Tariq Mahmood Awan
The national debate on political interference has become one of the most repeated themes in Pakistan’s intellectual, administrative, and reform discourses. Whether the subject is governance reforms, judicial reforms, political reforms, civil service reforms, or even economic reforms, one encounters a constant refrain: there should be no political interference. This phrase has been repeated so often that it has begun to sound like a universal principle. Yet, when placed under the light of constitutional reason and democratic philosophy, it reveals itself to be a misplaced and even dangerous idea.
My motivation to write on this subject arises precisely from this confusion. At the heart of the Constitution of Pakistan lies Article 2A, which makes it unambiguously clear that all power belongs to Almighty Allah and is to be exercised by the people of Pakistan through their chosen representatives. This is not a rhetorical claim but the foundation of the entire constitutional order. It means that politics—and more specifically, elected politicians—are not outsiders intruding upon the functioning of the state. They are the rightful custodians of power, entrusted to organize, regulate, and lead every organ of government, from the legislature and executive to the judiciary and bureaucracy. To call their role “interference” is to misunderstand the very architecture of democracy.
Yet, in Pakistan’s discourse, this confusion persists. Bureaucrats, judges, and even intellectuals often demand that politicians be kept at arm’s length from administration. They argue that the Chief Secretary should be independent to appoint civil servants, or that the Inspector General of Police should autonomously decide postings without political input. This suggestion is dressed up as “professional independence,” but in truth it undermines the constitutional chain of accountability. How can such a system function when the design of governance itself rests on the principle that legislatures elect political executives, and political executives must direct the administration? If elected governments are deprived of this authority, the entire spirit of parliamentary democracy collapses into bureaucratic technocracy.
This misplaced discussion is what inspired me to write a research article on the subject. I want to establish, with constitutional, legal, and political reasoning, that it is not “political interference” we are confronting—it is political accountability. The question is not whether politicians should exercise power, but how they must exercise it. And the answer, both in Pakistan and across the democratic world, is simple: politicians must exercise power subject to law.
Law is not an enemy of politics. On the contrary, it is the instrument that gives politics legitimacy. Laws are the collective wisdom of the people expressed through their representatives. The Constitution is the supreme law that defines institutions, distributes powers, and sets boundaries. Statutes and delegated legislation further detail how executive authority will be used in administrative, financial, and developmental matters. If a politician exercises power outside this legal framework, it is not democracy but arbitrariness. If a bureaucrat, judge, or police officer claims powers not granted by law, it is not professionalism but usurpation. Thus, law is the boundary that keeps every actor within its lane while ensuring that the politician, as the people’s representative, remains at the helm.
In Pakistan, however, the culture of governance has grown suspicious of politicians. This is partly due to weak democracy, partly due to repeated interruptions of political development, and partly due to the consensus of elites who find comfort in bureaucratic control. Over time, the people themselves have been led to believe that politicians are intruders into administration. They are told that political executives cannot be trusted with appointments, postings, or financial decisions. But this belief ignores the comparative evidence from around the world. In the United Kingdom, ministers appoint and oversee civil servants, and civil servants are duty-bound to serve the minister of the day. In India, the Council of Ministers is directly responsible for all appointments and transfers of the Indian Administrative Service and Police Service. In the United States, presidents appoint their cabinets and agency heads, who in turn appoint career officials to positions of responsibility. In each case, it is political leadership that governs, and bureaucrats that implement.
Why then should Pakistan demand an exception? Why should the Chief Secretary or Inspector General be free to appoint and transfer officers without oversight by elected leaders? Such a model may suit autocracies, but it is alien to parliamentary democracy. The political executive must exercise this power, for only the political executive is accountable to the legislature, and through it, to the people. Bureaucrats may be skilled, judges may be independent, and technocrats may be expert, but none of them have a direct mandate from the people. That mandate belongs only to politicians.
