Dr Bilawal Kamran

In recent weeks, tensions over provincial autonomy and resource control have reignited across Pakistan, raising important questions about the country’s federal structure. At the center of this debate are two major developments: the federal government’s proposed plan to construct six canals on the Indus River to irrigate the Cholistan desert, and the introduction of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Mines and Minerals Amendment Bill 2025. Both have sparked significant political controversy and drawn sharp criticism from opposition parties, civil society, and analysts.

The proposed Cholistan canal project has provoked a particularly strong reaction from Sindh, where the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) has accused the federal government of violating Sindh’s constitutional water rights. Sindh Chief Minister Murad Ali Shah has made it clear that if the federal government proceeds without taking Sindh into confidence, his party may consider exiting the coalition government. “We will not waste a minute to leave the federal government,” he warned—a statement that underscores just how combustible the issue has become.

The PPP’s opposition is grounded in genuine fears: the Indus River is a lifeline for Sindh, and any upstream diversion without consensus could lead to devastating water shortages in the lower riparian region. For a province already struggling with water scarcity, the idea of losing more to a politically motivated canal project is unacceptable. The government’s failure to conduct transparent environmental impact assessments and engage with stakeholders has only deepened suspicions of federal overreach.

While Sindh is battling for its water, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is navigating a different kind of autonomy crisis—one related to its mineral wealth. The Mines and Minerals Amendment Bill 2025, tabled by the PTI-led KP government, is being marketed as a reformist move aimed at aligning KP’s mining regulations with national standards and attracting foreign investment. However, opposition parties—including JUI-F, ANP, and PkMAP—have not been convinced. They’ve accused the provincial government of compromising KP’s authority and opening the door for federal and foreign influence over provincial assets.

Ironically, KP’s Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur, known for his combative stance against the federal PML-N government, has come out strongly in support of the bill. He has dismissed criticism as “misinformation spread by a certain mafia for personal gain.” He insists the bill protects KP’s autonomy and is necessary to modernize the mining sector, curb illegal extraction, and promote transparency. Yet, the controversy refuses to die down.

At the heart of the concern lies a deeper distrust—not just of the bill itself, but of the broader federal intentions behind it. The bill is said to be part of the harmonisation framework developed under the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC), a powerful civil-military forum established to accelerate economic reforms and foreign investment. Critics argue that while SIFC’s goals may be well-intentioned, its process sidelines provincial input and risks centralising power in Islamabad under the guise of efficiency and economic progress.

The initial draft of the bill was circulated to provinces in May 2024, and after nearly a year of back-and-forth, the KP government finalized its version. While the process may appear consultative on paper, the opposition maintains that key clauses—such as those related to licensing powers, joint ventures with government entities, and federal advisory roles—leave too much room for central control. These concerns are not just theoretical. In Pakistan’s historical context, provincial exploitation—particularly in Balochistan, where natural gas has been extracted for decades without fair compensation—remains a painful example of how resource mismanagement can fuel long-term resentment.

The KP bill’s provision that any large-scale mining project worth over Rs500 million must be conducted as a joint venture with a government-owned company has also raised eyebrows in the private sector. Investors fear that such requirements will deter free-market participation, erode investor confidence, and create unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles. Without a clear framework for how partnerships will be structured or negotiated, the risk of politicised deals looms large.

On the international front, the issue has gained further complexity. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, during his first call with Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, reportedly discussed the potential for American engagement in Pakistan’s critical mineral sector. This was followed by the Pakistan Minerals Investment Forum 2025 (PMIF25) in Islamabad, where Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif invited both local and foreign investors to explore opportunities in the country’s vast mineral reserves.

While foreign investment can be a catalyst for development, it must be grounded in transparency, public accountability, and respect for provincial rights. The last thing Pakistan needs is to repeat old mistakes—where provinces were treated as colonies for resource extraction without meaningful benefit to local populations. The KP bill, in its current form, is seen by many as a slippery slope toward that very outcome.

What also confuses observers is the PTI’s position on the matter. Despite being in power in KP, the party has stated that the bill will only be passed after consultation with Imran Khan, the party’s jailed founder. This has raised questions about the province’s decision-making autonomy. Should a provincial government, constitutionally mandated to function independently, really be seeking approval from a party leader on legislative matters?

The question here is not whether mining reform is needed—it certainly is. Illegal mining has drained KP of billions in potential revenue, and the lack of technical oversight has led to environmental degradation and unsafe working conditions. But reform should not come at the cost of provincial autonomy. Any new framework must balance efficiency with accountability, and investment with inclusivity.

The larger picture here reflects a dangerous pattern emerging in Pakistan’s governance: centralization of power under the banner of economic reform. From Sindh’s water to KP’s minerals, provinces are being asked to “trust the system” without being given meaningful control or ownership. The 18th Amendment, passed in 2010, was designed to fix exactly this problem by devolving powers to provinces. Undermining it now, in the name of harmonisation or efficiency, would be a regressive step—and one that could fuel long-term instability.

Provinces are not just administrative units; they are the heart of Pakistan’s federation. Denying them agency over their resources will not lead to sustainable growth. Instead, it risks alienating communities, politicising governance, and damaging investor confidence.

For progress to be meaningful, Pakistan must reaffirm its commitment to transparent, fair, and inclusive governance, where provincial autonomy is respected, not negotiated away. Whether it’s the irrigation canals in Sindh or the mining fields of KP, the people of each province deserve a say in how their resources are managed. Only then can Pakistan truly move toward sustainable and equitable development.