizations, the police station — the fundamental unit of service delivery — remains starved of funds. Station House Officers (SHOs) often lack money for basic functions such as fuel, stationery, or witness transportation. As a result, they are compelled to extract “informal revenues” from citizens, which institutionalizes corruption at the very first point of contact. This distortion cannot be corrected through rhetoric alone; it requires a structural rethinking of how police finances are allocated, managed, and scrutinized.

Line-Item Budgeting versus Needs-Based Budgeting

Pakistan’s police budgets are still structured around the colonial line-item model, where funds are allocated for salaries, allowances, fuel, and maintenance under rigid categories. This system leaves little room for operational flexibility and prioritization. An SHO who urgently requires funds for a key investigation cannot divert even a small amount from another head without risking audit objections. Conversely, senior officers often have discretionary access to vehicles, allowances, and perks that far exceed their operational necessity.

A transition to needs-based and program budgeting is essential. Police stations should receive lump-sum operational budgets tied to performance indicators such as response times, investigation completion rates, and community satisfaction surveys. Instead of being micromanaged through distant bureaucratic controls, SHOs should be empowered to spend according to local priorities, subject to independent audits. This shift would not only improve efficiency but also restore a sense of ownership and responsibility at the station level. Accountability would be ensured through transparent reporting and civil oversight rather than rigid bureaucratic controls.

Equitable Distribution of Resources

Another critical weakness of police finances in Pakistan is the inequitable distribution of resources. The overwhelming share of funds is consumed by urban centres and senior officers, while rural police stations, which often cover vast and insecure territories, remain neglected. Similarly, elite units such as Special Branch or VIP security divisions consume disproportionate allocations compared to routine patrol, investigation, and community policing. This imbalance reflects political priorities rather than operational needs.

Fiscal reform must prioritize equity and functionality. Rural police stations should be funded according to population density, crime rates, and geographic spread. Routine policing functions, including patrolling and investigation, must receive higher priority than VIP protection. Moreover, new technologies such as forensic laboratories or crime databases must not be restricted to provincial capitals; they must be decentralized to divisional and district levels. Unless budgeting is driven by operational necessity rather than political expediency, resource disparities will continue to undermine police legitimacy.

Transparency and Accountability in Police Expenditure

Transparency in financial management is virtually absent from Pakistan’s police system. Citizens have no access to information about how police budgets are spent, and even provincial assemblies often lack the capacity to scrutinize allocations effectively. This opacity fosters corruption, as funds allocated for fuel, rations, or allowances are often diverted or misused by senior officers without consequence.

Reform requires institutionalizing financial accountability. Police budgets should be subject to scrutiny not only by auditors but also by provincial public accounts committees and independent oversight bodies. Annual financial reports must be made public, detailing how funds were allocated and spent at each tier of the organization. Modern information systems can be introduced to track expenditures in real time, reducing opportunities for manipulation. Additionally, station-level financial committees, including community representatives, can play a role in ensuring that funds are used for local policing needs rather than diverted upward.

The Case for Performance-Based Funding

In advanced federations, police budgets are increasingly tied to performance indicators. Departments that reduce crime rates, improve community trust, or enhance response times receive higher funding, while underperforming units are subject to scrutiny. This creates an incentive structure that aligns financial rewards with public service outcomes.

Pakistan must adopt a similar approach. Provincial governments can allocate a baseline budget to all police stations but reserve a portion of funds as performance-linked grants. Criteria could include timely investigation of cases, citizen satisfaction surveys, reduction in petty corruption, and increased registration of genuine FIRs. Such a model would reward integrity and efficiency, creating internal competition within the force to improve service delivery. Performance audits must be conducted by independent bodies to prevent manipulation.

Long-Term Fiscal Sustainability

Finally, police reform requires attention to long-term fiscal sustainability. The demands of modern policing — from cybercrime investigation to counter-terrorism — will only increase in cost. Without careful planning, provinces will either underfund these needs or divert resources from essential services. A sustainable model must combine increased allocations with efficiency reforms. For example, investments in technology such as digital case management systems can reduce manpower costs in the long run. Similarly, partnerships with private security agencies can relieve the burden of non-core functions.