My motivation, therefore, is to correct this misconception at its root. When reforms are drafted and experts recommend “removing political interference,” they are in fact recommending removing the people’s representatives from governance. This cannot stand constitutional scrutiny. Instead, the proper approach is to insist that politicians exercise their authority lawfully. If the law does not permit a transfer, the minister cannot order it. If the budget does not authorize an expenditure, the chief minister cannot sanction it. If the Constitution requires separation of judiciary and executive, then politicians must respect it. But in every case, the solution is through law, not through bypassing politics. Politicians must legislate changes they wish to see, and once those changes are law, they must execute them. This is how the principle of rule of law protects both the people’s sovereignty and the accountability of their representatives.
I am writing this research article to make this clear: that what Pakistan calls “political interference” is in fact the rightful exercise of democratic power. The real question is not how to insulate governance from politics, but how to ensure that politics functions within the framework of law. The people of Pakistan, through their representatives, have the right to shape the destiny of the state. Bureaucracy, judiciary, media, and all other institutions must operate within the legal boundaries set by that democratic will. None of them can claim supremacy over the people.
This motivation is both legal and moral. Legally, because the Constitution provides no space for a bureaucracy or judiciary that governs without politics. Morally, because only the people’s representatives can claim to exercise power as a trust from the citizens. For too long, Pakistan’s governance has been distorted by the narrative of mistrust in politicians. It is time to reclaim the truth: politicians are not intruders, they are the foundation of the republic.
My journey into this research is, therefore, a journey of clarification. I wish to lay bare the fallacy of “no political interference,” to show how it undermines democracy, and to argue that power must remain where it constitutionally belongs—with the politicians, guided by law. In doing so, I hope to contribute to a healthier national debate, one that no longer mistrusts politics but instead demands of it integrity, accountability, and fidelity to the law.
Introduction
The sovereignty of Pakistan resides in the people, and their elected representatives are entrusted with governing the country. The Objectives Resolution—made a substantive part of the 1973 Constitution by Article 2A—explicitly declares that “the State shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people”[1]. In a parliamentary democracy like Pakistan’s, this means that laws are made by Parliament, executive decisions are taken by ministers answerable to Parliament, and budgets are approved by elected legislatures. All public offices and actions exist by virtue of legislation. By contrast, unelected bodies (administrative civil servants, judges, or military/technocrats) have no independent mandate to wield sovereign power. Recognizing this is critical: what is often branded as “political interference” is in fact constitutional accountability and legitimacy. Politicians and elected executives are legally empowered to govern, oversee administration, and set policy. Criticism of “political interference” overlooks this fundamental design: power belongs to the people and their representatives[1].
In practical terms, Pakistan’s political class has the exclusive authority to legislate and execute government policy, within the limits of the Constitution. The framers of the Constitution made this clear. For example, Articles 129–130 of the Constitution vest provincial executive authority in the elected Chief Minister and cabinet[2], not in bureaucrats. Similarly, at the federal level, Article 48 empowers the President to act on the advice of the Prime Minister, and Article 90 requires that all executive actions be taken in the President’s name under the Prime Minister’s direction. Parliamentary supremacy means that the people’s representatives create the laws & the rules, and the government (executive) must follow them. Civil servants and judges implement and interpret those laws & the rules, but they cannot make or change laws on their own. As Republic Policy Think Tank observes, transfers and postings of officials “are political decisions that flow directly from elected authority” – they are not “administrative favours” of career civil servants[3]. In short, “executive authority belongs to the Chief Minister and the cabinet, not to bureaucrats”[4]; any exercise of power outside that structure is unconstitutional.
People’s Sovereignty and Representative Rule
The foundation of Pakistan’s constitutional order is the principle of popular sovereignty. Article 2A (the Objectives Resolution) and the Preamble to the Constitution solemnly affirm that all power is a sacred trust of the people, to be exercised by their elected representatives[1]. No other institution—be it the bureaucracy, judiciary, institutions, or media—stands above that will. In fact, the Constitution itself is the product of an elected assembly: Pakistan’s lawmakers framed the Constitution and prescribed the entire system of government. Through parliamentary debate and votes, they established the legislature, executive, judiciary, fundamental rights, federal structure, and all branches of government. In other words, it is the politicians who made the Constitution, defined its structure, and vested authority in each organ of state. Once framed, the Constitution cannot be lightly overridden: it remains supreme law. As the Supreme Court has held, even Parliament cannot enact laws that breach the Constitution’s fundamental principles (such as democracy, fundamental rights, or the Objectives Resolution)[5]. This ensures that elected officials must govern within the Constitution, but it also confirms that the elected legislature is the highest lawmaker under that Constitution.
