Good governance and service delivery are the hallmarks of an efficient governance system. A society constructs a political contract for specific cultural, economic and political objectives. The government is the administrative tool to meet the ends of a state. Thus, functional governance is the end of a state. Hence, the administration is the process of an operating governance system. The quality of administration is directly proportionate to the objectives of governance. Governance is central to a political government. The procedures and methods of governance should always be flexible, efficient and productive.
The administration is the functional product of good governance. The government has three fundamental organs of the legislature, executive and judiciary. Primarily, the executive branch of government comprises the administration. It may either be political administration or bureaucratic administration. Hence, administrative reforms inherently cater to public organizations, institutions, departments, agencies and all other public offices. Then, the public human resources, managerial procedures, coded public laws, organizational structures and administrative operations comprise the administration processes. Functional administration always corresponds to constitutional, structural, legal, administrative and organizational compulsions. It also caters to all contemporary, efficient, effective and productive techniques and methods. Hence, modernization and updation of administrative strategies and techniques are vital for the growth and development of functional administration.
The administration is a living organism by all practices. Thus, it requires the transformation processes inherently to meet all the existing challenges. Therefore, administrative reforms are a critical part of evolving administration. The modern technological world is competitive, and only cutting-edge technologies and methods sustain the proficiency and productivity of organizations. Then, the public sector is always archaic, conventional and conservative. It does not welcome the reformation processes. Therefore, public sector reforms have always been cumbersome, complex and unyielding. Moreover, developing countries find it more challenging even to initiate the processes of reforms. Hence, administrative reforms are critical for the proficiency of the public sector, and redundancy is no option.https://republicpolicy.com/five-rules-of-civil-service-reforms-part-1/
Pakistan is a federation and parliamentary democracy. Thus, the administrative structures, organizations and institutions must reflect the spirit of federalism and parliamentary governance. Before discussing this further, it is essential to comprehend the organizational structures in Pakitan. Schedule IV of the constitution provides power distribution between the federation and provinces. The federal government has exclusive constitutional authority on all powers of Federal Legislative List Part I, which are 59 in total. Then, the Council of Common Interests CCI has eighteen exclusive powers of Federal Legislative List Part II. Moreover, all powers not enumerated in the FLL are residuary, and thus provinces have exclusive authority over them. The provincial powers should be distributed through an organic law between provincial and local governments. Hence, Pakistan establishes three governments with exclusive legislative, administrative and financial powers. Though local government entirely depends upon the discretion of the provincial assembly for the nature of local government, it is a constitutional obligation for the provincial assembly to establish a local government according to article 140-A of the constitution of Pakistan. Therefore, there shall be federal, CCI, provincial and local government organizations and institutions. Then, their restructuring, re-organizations, and revamping is the process of administrative reforms. Administrative reforms include reforming public sector human resources and administrative procedures, recoding the law and modernizing the operations and techniques.
Pakistan inherited a colonial mode of administration. Irrespective of the merit or demerit of the argument, it must have gone under organizational transformation to acclimatize it to the cultural, political, legal and administrative compulsions of the time. Stagnation and redundancy were not the options. However, The administrative structures could not be transformed to the will of the state of Pakistan. Historical dissection is not the aim of the article. Hence, Mr Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s administrative reforms comparatively restructured Pakistan’s civil service. However, these were not comprehensive reforms that could transform all administration aspects. Tragically, the reform processes in Pakistan never incorporated the core compulsions of reformation.
It has always been the fundamental question of who should reform the administration. All over the world, politicians are the imaginative leaders of reforms. As the process is complex and intricate, only politicians have the capacity and strength to jell all social, administrative, political and community representation and participation together for consensus-based administrative reforms. A federal form of governance shall only be able to reform administration with political will and consensus. Hence, politicians are the primary factor for administrative reforms. Inherently, the bureaucracy or the professionals can not bring a federation together. Therefore, the Politicians of Pakistan must lead the process of administrative reforms.
