Naveed Hussain
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) faced unprecedented state pressure, arrests, and intense leadership challenges after the events of May 9. Many political workers were detained or went into hiding, while several prominent figures left the party altogether. In this political and organizational vacuum, the lawyers’ community temporarily stepped in to fill the gap. They not only represented PTI on legal fronts but also helped sustain the party’s protest narrative to some extent. This gave the impression that a new front within PTI was emerging, one driven by law, constitution, and advocacy.
However, as time passed, it became evident that the lawyers’ contribution could not fully and sustainably replace political activism. While they secured some wins in legal defense, media advocacy, and judicial battles, they were unable to take charge of public mobilization, street protests, or the party’s organizational rebuilding. This limitation arises from the fact that lawyers, as a professional group, are more oriented towards institutional and legal engagement rather than grassroots political activism.
PTI’s organizational structure has always seen notable participation from lawyers. Many district-level and parliamentary representatives have a legal background, and PTI has often performed well in bar council and bar association elections. This reflects a general inclination of the legal community towards PTI’s narrative of constitutionalism and reform.
The question arises: despite their significant presence, why couldn’t lawyers lead PTI’s protest politics? Political analysts argue that lawyers are generally classified as professionals and technocrats. Their political style remains largely constitutional and institutional. They are visible in courts, press conferences, and legal petitions, but their involvement in street protests, slogan chanting, and long marches remains limited. Such actions require dedicated political workers trained for mass mobilization and public agitation.
In this context, while lawyers played a crucial role in PTI’s legal battles, they failed to gain a decisive position in protest politics. PTI must adopt a clear strategy that leverages the lawyers’ intellectual, legal, and institutional strengths, while allowing political workers and elected representatives to lead mass movements and street-level activism.
For PTI’s future strategy, defining this division of roles is critical. Expecting professionals to function like full-time political activists will only weaken the movement, as recent months have demonstrated. Lawyers can provide constitutional strength, legal shielding, and public legitimacy, but sustainable protest politics depends on grassroots mobilization by trained political cadres.
Ultimately, PTI’s strategic question is where to position lawyers within its political framework. Using their skills intelligently, while entrusting protest leadership to political workers, will create a durable and effective movement. Otherwise, overburdening professionals with street-level responsibilities risks weakening both the party and its cause.