By implication, any claim that “political interference” (by elected officials) is illegitimate overlooks the very source of legitimate power. Bureaucrats, judges, or military leaders might complain of political direction, but the Constitution grants that direction. The Judiciary itself is constituted by the Constitution; its independence (through Article 175(3)) serves only to remove executive control over courts, not to create an untouchable counter-majoritarian body. True, Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution mandates separating the judiciary from the executive to secure judicial autonomy[6]. But this provision aimed to protect judges from administrative pressures – it did not grant them executive powers or render them uncontrollable by law. In a parliamentary democracy, even an independent judiciary remains subject to law and constitutional constraints (for example, it cannot override fundamental rights or basic structure as written[5]). Likewise, bureaucrats are bound by statutory rules of service; they serve at the pleasure of political executives under rules such as the Civil Servants Act. In every case, the chain of authority flows from the people to their representatives to the bureaucracy, not the other way around.
Parliamentary Supremacy and Legislative Authority
Pakistan’s Parliament (Majlis-e-Shoora) and Provincial Assemblies hold plenary power to legislate on matters in their respective domains, as defined by the Constitution. Article 142 (a) empowers the parliament to make laws read with federal legislative list for CCI and federal government, while Article 142 (c) empowers each Provincial Assembly to legislate on provincial subjects[7]. Critically, the Constitution leaves no loophole for the executive to alter governance structures by decree alone. For instance, Article 240(b) requires that all provincial posts and services be created “by or under an Act of the Provincial Assembly”[7]. In simple terms, if the government needs a new department or post (whether a police station or a new bureaucratic cadre), it must pass a law to authorize it. The Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 and analogous laws in other provinces regulate terms of service, but they do not themselves create new services or posts out of nothing. Without legislative enactments, any departmental notifications to create positions are legally hollow.[7][8]
This constitutional design ensures legislative supremacy. For example, Republic Policy Think Tank emphasizes that any attempt by the bureaucracy to invent services or posts without statute undermines parliament’s authority[7][8]. Indeed, it warns that confusing budget appropriations with legislative power is “constitutionally fragile and democratically unsound”[8]. After all, budgets only allocate money; they cannot themselves amend laws or create institutions. This sharp distinction between executive implementation and legislative authority is intentional: under the Constitution, executive power is meant to implement laws, not to create them.[8] When executive officials (or courts) attempt to act beyond legislated authority, they violate the separation of powers.
In practice, this means that the Pakistani Parliament has exclusive domain over many issues often labeled “decisions” of the government. Transfers and postings of police or bureaucrats, creation of new government agencies, major infrastructure projects, and many other functions must be authorized by law. If elected leaders want to reorganize districts, reform the bureaucracy, or amend civil service rules, they must do so by passing legislation or valid delegated rules. This is no “inconvenience” – it is democracy. Ministers answerable to Parliament can direct subordinates, but only within legal bounds. Any politician who insists on a course of action outside existing law (for example, ordering a posting in contravention of the Civil Servants Act) actually exceeds their authority and must instead amend the law first. In short, the legislature is not a rubber stamp over the bureaucracy and public human resources: it is the very source of lawful authority.