Provincial governments must also explore new revenue streams for policing, such as earmarked fines, dedicated policing funds, or contributions from local governments. However, care must be taken to ensure that such measures do not create perverse incentives, such as excessive fining or rent-seeking. Ultimately, policing is a public good, and its funding must be guaranteed through predictable budgetary allocations, shielded from political & bureaucratic manipulation.

Fiscal reform is not simply about allocating more money; it is about spending smarter, fairer, and more transparently. Without financial independence at the station level, equitable distribution of resources, and performance-based accountability, no structural reform of the police can succeed. Citizens will continue to encounter corruption at police stations so long as SHOs must “raise their own budgets.” Conversely, a reformed fiscal model that empowers police stations, ensures equity, and ties funds to performance can transform policing from a culture of survival into a culture of service.

The Political-Administrative Dimension

Police reform is not a purely administrative or legal matter; it is deeply embedded in the political economy of the state. Every attempt at reform collides with entrenched interests that benefit from the existing arrangements. These interests include political elites who exploit police for patronage, bureaucratic elites who protect their monopolies, and even segments of civil society that adapt to police dysfunction through informal networks. Reform must therefore confront the political economy realities that perpetuate the status quo. Without recognizing these dynamics, reform proposals risk remaining cosmetic, producing reports rather than results.

The Monopoly of PSP Elites

At the centre of resistance to genuine reform stands the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP). This federal cadre, created without constitutional sanction, has become the principal beneficiary of Pakistan’s centralized policing model. By monopolizing senior posts in provincial police organizations, PSP officers secure rapid promotions, lucrative postings, and near immunity from provincial accountability. Their power rests not only on formal appointments but also on informal influence within federal corridors of power, where they lobby collectively to preserve their privileges.

The PSP elite often frames reform debates in terms of “professionalism” and “depoliticization,” but in practice these slogans are used to justify further centralization. Calls for police independence, for example, usually mean independence of PSP officers from provincial executives, not independence of the police as a whole from arbitrary influence. This selective notion of independence insulates PSP officers while leaving ordinary constables exposed to political manipulation. The persistence of this duality reveals the class character of the current system, in which a small federal elite governs a massive provincial workforce with little regard for constitutional federalism.

Politicians and the Logic of Patronage

If PSP elites resist reform to protect their monopolies, politicians often resist reform to preserve their patronage networks. In Pakistan’s patron-client political culture, control over police transfers and postings is a valuable currency. By securing the appointment of a loyal SHO or district officer, politicians gain influence over local disputes, access to informal revenues, and leverage over rivals. This logic has produced a cycle where police officers are frequently transferred at the behest of political patrons, undermining tenure security and professional autonomy.

Yet politicians are not monolithic. Some recognize that unchecked police powers can also threaten their own legitimacy, particularly when police are used by rival governments or federal authorities. Others, particularly at the provincial and local levels, see value in building a more accountable and community-oriented police service. The challenge is that short-term incentives of patronage often outweigh the long-term benefits of reform. Breaking this cycle requires strengthening institutional checks that prevent arbitrary transfers, ensuring that police accountability flows through transparent mechanisms rather than individual patronage.

The Bureaucratic Resistance to Decentralization

Beyond politicians and PSP elites, the broader bureaucracy has also resisted meaningful decentralization of policing. Centralization provides bureaucrats with control, prestige, and career mobility. Decentralization, by contrast, threatens to fragment authority and empower provincial or district-level actors. This is why, even after the 18th Amendment abolished the concurrent list and strengthened provincial autonomy, federal bureaucratic actors sought to retain influence over provincial policing through the PSP and other indirect mechanisms.

