Tariq Mahmood Awan
During my research on governance in Pakistan, I examined all three organs of the government. I studied the executive branch, including both the political and bureaucratic executives. I also researched the legislature and the judiciary. My conclusion is that no meaningful reforms in Pakistan are possible unless all three organs are reformed together. Reforms in isolation will fail because these organs are interconnected. Pakistan can only reform if it reforms the executive, legislature, and judiciary simultaneously. This is because Pakistan has a parliamentary system, where the executive is born out of the legislature. Federalism further strengthens the role of the judiciary, which protects the Constitution through judicial review, enforcement of fundamental rights, and other judicial functions.
Through nearly a decade of research, I identified a fundamental governance anomaly in Pakistan. Article 1 of the Constitution defines Pakistan as a federal republic. Federalism means power is shared between the federation and the provinces. Republicism to the context of Pakistan means sovereignty belongs to Allah, delegated to the people, who exercise it through chosen representatives. These are the constitutional foundations, and all reforms must respect them. Democracy, free elections, and representation through elected officials are crucial. The crisis in Pakistan is that even after 78 years, the country has not established a fully functional democratic system. Free and fair elections remain inconsistent.
Federalism is particularly important because it connects the legislature, executive, and judiciary. Senator Zamir Ahmed Ghumru refers to judicial federalism, emphasizing that provincial and federal courts must have separate judicial powers. In the legislature, federalism ensures that executive authority flows from elected assemblies. Federalism is not just a political model. It is a governance model that includes economy, identity, devolution, and social compacts. Pakistan’s intelligentsia and leadership have repeatedly failed to implement true federalism.
The anomaly is clear in practice. Pakistan has legislative and fiscal federalism but lacks administrative federalism. The bureaucracy remains unitary. Schedule 4 of the Constitution divides federal legislative powers into two lists. The first list contains 59 entries, the second 18. The second list relates to the Council of Common Interests, linking the federation and provinces. Residual powers remain with provinces. Despite this, provincial administrations are often staffed by federal civil servants.
Federal civil servants, such as officers of PAS, PSP, and other services, occupy provincial posts. These officers are part of the bureaucratic executive but do not correspond to the political executive of the province. In a parliamentary system, political and bureaucratic executives must complement each other. This is not happening. Federal officers in provinces often follow instructions from Islamabad rather than the provincial cabinet. If the provincial chief minister belongs to a party opposed to the federal government, the federal civil servants appointed in the provinces may resist provincial authority. This compromises the concept of executive governance.
The problem extends to legislative federalism as well. Provincial assemblies have legislative powers, but federal civil servants in the provinces do not answer to the assemblies. They are not accountable to provincial law. They cannot be summoned in Public Accounts Committees. Their terms and conditions are set by the federal government. Even if they fail or commit corruption, neither the provincial executive nor the legislature can hold them accountable. The bureaucracy becomes a parallel authority, independent of the provinces.
This unitary bureaucracy further undermines local government. Federal civil servants often run local government systems. Local governments are intended to serve communities and report to provincial authorities. Instead, federal officers bypass both local and provincial executives. They remain accountable only to the federal establishment. Local government becomes redundant, and the principles of devolution are violated.
The anomaly affects every layer of governance. The political executive in the provinces cannot control federal bureaucrats. The legislature cannot oversee them. The judiciary may intervene, but it can not apply provincial law on them. Thus, accountability is fragmented, and governance suffers. This creates a disconnect between legislative powers, executive authority, and bureaucratic administration. Pakistan remains federal in name but unitary in practice.
To address this anomaly, administrative federalism must be implemented. Provincial executives must have authority over provincial civil servants. Federal officers should serve only under federal political command in federal jurisdiction. Accountability must align with constitutional design. Legislative powers must correspond with executive authority. Local governments must be empowered to function independently of federal bureaucracy. Without these changes, Pakistan will continue to face governance crises.
The reform of the judiciary is also crucial. Judicial federalism must be strengthened so that provincial and federal courts respect constitutional boundaries. Parliament must ensure that legislative, executive, and bureaucratic authorities are harmonized. Reforms in one organ cannot succeed if others remain unchanged. Governance in Pakistan is a system, and isolated changes will not solve structural weaknesses.
The unitary bureaucracy in a federal Pakistan represents the core anomaly. It undermines democracy, devolution, and accountability. Until federal civil servants are taken out of the provinces and local governments regain functional control, Pakistan cannot achieve effective governance. This reform is not optional. It is the foundation for a functioning federal republic. Without resolving this anomaly, Pakistan’s governance crisis will continue, public trust will erode, and institutional dysfunction will persist. All parts of federalism, legislative, fiscal and administrative must be functional to ensure the jurisdictional independence of federalism.
True reform in Pakistan requires interconnected reforms in the executive, legislature, and judiciary, rooted in federalism and republican principles. Administrative federalism must replace unitary bureaucracy. Only then can Pakistan operate as a constitutional federation, where power is shared, accountability exists, and governance functions for the people.