Executive Authority: Political Leadership and Accountability
Under Pakistan’s parliamentary system, the true executive power lies with the elected government. Article 129 of the Constitution vests the executive authority of a province in the Chief Minister[2], and Article 130(6) makes the provincial cabinet collectively responsible to the Provincial Assembly[2]. Likewise, at the federal level, all executive actions are taken by the Prime Minister and federal cabinet (as directed by Articles 48, 90 and 92). These constitutional provisions leave no doubt: the elected cabinet, not career bureaucrats, is supposed to decide policy and strategy. This chain of accountability – from the people to the assemblies, to the Prime Minister or Chief Ministers, then to their ministers, and finally to the bureaucratic machinery – is the constitutional hierarchy[2]. It cannot be lawfully inverted.
Republic Policy articulates this clearly: bureaucrats are “servants of the state, not wielders of sovereign power,” whereas ministers are “representatives of the people”[9]. Indeed, when unelected officials usurp decision-making, they “disrupt” the constitutional chain of accountability[2]. Every transfer, promotion, or project signed by a minister is subject to political and parliamentary scrutiny; in contrast, when such actions are taken by an anonymous bureaucrat behind closed doors, “governance [becomes] unaccountable”[10]. This is why Pakistan’s civil service rules explicitly grant ultimate authority to the Government (the political executive), not to civil servants[11]. Any attempt by bureaucracy to exercise executive discretion through internal rules or orders is ultra vires the Constitution[11].
Put simply, ministers are elected and answer to voters and assemblies, whereas bureaucrats are not. If government decisions fail or face criticism, ministers can be voted out or censured by Parliament[10]; civil servants cannot. Therefore the Constitution keeps executive discretion firmly with elected officials. As one RP analysis puts it, allowing bureaucrats to govern “denies the very essence of parliamentary democracy.” Elected representatives embody the people’s sovereignty; civil servants do not[12]. When an unelected official makes a decision, the people lose their right to hold someone accountable at the ballot box or in the legislature. This hollowed-out democracy is precisely what Pakistan must reject. The imperative is that ministers should run departments and make policy decisions, and bureaucrats should faithfully implement those decisions[12]. Anything else upends democratic principles and must give way to constitutional order.
Separation of Powers: Judiciary and Legislature
Pakistan’s Constitution enshrines an independent judiciary, but always within the framework of parliamentary democracy. Article 175(3) mandates the progressive separation of the judiciary from the executive[6], ensuring judges cannot serve as administrators. This reform was intended to prevent executive encroachment on the courts. It did not place judges above the law or strip the legislature of oversight roles. In fact, the Legislature retains tools to check the judiciary (for example, through impeachment provisions in Articles 209–212). Judicial independence under the Constitution ensures fair adjudication and protection of fundamental rights, but it does not convert the judiciary into a second source of executive power. Judges apply the law and the Constitution; they do not legislate or implement policy. All courts remain answerable to the Constitution and the law as written.
Likewise, the establishment of powerful judicial institutions – including the Supreme Court and high courts – was a design of political leaders. Elected lawmakers wrote the Constitution that created the Judicial Commission and defined appointment and removal procedures. Although independence was bolstered (particularly by the 18th Amendment and later reforms), those changes happened through constitutional processes initiated by Parliament[6]. The key point is this: even a strong judiciary is ultimately constrained by law. Legislators may not micromanage courts, but judges cannot overrule the Constitution either. In fact, the very existence of judicial review rests on the people’s representatives choosing a written Constitution with entrenched rights and principles. The judiciary’s power to strike down laws is itself limited by the principle of the “basic structure” – the Parliament cannot amend the core democratic and Islamic values embedded in the Objectives Resolution[5]. Therefore, there is a mutual respect of boundaries: Legislators make laws, judges interpret them, both under the supreme Constitution.
In all branches, therefore, the authority of government derives from the people’s will. An oft-used term in Pakistan is “political interference,” implying that politicians are wrong to direct bureaucracy or law enforcement. But under our system this framing is misguided. Politicians are supposed to oversee these agencies. For instance, police and law-and-order are provincial subjects under Article 70(4) and Schedule IV of the Constitution. Provincial governments legislate and fund the police, and provincial political executives appoint their own Interior ministers and police chiefs. If federal officials try to claim authority over provincial police posts, they violate Article 240 b and the federal balance[13][7]. As one RP analysis observed, the posting of a provincial IG by the federal government was “unconstitutional, unlawful and illegal”[13] – precisely because it contravened the legislature’s exclusive authority.
