Editorial
The proposed 27th Constitutional Amendment has reopened an old wound in Pakistan’s constitutional evolution — the fragile balance of federalism. It seeks to create a Constitutional Court, amend the National Finance Commission Award, and alter provisions related to executive authority and judicial appointments. While these appear as technical reforms, their political and administrative implications are far-reaching. Critics, including Senator Raza Rabbani, warn that such changes could erode the provincial autonomy achieved through the 18th Amendment and reignite old centre-province tensions.
From an academic lens, this amendment challenges the doctrine of federal equilibrium embedded in Articles 97, 137, and 240 of the Constitution. Pakistan’s federation, unlike unitary systems, depends on a careful distribution of legislative, fiscal, and administrative powers. The 18th Amendment institutionalized this balance by giving provinces greater control over their resources and governance structures. Any reversal — deliberate or incidental — could shift the constitutional power hierarchy back toward centralization, undermining both provincial confidence and democratic representation.
Politically, the move is ill-timed. The country is already facing a trust deficit among federating units, fiscal instability, and administrative disorder. Introducing a constitutional overhaul without national consensus risks deepening political polarization. Federalism thrives on dialogue and inclusion — not executive fiat. If the government truly intends reform, it must first initiate an open parliamentary debate, include provincial assemblies, and, ideally, seek public endorsement through a referendum.
In essence, constitutional amendments should strengthen, not destabilize, the federation. The 27th Amendment, in its current form, appears less about reform and more about control — a step backward for a country still struggling to mature its democratic and administrative institutions.