Let’s begin the discussion of administrative reforms in Pakistan! The restructuring of federal, CCI, provincial and local governments is the most vital component of administrative reforms.
The 1973 constitution was a consensus document. It was formulated and agreed upon by all political parties and arrived at with great difficulty after the trauma of the 1971 war. Subsequent military governments mauled it beyond recognition. The 18th Amendment restores the division of powers between the federation and the provinces, abolishing the dyarchy in the concurrent list. The subjects enumerated in the federal legislative list fall under the federal government’s purview. All other subjects go to the provinces – except criminal law (procedure and evidence), which is common to both.
The federal legislative list (Part I) has 59 entries; the federal cabinet deals with these. The federal list (Part II) has 18 entries and falls under the purview of the Council of Common Interests. (Under Article 154, read with Article 97).
Both the federal cabinet and the CCI are responsible to parliament. It is an elementary division which every citizen can easily understand. Deliberate, incessant propaganda makes it complex – causing total confusion.
The 53 items of the federal list part I (including the ten related to taxation) yield only six federal ministries. The rest are superfluous. These are; defence (Entries 1, 2 &18), foreign affairs (Entries 3, 4, 5, 6, 17 & 32), finance (Entries 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, 16, 28, 29, 37, 42-54), communications (Entries 7, 22, 23, 34 & 35), commerce (Entries 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 36 & 39) and law (Entries 11, 13, 14, 41, 55, 56, 57, 58 & 59).
The 18 entries enumerated in the federal legislative list (part II) fall under the CCI. These include railways, Wapda (both were provincial subjects in the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions), mineral oil and gas, electricity (excluding the provincial part under Article 157), major ports, census, debt management, professions, standards (in institutions of higher education), inter-provincial coordination, and regulatory bodies under federal law. All other subjects are the business of the provinces.
Therefore, it is compulsory to establish federal and CCI ministries according to Federal Legislative List. Instead of limiting its mandate to six ministries, the federal cabinet has expanded its ministries to more than 50 and created ministries for subjects under the CCI’s ambit.
Further, it has also created ministries on the subjects not enumerated in the federal list, which solely come under the domain of the provinces. Even before the 18th Amendment, federal executive authority under Article 97 of the constitution was never extended to the concurrent list. The ministries devolved into provinces were created unconstitutionally on the subjects of the concurrent list.
The sole purpose of establishing more than fifty ministries is to adjust political ministers and elite bureaucrats. It is the worst convergence of interest between politicians and bureaucracy. The elite bureaucracy not only wants to hang on to the maximum posts of grade 21 and 22 (therefore, the continued existence of 44 superfluous ministries) but also continue to operate all the (loss-making) state enterprises, which have been an unending bane for the economy of Pakistan. Bad governance by these superfluous federal ministries and federally operated state corporations have accumulated a colossal circular debt.
The state cannot pay these bills, the economy is in shambles, and all security and economic challenges have worsened. So what does the federal government do? It says: well, let’s scapegoat the 18th Amendment! And see if we can squeeze out some money from the NFC.
The current storm against the 18th Amendment and the NFC is to cover their failures and severe acts of omission and commission. They have even created a Ministry of National Harmony. Most ministries are either replicas of portfolios in the provinces or extensions of the six ministries mentioned above. For example, health, education, food security, housing, narcotics, state & frontier affairs, privatization, religious affairs etc., are all extra and unconstitutional. The federal government has two significant expenses: defence and debt servicing, more of the debt servicing are due to loans on federal ministries created unconstitutionally. Hence, it is compulsory to establish all the federal ministries according to the FLL. It will not only restructure the federal government but also ensure administrative proficiency and financial management.