Bureaucracy and the Fallacy of “Political Interference”
In Pakistan’s political debate, the term “political interference” is often used to criticize normal government actions. But viewing constitutional oversight as “interference” is to confuse the proper roles of institutions. Bureaucrats have inherited vast authority from colonial times[14][15], and they may complain when politicians exercise authority. Yet such complaints neglect that the Constitution (partly framed to undo the colonial legacy) places bureaucrats in a subordinate role. For example, it is sometimes argued that police officers should be able to choose their own leadership without politics. That argument has no constitutional basis: the Constitution says police are provincial subjects, to be organized by elected provincial governments[13]. Likewise, proposals that “an international police mechanism” or unaccountable body appoint police chiefs would directly violate Articles 240 b , 137 and 142 c (which reserves these powers to the provincial political executive under law).
On the contrary, it is the duty of the political executive to lead in these matters[16]. Bureaucrats are meant to implement the law, not to initiate personnel decisions. When civilians or lawyers criticize a minister for “intervening” in transfers, they must recall that under the Civil Servants Acts and Government Rules of Business, ministers (through their departments) hold the ultimate appointment and transfer powers[11]. If a minister signs a posting order, Parliament and public can scrutinize it; if a bureaucrat signs the same order quietly, that evades democratic accountability. This asymmetry explains why Pakistan’s constitutional design deliberately keeps such discretion with ministers[10].
A similar misconception surrounds judicial or regulatory reforms. Any effort to remove politicians from policymaking (for example, by handing over functions to independent commissions without statutory backing) should be viewed skeptically. If lawmakers feel the need for an independent commission, the solution is to legislate one – not to let the executive rule by fiat or contract. Indeed, the English maxim “the King can do no wrong” has its counterpart in our democracy: elected officials can only do what the law permits. If a politician bypasses legal procedures (for example, creating a post by issuing a gazette notification instead of passing a law), that is the real violation.
Consider the widely discussed example of appointing an Inspector General (IG) of Police. Some say police officers should be selected “apolitically.” But under Articles 240, 137 and 119, the power to establish police posts and services lies with the provincial legislature, the provincial government, and constitutionally-designated authorities[13][7]. If politicians believe a different appointment mechanism is needed, the remedy is legislative (e.g., amending the Police Act or Provincial Rules of Business), not unilateral executive action. In fact, Republic Policy underscores that police reforms must align with constitutional provisions: law-and-order is a provincial subject, so provinces must create their own police service (Provincial Police Service) by law[17][18].
Ultimately, accusing politicians of “interference” simply because they fulfill their constitutional roles is misleading. The real problem in Pakistani governance has been the inverse: when bureaucrats or courts assume unwritten powers, bypassing democracy. Good governance demands that elected leaders reclaim their rightful authority. As emphasized earlier, the parliamentary system only works if ministers make the tough choices and civil servants implement them[12][19]. Anything short of that is a betrayal of democratic accountability.
Comparative Perspectives: Democratic Governments and Public Administrations
This constitutional principle – that elected officials govern while public servants implement – is not unique to Pakistan. In parliamentary democracies around the world, the accountability chain runs from voters to their representatives to the bureaucracy.
- United Kingdom: The British system is founded on the convention of ministerial responsibility. Civil servants are explicitly accountable to ministers, and ministers answer to Parliament. A House of Lords Constitution Committee report notes that “civil servants are responsible to ministers, and ministers in turn are responsible to Parliament”[20]. Civil servants are expected to be politically impartial, but they only execute policy on behalf of elected officials. No one would claim that an unelected permanent secretary can override a cabinet decision; rather, this hierarchy is considered democratic normality. As in Pakistan, British civil service rules (the Cabinet Manual) make clear that Ministers, not officials, have ultimate decision-making authority in government departments.
