Dr Bilawal Kamran
European leaders no longer have the luxury of hesitation on Ukraine. Recent statements and policy signals from the Trump administration have stripped away any remaining illusions that the United States will indefinitely underwrite Europe’s security on European terms. What once could be deferred to Washington must now be confronted in European capitals. The war in Ukraine is not only about Ukraine’s survival. It is a defining test of whether Europe can act as a serious geopolitical actor capable of defending its own security interests in a far harsher world.
Russia under Vladimir Putin presents the most serious threat to European security since the Cold War ended. This is no longer a theoretical concern or a distant risk. It is a lived reality playing out on Europe’s eastern flank. Yet instead of shaping events, Europe has largely confined itself to reacting to crises as they unfold. The Trump administration’s unpredictable posture has understandably unsettled European leaders, but fear has translated into tactical damage control rather than strategic planning. Europe has been busy managing shocks rather than setting direction.
Earlier in the year, many European governments believed they could stabilize relations with Washington by accommodating American economic interests. They bought more US weapons and liquefied natural gas, hoping commercial alignment would translate into political reliability. At moments, they even demonstrated a capacity for collective action, whether in managing the fallout from President Volodymyr Zelensky’s disastrous Oval Office meeting or in navigating the optics of Trump’s unusually warm encounter with Putin. Yet these efforts have not changed the underlying reality. European diplomacy has been moving against a strong current, not only in Washington but also in Moscow and Kyiv.
In the United States, European hopes are bound to collide with the Trump administration’s core priorities. Trump’s political base and inner circle are driven by three objectives that directly conflict with European interests. They want to impose a peace settlement at almost any cost, normalize relations with Russia to unlock commercial opportunities, and pull American military power back toward the Western Hemisphere. For too long, some European leaders chose denial over realism. That option disappeared with the publication of the new US National Security Strategy, which leaves little doubt about Washington’s direction.
At the same time, Putin has shown no sign of fatigue or hesitation. He has committed enormous Russian resources to this war and restructured both the state and the economy around long-term confrontation. Russia now produces several times more ammunition than Ukraine, outpaces it in drone manufacturing, and continues to deploy weapons systems that are difficult to counter. Diplomatically, Moscow’s strategy of sidelining Europeans, managing Americans, and pressuring Ukrainians has been disturbingly effective. Trump’s growing pressure on Zelensky to accept unfavorable terms reflects this success.
Ukraine itself is under immense strain. The resilience and courage of Ukrainian society have been extraordinary, but no society can endure endless war without limits. Military aid fell sharply in mid-year, manpower shortages are worsening, and public resistance to conscription is growing. Domestic politics have become more volatile, with corruption scandals shaking confidence in the leadership. These pressures matter because wars are not decided by weapons alone but by social endurance and political cohesion.
Even if Europe avoids a catastrophic collapse in the short term, it would be reckless to treat survival as success. The deeper challenge is preventing long-term strategic failure. European leaders cannot afford to spend the coming months merely reacting to the next provocative statement from US or Russian envoys. They must reclaim initiative and present themselves as a credible party of peace, not passive observers waiting for decisions made elsewhere.
The most immediate step is the mobilization of frozen Russian assets. These funds could sustain Ukraine financially for at least two years and represent Europe’s single most powerful source of leverage. Yet internal disputes, particularly over legal and technical issues surrounding where the assets are held, have made Europe appear indecisive and weak. This is not a technical problem but a political one. Failing to act undermines Europe’s credibility with Russia, the United States, and Ukraine alike.
Securing new financial arrangements for Ukraine should not be the end of Europe’s effort but the beginning of a more serious strategic conversation. Ukraine cannot fight an attritional war indefinitely. Europe must confront uncomfortable questions about how it wants this war to end. What outcome is realistically achievable next year, and what costs is Europe prepared to bear to reach it. Avoiding these questions does not preserve unity; it merely postpones difficult decisions until conditions are worse.
A serious European approach requires high-level discussions about credible security guarantees. Any sustainable settlement must include mechanisms that deter future Russian aggression. This means automatic and enforceable snapback provisions for sanctions, financing, and military support if Russia violates a ceasefire or peace agreement. At the same time, Europe must accept that direct engagement with Russia may become unavoidable, particularly if Washington disengages from the process.
The Trump administration’s recently floated peace framework shocked many in Europe and Ukraine because it appeared designed to exploit Ukrainian vulnerability. Yet it also revealed the unavoidable contours of any serious negotiation. Questions of territory, NATO membership, minority protections, military limitations, and long-term security guarantees cannot be wished away. Europe’s failure has been its reluctance to confront these issues honestly and early.
There are clear red lines that Europe must articulate without ambiguity. The survival of Ukraine as a sovereign, democratic state is non-negotiable. Europe cannot accept a settlement that reduces Ukraine to a permanently unstable buffer zone or legitimizes conquest as a tool of statecraft. At the same time, realism demands acknowledgment that some outcomes will fall short of justice. Europe may never recognize Russia’s territorial seizures, but it may have to accept de facto control over certain areas as part of a ceasefire. NATO membership for Ukraine, however desirable in principle, is unlikely in the near term. These realities do not represent surrender; they reflect the limits imposed by power and circumstance.
The crucial point is that Europe should be shaping these compromises alongside Ukraine, not discovering them through pressure imposed by others. Quiet, serious engagement with Kyiv is essential to build a framework for peace that Ukrainians themselves can accept and sustain. An imposed or unjust settlement would merely freeze the conflict temporarily, setting the stage for renewed violence.
This is why the war is existential for Europe, not just Ukraine. If Europe can demonstrate strategic coherence and resolve on Ukraine, it will strengthen its hand across the board. Credibility gained in Eastern Europe would carry over into trade disputes with the United States and economic pressure from China. Failure, by contrast, would advertise European weakness to every major power. In such a world, Europe would not be a pole of stability but an arena of competition.
The broader lesson is that security cannot be outsourced indefinitely. The post-Cold War habit of relying on American leadership allowed Europe to defer hard choices about defense, strategy, and power. That era is ending. Whether Europe adapts or clings to old assumptions will determine its future standing. Strategic autonomy does not mean hostility to the United States, nor does it require abandoning alliances. It means having the capacity to act when allies hesitate or diverge.
Ukraine has exposed the cost of delay and ambiguity. Each month of indecision narrows Europe’s options and increases the price of action. The question is no longer whether Europe should get serious, but whether it can do so in time. If European leaders rise to the challenge, they can still shape an outcome that preserves peace and security on the continent. If they fail, they will signal to the world that Europe remains dependent, divided, and vulnerable, and others will act accordingly.