The federal government has taken over CCI subjects. It continues to sanction lucrative positions for its several party loyalists, retired officers and their favourite errant boys and girls in the positions of all these federal and CCI organizations. Critics attribute that most attached organizations are established to provide job opportunities to the elite. How can a state meet this conflict of interest? The coveted lucrative positions of federal secretaries, CEOs of state-run enterprises, and chairperson positions of various commissions are criminally perpetuated, causing severe economic losses. Hence, there is a need to hand over all CCI ministries and divisions from the federation government to CCI. The process of administrative reforms shall ensure effective service delivery.
Unfortunately, it is like camouflaging this massive contravention of the constitution (44 ministries and 43 divisions); centrist stalwarts evoke ‘national interest’/ emergencies and scapegoat the 18th Amendment and the NFC instead. The federal government needs only six ministries with an operating budget. The remaining part of the budget must go to the provinces and local governments, the locus of the ordinary citizens.
Likewise, restructuring provincial governments is essential for good governance and service delivery. Almost all provinces have more than 40 departments. All provincial departments and organizations must correspond to schedule IV of the constitution. Inherently, the provinces have only six fundamental subjects. A province requires only six departments in place of 40 departments. For example, agriculture, livestock, fisheries, forest, environment, food and all their attached organizations must formulate a single department. Similarly, all health departments, including the population welfare department, should merge into a single department. Then, higher education, school education, Literacy, special education and other educational organizations should merge into a single department. All departments of social protection must form a single department. Similarly, finance, development and planning local government departments should merge into a single department. Then, Home, law, prosecution and all such departments may merge into a single department. There is no need to raise so many departments with so many public employees at the expense of the state exchequer. However, the governance system again creates a convergence of interest between politicians and bureaucracy. Then, how can politicians and bureaucrats be adjusted without these departments? Police is not a department. It is a specialized agency of the Home Department according to the rules of business. Then it is also essential to merge the office of the Inspector General of Police IG and other related Police Institutions into the Home department. It will not only save the organizational expenditure but also enhance the capacity of the Home Department and Police simultaneously.
Then, many offices and organizations conflict with the administrative constitutional and operational necessities. Is it essential to preserve the post of chief secretary where the Chief Minister is the province’s chief executive? Article 130 of the Constitution provides that there shall be a Cabinet of Ministers, with the Chief Minister as its head, thus constituting a provincial government. It categorically ascertains the Chief Minister as the sole chief executive of the province. Against this constitutional backdrop, the chief secretary post should not exist as the chief minister is a chosen representative by the people and holds a constitutional office, that of the chief executive.
Let the argument be crossed! Article 139 of the Constitution empowers provincial governments to make rules of business. The Punjab Government formulated the Rules of Business in 2011. Section 5 of those rules illustrates the functions of the Chief Minister, whereas section 9 provides the functions of the chief secretary. Yet, Ironically, the functions of the Chief Minister are less executive than those of the chief secretary. None other but the provincial government has to take the blame for making a mockery of the office of the Chief Minister. The provincial government should realize the constitutional and democratic responsibility to reorganize the functions of the chief secretary to make the office facilitator, not a commander of the provincial government.
Amendments thus are required to take Cabinet Secretary’s powers and appoint an exclusive minister for the department of Services and General Administration Department. The provincial government should at least reorganize the functions of the chief secretary if it is willing to continue the post of chief secretary.
Who is preventing the provincial governments from abolishing the post or reorganizing the functions of the Chief Secretary? Paradoxically, there has always been a marriage of inconvenience between Pakistan’s de jure and de facto power corridors. Despite the de jure proposition, there is a de facto colonial hangover around the office of the chief secretary.
Centralists prefer it over the representative office of the Chief Minister. Political leaders love to concentrate all the powers in themselves, barring the devolution of political powers to junior leadership. Ostensibly, it is in their interest to keep the power of appointing a chief secretary in order to control the provincial governments. This scripted confusion often leads to confrontation among involved parties owing to the inherent flaw of keeping two offices of chief executives alive. Then, provincial political leaders must impose their constitutional authority to upkeep the only valid office of the chief executive.