- India: India’s Constitution similarly vests executive power in the elected Council of Ministers. Article 75(3) states that “the Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the House of the People” (Lok Sabha)[21]. This means the Prime Minister and Cabinet must retain the confidence of the majority in Parliament. Ministers are, by law, accountable to the legislature. The bureaucracy (Indian Administrative Service, Police Service, etc.) operates under the control of these ministries. Indeed, Indian law requires that all major bureaucratic posts are filled by appointments made by the political executive (Ministers and Governors, as per Article 156(3)). Consequently, any suggestion that IAS or IPS officers should be appointed “without ministerial input” would be foreign to the Indian model – in practice, Ministers routinely approve postings and transfers through state and central governments. This reflects the same democratic principle: elected governments lead governance, bureaucracy supports.
- United States: Although the U.S. system is presidential rather than parliamentary, the core idea of elected accountability remains. Article II of the U.S. Constitution vests the executive power in the President[22]. In practice, this means that policy direction comes from the President and the political appointees he selects, not the permanent civil service. The president’s cabinet secretaries and agency heads serve at the pleasure of the President and can be removed by him. U.S. law scholars note that federal agencies carry out laws enacted by Congress, but they do so under the oversight of the President, who must “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”[22]. As one expert explained: “These agencies are acting on behalf of Congress,” said a leading commentator; “the President’s duty is to … make sure that those who execute [the laws] are doing it faithfully”[23]. In short, American civil servants can only exercise powers delegated by statute; any real control of them comes through elected officials (the President, Congress). The Founders explicitly designed this to preserve democratic control over administration.
These international examples reinforce the Pakistanis’ constitutional judgment: governments of all stripes, if truly democratic, place ultimate authority in elected office-holders. Civil services and independent agencies carry out the mission, but they do not originate policy or override the legislature. In each country, claims that unelected officials should “take charge” are considered aberrations. Pakistan’s Constitution follows this norm. Our parliamentary structure was modeled on Westminster principles (indeed, Pakistan is a parliamentary federation), so it is quite consistent that Articles 41–48, 70–93 and elsewhere assign lawmaking and executive roles to the political branches. The idea that a bureaucrat should substitute for a minister or that the president of Pakistan or a Chief Justice should run a department is alien to these systems. Rather, constitutional order demands respect for the chain of democratic accountability.
Strengthening Democracy and Rule of Law
To ensure that political accountability functions as intended, Pakistan must reinforce its democratic institutions and civic culture. This involves empowering all actors—politicians, bureaucracy, judiciary, and citizens—to understand and fulfill their roles under the law. Key measures include:
- Clarifying and Upholding Legal Frameworks: The legislature should exercise its law and rule-making power vigorously. That means enacting clear laws for governance (on public service structure, budgeting, appointments, etc.) and closing loopholes that have allowed extra-legal practices. For example, provinces should pass “creation of posts” laws as envisioned by Article 240(b)[7]. Rules of Business must strictly conform to the Constitution (as the Supreme Court noted, they cannot create or abolish offices by themselves[24]). When laws are ambiguous or outdated, Parliament and Assemblies should amend them rather than let administrators interpret them in opaque ways. In this way, all actions—even in emergencies—remain within a legal frame, preserving both effectiveness and accountability.
- Legislative Oversight and Capacity-Building: Assemblies should strengthen their oversight functions. Effective parliamentary committees can review executive actions, summon ministers for explanations, and engage with policy experts. Providing legislators with research support and legal training will help them make informed laws rather than deferring to technocrats. Political parties, too, must nurture internal democracy and discipline, so that coalition governments can commit to decisions rather than fragmenting on bureaucratic influence.
- Training and Reorientation of Public Servants: Civil servants should be trained to appreciate that their technical expertise serves the elected leadership’s vision. Induction courses and service rules can emphasize that a healthy civil service is one that implements lawful policies faithfully, not one that monopolizes power. The bureaucracy needs assurances of job security and promotion based on merit, so that it is not tempted to seek extra-constitutional authority. Simultaneously, judges and lower courts can be reminded (through orientation and judicial training) that while they guard rights, they do so within the limits of law and must respect legislative intent.
