Zohaib Tariq
Ibn Khaldun, the 14th-century giant of political philosophy, argued that every great power passes through a natural civilizational cycle lasting five generations, roughly 125 years, before decline becomes unmistakable. If we place the United States within this framework, its global arc began with the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 and reached full dominance after the First World War. By that measure, the U.S.-led rules-based international order has already outlived the historical life expectancy Ibn Khaldun envisioned for empires.
Had he been alive today, Ibn Khaldun might have credited America’s longevity to one thing he considered essential for state survival: the endurance of a functioning and credible justice system. As long as justice prevails, he wrote, a state can endure. For decades, the United States managed to project precisely that image. But in an era defined by financial interdependence and geopolitical multipolarity, justice alone is no longer sufficient. Economic leverage, not moral authority, is now the decisive currency of global power.
China’s Parallel Order
China’s rise has produced a structural transformation in the international landscape. Beijing has not simply expanded its influence, it has built alternatives to the Western-led system. The BRICS grouping, the New Development Bank, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank now serve as credible challenger institutions to the IMF and the World Bank. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has evolved into a broad security platform, often dubbed the “Asian NATO”, that counters Western security frameworks across Eurasia.
Then there is the Belt and Road Initiative, what can be called the revival of Marco Polo economics, connecting China to more than 130 countries through infrastructure, energy, and trade networks. Crucially, these partnerships come with minimal political strings, making Beijing’s model especially appealing to developing states that have long felt constrained by Western conditionality.
Perhaps the most disruptive challenge to the current world order is China’s sustained push for de-dollarisation. Major economies, including Saudi Arabia, Russia, Pakistan, Iran and much of Southeast Asia, are increasingly conducting bilateral trade in local currencies. This trend carries enormous implications. The core pillar of U.S. global dominance is the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency. If that foundation is eroded, the U.S. will no longer be able to sustain its deficits by printing money, interest rates will surge, inflation will follow, and American corporations will face unprecedented strain.
What is remarkable is that current U.S. policy is accelerating this shift. Trade wars, tariff escalations, and the alienation of traditional allies have created diplomatic vacuums that China is now filling with strategic precision. Washington, intentionally or not, is creating the future Beijing envisioned.
A New Pattern of Alliances
The collapse of the current rules-based order seems less a question of if than when. But what comes next?
The alliances of the future will not be built on nationality, ideology, creed, or colour. They will be grounded in interests, values, and shared objectives. We may see ideological hybrids previously unimaginable, communists aligned with Muslim states, liberals standing with Islamists against neo-conservatives, humanitarians partnering with Muslim communities against genocide.
In this emerging system, a liberal opposing injustice may matter more than a Muslim who supports oppression, a communist standing for sovereignty may hold greater value than a Muslim endorsing secular authoritarianism. Interests will supersede labels. These will be the “neo-values” of the post-American order.
For middle powers, this polyvalent diplomacy will become the norm, a country may partner with State A on climate, State B on trade, and State C on security, without needing ideological uniformity across all fronts.
What This Means for the Islamic World
A world less dominated by Washington may offer the Muslim world the strategic breathing space it has long sought. Unlike the U.S., China is unlikely to micromanage the internal political architecture of Muslim-majority states. With fewer external constraints, Muslim nations may find room to recalibrate their alliances and revive long-dormant collective aspirations.
The 1974 Lahore Islamic Summit’s vision of unified political and economic coordination could resurface. The recent Pakistan–Saudi defence pact is an early indicator of a potential realignment grounded not in imposed frameworks but in shared history, mutual identity, and strategic necessity.
In a post-U.S. international system, fluid, interest-driven, and multipolar, the Muslim civilisation may find its long-awaited opportunity for revival. The next world order might not be a contest between East and West, but a mosaic of partnerships where civilisations reassert themselves on their own terms.
And in that world, the Islamic world may finally reclaim its space, not as a subordinate bloc, but as a strategic actor shaping the global future.