Likewise, the position of chief secretary is against the canons of cabinet governance and halts the processes of cabinet governance. It brings in bureaucratic slowdowns and layoffs in cabinet governance. The worst procedure is routing the official business through the office of the chief secretary. It creates delays, pendency, obstructions and hiccups. The operations of the chief secretary create unnecessary financial and structural costs for cabinet governance.
Nonetheless, the chief secretary is also the cabinet secretary and controls the processes of legislation, administration and policy decisions. Comparatively, the federal government does not maintain an office similar to that of the chief secretary in order to warrant the smooth delivery of official business.
Why is it mandatory for the provincial governments to keep an office directly in conflict with the powers of the chief minister? Hence, the office of chief secretary should either be abolished or reorganized in a manner to facilitate the Chief Minister for attaining governance and service delivery. The offices of the President and Governors are also constitutional offices. They are not administrative offices. The secretariats of the President and Governors should be rationalized. It is essential not only for the offices of federal and provincial chief executives but also for saving the state exchequer. Then, there are so many other voluntary and involuntary offices which are a burden on state kitty. The rationalization of offices is a critical part of administrative reforms.
Curtailing the provincial departments to six, followed by all unnecessarily attached organizations, the volume of state expenditure can be minimized as it will control not only the burden of salaries and pensions but also enhance the capacity of the organizations. The capacity of public human resources is elemental for the growth and productivity of public organizations. How does an administrative secretary function in a ministry or department in Pakistan? He requires an army of drivers who could fetch him to the office. Then, he requires a couple of peons to open his door. He also requires a couple of cooks who could prepare tea or meal for him and his guests. Then, he requires a few stenographers to type a few lines. He also requires telephone operators who manage his communications. He also requires a few special and additional secretaries to feed him on the files. After all this rigorous manning and positioning, he starts working. It is still a wonder whether he works efficiently or not. Can this system work? Against the backdrop of an administrative secretary, the CEO of a functional organization drives himself, opens the door, offers tea to his guests, operates on a laptop and does all communicational and administrative tasks without the support of support staff. Finally, he is thousand times more effective, proficient and productive than the administrative secretary of a public ministry or department. Therefore, administrative reforms must have a functional capacity of the bureaucracy. The modern secretariat system of governance does not require support staff. Hence, it is critical to reform the capacity of public human resources. Hence, rationalizing organizations and offices is the fundamental requirement of administrative reforms.
The procedures of organizational operations in Pakistan need to be revised and updated and employ technological standards. Public institutions are primarily non-productive because of the need for more technology. How is a file approved in our ministries? It is the most bizarre administrative operation in the world of governance. A file of papers is prepared in the section and put up to the section officer, who forwards it to the other senior section officer, who endorses it to the deputy secretary. Then, a deputy secretary delivers it to the joint secretary and the latter to the additional secretary. An additional secretary may sometimes add value to the noting and send it to the administrative secretary. At that point, the ball is the final court. It is up to the secretary to approve it or raise an objection. The approval, disapproval or objection is directly proportionate to the fate of the file.
Furthermore, the file can be stalled at any step. How can the system function with this sort of concentration of authority? Administrative reforms must ensure the delegation of authority. First, public organizations must have only a two-tier system of posts and administration. The file must be decided on the next step. E-filing is the only way forward. Delegation of all administrative, financial and organizational matters is the foremost requirement of administrative reforms. Pakistan needs smart organizations, human resources and procedures. Smart filing operations are the fundamental requirements of administrative reforms.
The public sector has been facing the challenging task of human resource management. The permanent and regular mode of appointments has created an administrative and financial challenge to the government. The resolution of these challenges should be the core policy priority of administrative reforms. Therefore, all governments across the world adopted the contractual mode of appointment. The world’s developing economies can not tolerate the expenses of the permanent recruitment method alongside pensions.
