Mudassir Rizwan
The warning issued by the Council on Foreign Relations should not be dismissed as speculative or alarmist. CFR is a respected foreign policy institution whose conflict assessments are closely followed by governments and security planners. Its conclusion that Pakistan’s disputes with India and Afghanistan could escalate into armed clashes in 2026 reflects realities already visible on the ground. These are not distant scenarios imagined in policy papers, but unresolved tensions shaped by recent events, shifting regional alignments, and weakening restraints.
On Pakistan’s eastern border, the consequences of this year’s confrontation with India continue to linger. The crisis that followed the Pahalgam attack ended with a ceasefire mediated by the United States, but the deeper causes of instability remain unaddressed. India launched military action without presenting credible evidence linking the attack to the Pakistani state. Islamabad immediately rejected the accusation and called for an independent and neutral investigation. This position was later echoed by United Nations experts, who noted that India had failed to meet the legal threshold required under international law to justify cross border use of force.
That finding carries serious implications. It undermines the legal and moral justification India attempted to construct for its actions. When international validation failed to materialise, New Delhi shifted its focus inward. Political and military rhetoric hardened, aimed less at diplomacy and more at shaping domestic opinion. This escalation in language suggests an effort to compensate for a confrontation that did not produce the outcome India had anticipated or claimed.
The military dimension of the crisis is central to understanding today’s tensions. During the exchange, Pakistan demonstrated clear tactical effectiveness, including the downing of multiple Indian fighter jets. This outcome challenged India’s long standing narrative of escalation dominance and forced an abrupt reassessment in New Delhi. The rapid intervention by external powers, particularly the United States, to secure a ceasefire reflected an understanding that the situation was slipping beyond control and that India had not achieved decisive gains. The ceasefire was not the result of success, but of recognition that continued fighting carried unacceptable risks. Attempts to retrospectively reshape this reality through rhetoric do not change the facts established on the battlefield.
CFR is right to identify Kashmir as the most likely trigger for renewed conflict. The dispute remains unresolved, and coercive policies combined with recurring violence continue to push the region back towards confrontation. Kashmir has never been a closed chapter. As long as it is managed through force rather than addressed in accordance with international law and the wishes of its people, it will remain a structural source of instability in South Asia.
On Pakistan’s western front, the nature of the risk is different but equally serious. CFR highlights the possibility of escalation between Pakistan and Afghanistan due to continued cross border militant attacks. Islamabad has repeatedly stated that violence originating from Afghan territory cannot be dismissed as incidental. These concerns have intensified as the Taliban authorities have failed to take decisive action against militant groups operating against Pakistan.
The regional context further complicates this picture. India has steadily expanded its diplomatic and political engagement with Afghanistan’s de facto rulers. This growing proximity between New Delhi and Kabul, combined with Afghanistan’s reluctance to address Pakistan’s security concerns, deepens mistrust. Border dynamics that are already fragile become even more volatile under these conditions. While CFR categorises this front as moderate in likelihood and lower in impact, such assessments should not encourage complacency. Strategic pressure from two directions at the same time is a serious challenge for any state.
The common thread across both fronts is the erosion of restraint. India’s failure to substantiate its claims has not produced caution, but sharper accusations. Afghanistan’s leadership continues to deflect responsibility while regional alignments shift in ways that heighten suspicion. These dynamics feed into each other, increasing the risk of miscalculation rather than deliberate war.
For Pakistan, the report reinforces the importance of firmness without recklessness. During the last crisis, Islamabad’s approach of denying involvement, demanding evidence, and avoiding uncontrolled escalation helped prevent a wider catastrophe. That posture must now be sustained and strengthened through active diplomacy and credible deterrence. Military preparedness alone is not enough. Narrative clarity, legal consistency, and diplomatic engagement are equally vital.
The CFR report is not a call for conflict. It is a warning about accumulated risk. Unresolved disputes do not disappear with time. They harden, deepen, and become more dangerous. If 2026 is not to be defined by renewed brinkmanship, regional actors must recognise that rhetoric cannot replace evidence and force cannot replace law. Pakistan’s challenge is to ensure that this reality is understood, defended, and not distorted when the next test inevitably arrives.