At the provincial level, too, bureaucratic inertia has hindered reform. Provincial Home Departments, constitutionally responsible for policing, have often ceded authority to PSP elites rather than asserting their control. This reflects a combination of capacity deficits, political capture, and bureaucratic caution. The result is a paradox: even where constitutional provisions empower provinces, provincial institutions lack either the will or the capacity to assert ownership of policing.

Civil Society and Informal Adaptation

Civil society is often portrayed as a natural ally of reform, but in practice, many segments of society adapt to police dysfunction through informal mechanisms. Business elites cultivate relationships with police officers to secure protection. Lawyers exploit police inefficiency to prolong cases. Ordinary citizens rely on personal connections or bribes to secure registration of FIRs or favorable investigation outcomes. These informal adaptations reduce pressure for systemic reform because they allow powerful actors to navigate dysfunction in ways that shield them from its worst effects.

At the same time, segments of civil society — particularly human rights groups, think tanks, and academia — have consistently called for comprehensive police reform. Institutions such as the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) and independent policy forums like Republic Policy Think Tank have highlighted the constitutional, structural, and fiscal anomalies of Pakistan’s policing system. However, these voices often lack political leverage, and their recommendations are drowned out by elite resistance. The task ahead is to bridge the gap between academic diagnosis and political implementation, ensuring that reform proposals are not confined to policy papers but translated into legislative and administrative action.

The Judicial Dimension

The judiciary also plays a significant role in the political economy of police reforms. Courts frequently intervene in policing matters, whether to order registration of FIRs, scrutinize transfers, or direct governments to establish commissions. Landmark cases, such as the Parkash Singh decision in India, demonstrate how courts can compel executive action. In Pakistan, however, judicial interventions have been inconsistent. At times, courts have emphasized the need for police independence, but they have often done so without clarifying the constitutional boundaries of provincial control. This ambiguity has sometimes been exploited by PSP elites to resist provincial oversight.

Reform requires a judiciary that consistently interprets constitutional provisions in favor of provincial ownership and democratic accountability. Judicial clarity that police are a provincial subject under Article 142(c) would strip away much of the legal ambiguity that sustains the current centralized model. At the same time, courts must avoid micromanaging policing through suo motu actions that substitute judicial discretion for executive authority. The judiciary’s role should be to uphold constitutional principles, not to replicate the very arbitrariness it seeks to eliminate.

The Way Forward: Breaking the Political Economy Deadlock

Understanding the political economy of police reform reveals why past attempts have repeatedly failed. Reform commissions, task forces, and donor-driven projects have produced reports but little change because they did not address the incentive structures of key actors. PSP elites benefit from centralization; politicians benefit from patronage; bureaucrats benefit from control; and segments of civil society adapt to dysfunction. Reform threatens all these interests.

The challenge, then, is to build a coalition for change. Provincial assemblies must assert their constitutional authority to legislate police services, creating political ownership at the provincial level. Civil society must amplify demands for accountability and transparency, linking police reform to broader struggles for rule of law. Judiciary must interpret constitutional provisions consistently to reinforce provincial autonomy. Finally, reformers within the bureaucracy must recognize that decentralization is not a threat to governance but a pathway to legitimacy.

Only by realigning these incentive structures can Pakistan move from rhetoric to reality in police reform. Without such a coalition, reforms will continue to be superficial, serving elite interests while leaving ordinary citizens at the mercy of a dysfunctional and unaccountable system.

The Necessity of an Implementation Roadmap

The most common weakness of reform efforts in Pakistan has been the absence of a coherent implementation strategy. Over the past five decades, dozens of commissions, committees, and working groups have produced reports diagnosing the problems of policing. Yet these documents, though often insightful, remained politically sterile because they lacked actionable pathways, timelines, and institutional responsibilities. Reform in Pakistan is rarely defeated by lack of knowledge; it is defeated by lack of implementation planning. A credible roadmap must therefore translate constitutional principles and reform ideas into a structured sequence of measures that provincial and federal governments can realistically adopt.