Now, coming to the fundamental question of contract appointments, the contract mode is the way forward. The public exchequer and functionality of the public sector require the implementation of qualitative contract regimes. The contract mode shall ensure transparency in the promotion, competition, and growth of civil servants and public sector officials. However, the standards of the contract regimes must be competitive and transparent. The tenure and extension of the contract appointment must be based on qualitative performance. The incentive should replace the existing perks and privileges. It will enhance financial and administrative capacity. However, it is achievable only if the process is revamped and ensures competition and transparency.
The administrative reforms in the secretariat organizations are comparatively different from the field’s operational assignments. The secretariat administrative reforms might be easier owing to the corporate nature of work. However, the field assignments are different owing to social, cultural and political communications. Federal, Provincial and Local governments operate in the districts in their respective domain. The fundamental administrative reform is to establish all the institutions per the constitution. Local governments are vital organizations in the districts. Then, there needs to develop coordination between all tiers of organizations. Administrative reforms in the districts are more critical due to the reasons that these directly deal with the core issues of the people. Hence, these are also essential for good governance and service delivery.
Deputy Commissioner, popularly abbreviated as DC, is a principal officer of the Provincial Government in a district. The office is a colonial legacy of the British- Raj that empowered the office with the powers of a district magistrate, chief Administrator, land revenue officer/collector and representative of the provincial government in a district. A district is an administrative sub-unit of a Division in Pakistan. The appointment of the office belongs to the commission of Pakistan Administrative Service (PAS), erstwhile DMG/CSP or the Provincial Management Service (PMS), erstwhile Provincial Civil Service PCS. The PMS officers serve in their respective provinces only, whereas PAS officers perform throughout Pakistan. Deputy commissioners perform their duties under the supervision of a divisional commissioner, and commissioners generally have a ceremonial role.
District administration in Pakistan is a legacy of the British Raj. District collectors were members of the British Indian Civil Service and were responsible for supervising general administration in the district.
Warren Hastings introduced the office of the district collector in 1772. Sir George Campbell, lieutenant-governor of Bengal from 1871 to 1874, intended “to render the heads of districts no longer the drudges of many departments and masters of none but the general controlling authority over all departments in each district.”
The office of a collector/DC during the British rule in the Indian subcontinent held multiple responsibilities – as a collector, he was the head of the revenue organization, charged with registration, alteration, and Partition of holdings; the settlement of disputes; the management of indebted estates; loans to agriculturists, and famine relief. As district magistrate, he exercised general supervision over the inferior courts and, in particular, directed the police work. The British Raj meant the office to achieve the “peculiar purpose” of collecting revenue and of keeping the peace to extend control and authority over the general public. The superintendent of police (SP), inspector general of jails, surgeon general, divisional forest officer (DFO) and chief engineer (CE) had to inform the collector of every activity in their departments.
Until the later part of the nineteenth century, no native was eligible to become a district collector. But with the introduction of open competitive examinations for the British Indian Civil Service, the secretary of state for India opened the office to natives.
The district continued to be the unit of administration after the Indian Partition and the independence of Pakistan in 1947. The office had the autocratic powers of the legislature, executive and judiciary in the British Raj. Initially, the role of the district collector remained essentially untouched. However, the constitution of 1973 guaranteed the progressive separation of the executive from the judiciary. Article 175(3) was categorically inserted in the constitution of Pakistan to achieve the objective of an independent judiciary. Then, during the Presidency of Pervez Musharraf, the government replaced the deputy commissioner’s office with District Coordination Officer, i.e. DCO, except in Islamabad. Also, the office of Divisional Commissioner was abolished. After his presidency, the provincial governments of Pakistan again established this office through provincial legislation. Hence, the office of Deputy Commissioner is deprived of its previous powers as a District Magistrate and supervisory officer of the police and district local government.