- Civic Education and Media Responsibility: The public should be informed about their constitutional rights and the limits of power. Media, civil society, and academia have a role in dispelling myths about “political interference” and explaining democratic processes. When communities understand that elected officials are supposed to make decisions for them, the narrative can shift: demands for accountability will be directed appropriately at legislators and ministers, and citizens will pressure politicians to enact needed reforms (for example, to limit bureaucratic red tape), rather than bypass them.
- Rule of Law and Accountability Institutions: All actors must operate under the rule of law. Police and anti-corruption bodies, for instance, must enforce laws without fear or favor, whether the person in power is a politician or bureaucrat. Political leaders should support institutions like election commissions and ombudsmen that check government excess, but only as mandated by law. Importantly, no one – not a bureaucrat, judge, nor politician – is above the law. Lawmakers cannot direct institutions to act beyond legal authority, and the institutions cannot act without legal mandate. As one analysis puts it, if politicians are “so interested, they must change the law” to legitimize their actions. This reciprocal responsibility—that politicians abide by the law they make, and that bureaucrats enforce only what is lawful—embodies the rule of law.
Each branch of government and sector of society is thus accountable: politicians to the legislature and the electorate; judges to the Constitution and statutes; bureaucrats to the executive chain of command; and the military to the state under civilian control. By reinforcing these checks and educational measures, Pakistan can move toward its constitutional ideal: a system where the people’s will, expressed through duly empowered representatives, guides the state.
Conclusion: Reaffirming the Constitutional Balance
In sum, the debate over “political interference” in Pakistan often misses the forest for the trees. The Constitution makes clear that political authority belongs with elected leaders and, by extension, to the people who chose them[1]. Pakistan’s system is designed so that politicians, acting through legislation and accountable mechanisms, take charge of governance. Bureaucrats and judges are meant to be servants of the law, carrying out policies determined by the people’s representatives. When Supreme Court justices or senior secretaries reserve powers beyond this scheme, they erode democratic accountability. Pakistan needs a transformation from bureaucratic governnace to democratic governance.
The notion of political accountability versus interference is therefore crucial: what must be preserved is the rule that no official may exceed legal bounds, whether motivated by politics or motives. The remedy for abuse of power is not “de-politicization” by fiat, but rather proper politicization—that is, clear and enforceable laws made by Parliament, freely debated and amended as needed. If a rule or appointment is flawed, elected legislators can (and should) fix it through legislation. This way, the exercise of every state function is legitimized by the constitutional will of the people[1][7].
Foreign examples illustrate that democracies flourish when political leaders own governance. In the United Kingdom, civil servants “help only to execute decisions,” while Ministers answer for them in Parliament. In India, the Council of Ministers stands or falls with the Lok Sabha[21]. Even in the United States, as noted by experts, federal agencies ultimately enforce laws made by Congress under the President’s supervision[23][22]. Pakistan is no different in principle.
Ultimately, to advance good governance, Pakistan must discard the myth that political interference is fatal to merit, law and governance. The real deficit has often been political accountability, not interference. By reclaiming the Constitution’s intent, we recognize that when elected governments lead (and are held to account by law), democracy works. The nation will be better served by insisting that all powers be used under law, by and through the legislature, rather than by courts or permanent officials alone. This is not only legally correct; it restores the promise of Pakistan’s democratic order.
Yes, all powers belong to politicians, working as legislators or political executives, however, these powers are subject to law. Law represents the will of the people in genuine and functional democracies. Politicians will lead, but they will not pressurize the bureaucracy, tenchnocracy and public human resources to break the laws or serve their personal interests. All power is subject to collective law, which is formed in the constitution.
Sources: Constitutional provisions and scholarly analyses (see citations), including Republic Policy commentaries[3][4][13][7] and comparative studies[20][21][22][23] which underscore that ultimate authority rests with the people’s representatives, within the framework of the rule of law.
The writer is a civil servant and can be reached at