Step One: Constitutional Fidelity and Legislative Action

The starting point of reform must be a return to the Constitution itself. Article 142(c) grants provincial assemblies exclusive competence to legislate on police, while Article 240(b) obliges them to establish provincial services. Therefore, the first step is for each provincial assembly to pass a comprehensive Provincial Police Act, explicitly creating a Provincial Police Service (PPS) and abolishing the federal occupation of provincial posts.

These Acts must define the structure of the PPS, recruitment processes, promotion mechanisms, and accountability systems. They must also codify the separation of functions — investigation, operations, prosecution, traffic, intelligence — into specialized cadres. This legislative act would not merely be administrative housekeeping; it would be a restoration of federalism, ensuring that police services reflect the spirit of provincial autonomy enshrined in the Constitution.

At the federal level, legislation must confine the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP) to federal domains — such as FIA, ANF, and Islamabad Police. Federal legislation must also establish clear cooperative mechanisms under the Council of Common Interests (CCI) for coordinating federal and provincial policing in cross-jurisdictional matters. Without this dual movement — provincial assertion and federal withdrawal — the constitutional misalignment will persist.

Step Two: Structural Realignment and Decentralization

Legislation alone will not change ground realities unless it is matched by structural realignment. Provinces must reorganize their police hierarchies around the principle of functional decentralization. This requires recognizing the police station as the primary operational unit, devolving real authority and budgets to the SHO and his team, and reducing unnecessary layers of supervisory bureaucracy.

Simultaneously, decentralization must extend beyond the provincial level. Districts, as the first tier of governance closest to citizens, must play a central role in policing. District Police Services should be created by provincial laws, accountable to both the provincial home department and elected district councils. This two-way accountability — upward to the province and downward to local communities — would end the culture of arbitrary, top-heavy control and replace it with community-grounded policing.

Step Three: Codification of Police Law

The third step is codification. Pakistan cannot continue to operate on the basis of the Police Act 1861, the CrPC 1898, and ad hoc executive orders. Each province must compile and enact a Police Code that consolidates all laws relating to police powers, duties, procedures, and accountability.

This Police Code must:

1. Clearly define police functions as civil law enforcement, distinct from national security.

• Establish legal procedures for investigation, evidence collection, and interrogation consistent with fundamental rights.

• Codify rules for use of force, arrests, detentions, and bail to prevent arbitrary discretion.

• Embed accountability mechanisms, including internal affairs units and independent police complaint authorities.

• Integrate modern tools of forensic science, cyber-investigation, and digital record-keeping.

Codification will provide not only legal clarity for officers but also legal certainty for citizens, who will know the scope of police authority and the remedies for abuse.

Step Four: Fiscal Reforms and Resource Allocation

Reform cannot succeed without money and financial autonomy. Each province must restructure its police budget to ensure that resources flow directly to police stations rather than being trapped in bureaucratic hierarchies.

Key measures include:

1. Establishing station-level operational budgets managed by SHOs with independent audits.

• Introducing program budgeting, where allocations are tied to outcomes such as crime reduction or community satisfaction.

• Ensuring equitable distribution between urban and rural areas, with rural police no longer treated as an afterthought.

• Creating performance-linked funding, where well-performing stations and districts receive additional resources.

These fiscal reforms will not only end the culture of corruption born of resource scarcity but also create financial accountability rooted in service delivery.

Step Five: Human Resource and Career Reform

Human resource reform must address the dual problems of stagnation and class division. The career path of a constable should not be confined to stagnation, while PSP officers ascend unchallenged to senior grades.

Reform measures must include:

1. Establishing unified career paths for all police personnel, with transparent examinations for promotion.

• Abolishing the class barrier between federal PSP elites and provincial staff.

• Institutionalizing continuous training programs for skill enhancement.

• Recruiting women, minorities, and underrepresented groups into mainstream policing.

• Providing mental health and welfare support for officers/officials exposed to trauma and stress.

Such reforms will transform policing from a career of survival to a career of professional growth and public service.

Step Six: Accountability and Oversight

No roadmap is complete without accountability. Reform must embed independent oversight bodies at both provincial and district levels. These bodies should include civil society representatives, retired judges, and human rights experts, with powers to investigate complaints and recommend disciplinary or criminal action.