Because of the preceding, the critical question arises whether we still need it. Undoubtedly, the colonial office has lost all the objectives according to Pakistan’s law regimes and constitution. Then, the provincial government is still persistent in controlling the people and district administration through the office, which neither has legal powers nor resources. The office is directly in conflict with the structure of the local government. Critics attribute the office’s existence as the chief reason for the failure of a thriving local government system. The provincial government wants to concentrate all powers in the provincial capital and extend its control in the district through the office of the deputy commissioner.
Schedule IV of the constitution provides the distribution of powers between federation and provinces. Federal legislative list parts I and II comprise 77 federal subjects, and the remaining residuary or provincial powers belong to provinces. Then, the residuary powers of the province must be distributed between the province and a district. However, it does not happen, and provinces want to control districts from the provincial capital. It is the primary reason the Provincial government wants to keep the deputy commissioner’s office to manage the districts. Therefore, provincial governments disallow the local governments and allow the office of DC to work as the head of a district and representative of the provincial government in a district regarding all residuary powers.
However, the distribution of residuary powers in the district between local and provincial governments is critical for good governance and service delivery. Primarily, a district needs the operations of the two governments, as mentioned earlier. The separation of administrative spheres is critical. The district government should work through its principal officer, and the provincial government must work through its representative but in allotted spheres per the distribution of residuary powers. The hotchpotch colonial office of the deputy commissioner is failing the system of governance in Pakistan. The office with all the colonial and central objectives must soon vanish. Then, the reformers may evolve the office according to the governance model protected in the Constitution of Pakistan. The government may transform the deputy commissioner’s office into an office representing only provincial affairs by bifurcating the powers of local and provincial governments.
A district is a sub-unit of an administration. The constitution of Pakistan provides three forms of government; federal, provincial and local. All governments may divide their powers according to the constitution and legislation. Then, all governments need to execute their powers in the districts. Presently, the office of the provincial government in the form of a deputy commissioner is operational and federal, and provincial governments operate through the office of provincial DC. A district should have three principal coordinating officers; one may be a federal district officer, and the others may be the provincial and local officers of the respective governments.
All executive offices must have the exact legislative, executive and structural alignment. A district belongs to a district government and must have its own representative political chief executive with a local administrator, not the provincial Administrator. Then, provincial or federal governments may establish their principal officers according to schedule IV of the constitution. It is critical for governance to reform the executive offices strictly in line with legislative and constitutional competence. The deputy commissioner’s office must vanish, and the provincial government must transform it according to the structural requirements of governance, law and constitution. The governments must devolve the centralized colonial authority to the specialized offices and replace the general cadre of the office with specialized organizational cadres. The offices of local government must lead the operations and development of districts. Let’s respect the domains! The re-organization of administrative reforms is essential in the districts. Then, there is no need to raise and maintain the offices of commissioners, which are only administrative excesses and a burden to provincial financial resources.
Administrative reforms must also abolish the perks and privileges of the executive, either political or bureaucratic. There may be financial compensation for the perks and privileges. There is no way the developing democracies should bear the costs of clubs, vehicles, larger houses and other capitalistic benefits. Administrative reforms must also ensure organizational autonomy. De-centralization and organizational autonomy the organization shall enhance the functionality of the organizations. One of the primary reasons stalling the motivation of public functionaries is the country’s anti-corruption organizations. There is a difference between procedural lapse and criminality. Procedural lapses are an integral part of official work. Lately, anti-corruption agencies have booked public functionaries on procedural lapses. There is administrative law for procedural lapses, not criminal law. Administrative immunity of civil servants is the fundamental requirement of administrative reforms to improve the quality of coded laws of civil services. The compartment between administrative and criminal laws is central to administrative reforms. Civil service and Police reforms are also an integral part of administrative reforms. The government may ensure that the five rules of civil service reforms, constitutional alignment, structural alignment, cadre management, coding civil service laws and improving service terms and conditions become an integral part of functional administrative reforms.
The process of administrative reforms requires the essential political will of the politicians. It is a complex, intricate and convoluted process. It comprises the interests of powerful people. Therefore, a national political will can only accomplish the process of administrative reforms.