Internally, police organizations must establish internal affairs units empowered to investigate corruption and misconduct. Annual accountability reports should be published to build public trust. At the political level, provincial public accounts committees and standing committees on home affairs must scrutinize police budgets and performance. Only by institutionalizing accountability at multiple levels can the culture of impunity be broken. The political executives and legislators at district and provincial levels are important tools for monitoring and evaluation, but that be done under a law.

Step Seven: Phased Implementation and Monitoring

Finally, reform must be implemented in phases with clear timelines. Attempting to overhaul the entire system in one stroke risks collapse under bureaucratic inertia and political resistance. A phased approach could begin with pilot projects in selected districts, testing new budgeting models, accountability structures, and career systems. Lessons learned can then be scaled up to provincial and national levels.

Equally important is monitoring and evaluation. Independent think tanks such as PIDE and Republic Policy Think Tank can play a vital role in assessing progress, publishing scorecards, and holding governments accountable. Regular reviews by provincial assemblies and the CCI should ensure that reforms remain on track and are not derailed by elite resistance.

The roadmap for police reform in Pakistan is ambitious but achievable. It requires fidelity to the Constitution, legislative action by provincial assemblies, structural realignment, codification of law, fiscal restructuring, human resource reforms, and institutionalized accountability. Most importantly, it requires political courage to confront entrenched interests. Reform is not a technical project; it is a democratic imperative. By following this roadmap, Pakistan can transform its police from a colonial relic into a professional, accountable, and community-oriented service that embodies the rule of law.

Recommendations for the Federal Government

The federal government must begin by acknowledging its constitutional limits in the sphere of policing. Law and order are not federal subjects; they are provincial responsibilities under Article 142(c) and Schedule IV of the Constitution. The persistence of the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP) in provincial domains represents an ongoing constitutional anomaly. The federal government should therefore confine the PSP to federal policing agencies such as the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), NAB, and Islamabad Capital Police or may place them under CCI subjects, if PSP is to be enacted as an All Pakistan Service.

In parallel, the federal government should strengthen cooperative mechanisms through the Council of Common Interests (CCI). The CCI can serve as the platform for coordinating cross-provincial policing matters such as inter-provincial crime, cybercrime, and organized networks. Rather than occupying provincial posts, the federal role should be limited to facilitating information-sharing, funding specialized training, and ensuring inter-agency cooperation. This would not diminish federal authority but would reposition it within its proper constitutional sphere.

The federal legislature should also focus on modernizing national criminal law — specifically, revising the Criminal Procedure Code 1898 and Pakistan Penal Code to align with fundamental rights and contemporary challenges. These reforms, once enacted, will provide the legal infrastructure within which provincial police can operate.

Recommendations for Provincial Governments

Provincial governments are the primary custodians of police reform. They must take ownership by enacting comprehensive Provincial Police Acts that establish Provincial Police Services (PPS), regulate their functions, and codify accountability mechanisms. These Acts should abolish dual hierarchies and ensure that all posts connected with the affairs of the province are filled through provincial cadres, in compliance with Article 240(b).

Provinces must also address fiscal reforms by providing operational budgets directly to police stations, ensuring that SHOs are not compelled to “raise their own funds.” Transparent audits and community oversight must accompany this decentralization of finances. Furthermore, human resource reforms are indispensable: constables and inspectors must be given career progression opportunities, while recruitment must be based on merit, not political quotas.

Provincial governments must also prioritize specialized training and technological modernization. Establishing forensic laboratories, digital record systems, and specialized academies at divisional levels will prevent the concentration of resources in provincial capitals. Above all, provinces must make policing people-centered, embedding community policing strategies that rebuild trust between citizens and the state.

Recommendations for the Judiciary

The judiciary plays a pivotal role in shaping the legal environment of police reform. Courts must interpret constitutional and legisative provisions consistently, clarifying that policing is a provincial subject and that federal encroachments are unconstitutional. This interpretive clarity would close the legal loopholes exploited by PSP elites to justify their presence in provincial posts.

At the same time, courts must ensure judicial oversight of police powers. Arrests, detentions, and investigations must be subjected to strict judicial supervision to prevent abuse. Courts should insist that torture, custodial deaths, extra-judicial killings and illegal detentions are met with exemplary punishment, thereby reinforcing constitutional guarantees under Articles 9, 10, and 14.It is very important for judiciary to make sure that policing in Pakistan is being performed in line with fundamental rights protected in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

However, the judiciary must also resist the temptation to micromanage policing through suo motu interventions that replace executive discretion with judicial fiat. The proper judicial role is to safeguard rights and constitutional boundaries, not to run police organizations directly. By striking this balance, the judiciary can become a guardian of both constitutionalism and public accountability.

Recommendations for Civil Society and Academia

Civil society must recognize that police reform is not an isolated agenda; it is central to the struggle for rule of law, federalism, and democratic accountability. Human rights groups, bar associations, and think tanks must build coalitions to pressure provincial assemblies into exercising their constitutional mandate. Instead of focusing solely on cases of abuse, civil society should push for systemic reforms: provincial police legislation, codification of police law, and establishment of independent complaint authorities.

Academia and think tanks such as PIDE, Republic Policy Think Tank and others must continue producing rigorous policy research, but they must also engage directly with legislators, local governments, and media to translate technical knowledge into public and political momentum. Academic insights must not remain confined to reports; they must become tools of political advocacy.

Civil society also has a role in community-level oversight. Citizen-police liaison committees, neighborhood watch programs, and independent monitoring boards can serve as intermediaries, ensuring that police remain responsive to the needs of the public. These mechanisms must be institutionalized by law, not left to ad hoc arrangements.

Recommendations for Political Leadership

Ultimately, no reform will succeed without political courage. Politicians must be willing to sacrifice short-term patronage for long-term legitimacy. The temptation to use police for personal or partisan gain has corroded both governance and public trust. Leaders at provincial and federal levels must recognize that genuine police reform enhances their credibility, strengthens democracy, and improves public safety.

This requires setting aside partisan rivalries to build consensus on reform. Police reform should be treated not as a weapon of political competition but as a national democratic project. Political leadership must also recognize that reforms are not cost-free: entrenched elites will resist, and vested interests will fight back. Only sustained political will, backed by legislative action, can overcome these barriers.

Accordingly, politicians must act through legislatures by making laws for establishing police as well as legislating police functions and also, holding police accountable to the legislatures through committees. Then, political executives, at provincial level should lead the policing in Pakistan subject to law. Local governments political executives should also be empowered to lead the police, working at district or local levels. Politicians represent people and are the constitutional tool to monitor the police as per article 2-A of the constitution of Pakistan. However, this power is always subject to law. Political intervention is a negative term in Pakistan. As, all powers belong to politicians constitutionally, they will make police accountable, but under a law. Hence, they can not force the police which is not protected under the law.

Conclusion: Building a Reform Coalition

The recommendations outlined above are not discrete actions; they are components of a coalition for reform. The federal government must withdraw from unconstitutional domains, provincial governments must legislate and restructure their police, the judiciary must interpret and protect constitutional boundaries, civil society must mobilize public demand, and political leadership must provide the will to act.

Police reform in Pakistan is, at its core, a question of whether the state will continue to operate on a colonial model of control or will transition to a democratic model of service. The path forward requires courage, consensus, and constitutional fidelity. Without such a coalition, reform will remain elusive; with it, Pakistan can finally build a police service that embodies professionalism, accountability, and public trust.

Conclusion: From Colonial Policing to Democratic Policing

The debate on police reform in Pakistan has too often been reduced to slogans about “depoliticization,” “modernization,” or “independence.” These terms, while appealing, have been misused to mask the deeper constitutional and structural crises at the heart of Pakistan’s policing. The reality is that Pakistan still operates under a colonial policing framework, where the primary function of the police is not to serve the people but to control them, and where the benefits of the system flow upward to elites rather than downward to citizens. Reform, therefore, cannot be cosmetic. It must be transformational, moving Pakistan from colonial policing to democratic policing.

At the core of this transformation lies constitutional fidelity. The Constitution is unambiguous: law and order is a provincial subject, and posts connected with the affairs of a province must be legislated by provincial assemblies. Yet Pakistan has allowed a federal cadre — the Police Service of Pakistan — to occupy provincial posts for decades, undermining both federalism and democracy. No reform can succeed until this constitutional misalignment is corrected. Federal agencies must remain in their federal domain, and provinces must raise, manage, and legislate their own police services.

The Centrality of Federalism

Federalism is not a technical arrangement; it is the political soul of Pakistan. It guarantees that power is shared, that provinces have autonomy, and that citizens are represented through multiple layers of governance. By centralizing policing in a federal cadre, Pakistan has hollowed out this federal spirit, leaving provinces unable to exercise their constitutional mandate and citizens unable to hold local institutions accountable. Restoring federalism in policing is therefore not merely about administrative efficiency; it is about preserving the federation itself. Without provincial ownership of policing, federalism remains incomplete.

Reclaiming the Police Station as the Unit of Service

The police station is the frontline of justice. It is where citizens go to file complaints, seek protection, and demand the state’s presence. Yet in Pakistan, the police station has been systematically deprived of resources, authority, and accountability. SHOs operate in an environment of scarcity, corruption becomes institutionalized, and citizens experience the police as predators rather than protectors. Reform must therefore begin at the grassroots: every police station should be financially empowered, professionally staffed, and accountable to both provincial authorities and local communities. Unless the police station is reclaimed as a service centre, reform will remain abstract.

Humanizing the Police

Perhaps the most neglected aspect of reform is the human dimension of policing. Behind every uniform is an individual — a constable, an inspector, a woman officer — who operates under immense stress, low pay, and limited career prospects. The current class system, which privileges a small elite of PSP officers while leaving four hundred thousand provincial employees without meaningful career paths, is both unjust and dysfunctional. Reform must humanize the police by ensuring career mobility, fair promotions, adequate welfare, and professional dignity. A demoralized police force cannot protect citizens; a respected and motivated force can.

The Role of Political Will

All reforms, however, ultimately depend on political will. The Constitution already provides the framework. Policy experts, academics, and think tanks have repeatedly diagnosed the problems. Civil society has demanded accountability. Yet reform stalls because political leaders continue to view the police as an instrument of patronage rather than as a public service. If politicians persist in treating police postings as favors, if they resist provincial legislation for fear of losing control, then no technical fix will succeed. Political leadership must rise above short-term incentives and embrace reform as a democratic obligation. Only then can reform move from paper to practice.

Building a Reform Coalition

Police reform cannot be achieved by one actor alone. It requires a coalition of institutions and citizens. The federal government must retreat from unconstitutional domains. Provincial assemblies must legislate comprehensive police acts. The judiciary must uphold constitutional boundaries and safeguard rights. Civil society must mobilize demand and monitor implementation. The police themselves must accept accountability and professionalism as the new norms. Reform will not come from one source of power; it will come from the interaction of many, bound together by a shared commitment to the rule of law.

A Call to Action

The time for delay has passed. Pakistan cannot afford to let its police remain a colonial relic while society faces rising crime, terrorism, and public distrust. Reform is not only possible; it is urgent. The roadmap is clear: constitutional alignment, structural reorganization, codification of law, fiscal reform, human resource transformation, accountability, and coalition-building. What remains is the courage to act.

If Pakistan is to realize its democratic promise, it must build a police service that protects citizens, enforces laws fairly, and embodies constitutional federalism. Anything less will perpetuate the cycle of mistrust and dysfunction. The question, then, is not whether Pakistan knows how to reform its police. The question is whether Pakistan has the courage to implement what it already knows.