M. Gessen
Israel’s complicated coalition arithmetic ultimately rests on a straightforward political reality: anti-Arab prejudice appears to outweigh the possibility of a broader parliamentary alliance. The exclusion of Arab parties from government exposes the limits of political equality in a system that claims democratic representation.
Israeli politics is often portrayed as a complicated exercise involving fragile coalitions, lengthy negotiations and intricate parliamentary arithmetic. Yet the current political deadlock revolves around a remarkably simple question: Is there any political force in Israel stronger than anti-Arab racism? The answer, apparently, is no.
The Israeli parliament, the Knesset, comprises 120 seats. In the October 27 elections, parties opposed to Benjamin Netanyahu secured 67 seats, theoretically giving them enough parliamentary strength to form a stable government under Gadi Eisenkot, who has been tasked with assembling a coalition. However, 19 of those seats belong to Arab-majority parties, complicating the coalition-building process.
Eisenkot, like most Jewish political leaders, has indicated that he would not bring Arab politicians into his cabinet. His prospective coalition could include Jewish left-wing parties, as well as right-wing figures such as former Netanyahu ally Avigdor Liberman, who has proposed making Israeli citizenship conditional on a loyalty oath. Arab parties, however, are likely to remain excluded.
Consequently, what should have been a straightforward parliamentary majority has turned into a complicated political calculation—not because the numbers are insufficient, but because Arab political representation remains unacceptable to much of Israel’s political establishment.
The politics of exclusion
Earlier this month, prominent American-Israeli journalist Gil Hoffman published a column in The Jerusalem Post, a centre-right newspaper, offering explanations for Israel’s election outcome to help Israelis respond to questions from foreign audiences. One anticipated question was why an Arab politician would not be appointed minister.
Hoffman argued that the exclusion should not be interpreted as racism. He suggested that an Arab minister responsible exclusively for issues such as crime and poverty in Arab communities might face little opposition. However, he maintained that cabinet members would inevitably participate in decisions concerning sensitive security matters, which he argued remained too problematic for Arab politicians to handle.
This argument reflects a deeply entrenched political assumption in Israel: that Arab politicians possess divided loyalties and cannot be trusted with national security decisions. Such suspicion has become widely accepted across much of the Israeli political spectrum, often without being recognised as discriminatory.
The underlying contradiction is difficult to ignore. Arab citizens may participate in elections, hold parliamentary seats and represent millions of voters, yet their political legitimacy appears to diminish when it comes to sharing executive power or participating in decisions concerning the state’s security.
The exclusion of Arab parties, therefore, is not merely a matter of coalition arithmetic. It exposes a deeper political reality in which democratic participation is accepted in principle, but the prospect of Arab politicians exercising equal authority remains constrained by suspicion, prejudice and political exclusion.
Democracy without equal political participation
The central issue is not whether a political party has the right to negotiate with particular partners or whether every parliamentary party must be included in government. Coalition governments are built through political negotiations, and parties routinely reject alliances on ideological, policy or strategic grounds. The problem emerges when an entire political community is treated as inherently unsuitable for executive responsibility because of its ethnic or national identity.
A democratic system cannot be judged solely by the existence of elections or the number of parties competing for parliamentary seats. Its democratic character also depends on whether elected representatives can exercise political authority on equal terms. If a substantial section of the electorate can vote, elect representatives and participate in parliamentary proceedings but remains effectively disqualified from executive power, the meaning of political representation becomes severely limited.
The argument presented by Hoffman illustrates this distinction. His suggested explanation is that Arab politicians might be acceptable in ministries dealing with crime and poverty but not in positions where national security decisions are made. In effect, this creates a hierarchy of political trust: Arab representatives may be permitted to administer certain domestic issues, but their participation in decisions concerning the state as a whole is regarded with suspicion.
Such reasoning turns identity into a test of political eligibility. Rather than assessing politicians through their individual conduct, constitutional responsibilities, policy positions or demonstrated competence, it assumes that Arab identity itself creates a security problem. This is not a neutral assessment of political reliability. It is a collective presumption that places an entire category of elected representatives under suspicion.
The security argument and the question of loyalty
National security is an important responsibility of every government. States have legitimate reasons to examine security risks, protect sensitive information and ensure that those entrusted with public office fulfil their constitutional obligations. However, these standards should apply to individuals on the basis of evidence and conduct, not through blanket assumptions about their ethnic or national background.
The claim that Arab politicians cannot be trusted with security responsibilities also raises a fundamental question about citizenship. If Arab citizens are entitled to vote and stand for election, on what basis can their representatives be regarded as inherently unfit to participate in national decision-making? Political loyalty cannot reasonably be established through ethnic identity. It must be assessed through the same legal and constitutional standards that apply to every citizen.
The suggestion that an Arab minister could be trusted with crime and poverty but not with security matters also reveals the limits of conditional inclusion. A cabinet is not simply an administrative collection of separate departments. Its members participate collectively in government policy, national priorities and decisions affecting the entire state. Excluding representatives from this collective responsibility because of their identity undermines the principle that elected citizens are entitled to equal political consideration.
The concern is particularly significant when the suspicion resembles the longstanding stereotype that minorities or particular communities maintain divided loyalties. Such assumptions have historically been used to question the political belonging of minority populations. Presenting them as reasonable security concerns does not remove their discriminatory character.
The contradiction in Israel’s political arithmetic
The coalition dilemma also exposes a contradiction within Israel’s opposition politics. Parties seeking to replace Netanyahu may disagree with his policies, political conduct and approach to government, yet their willingness to cooperate with Arab parties appears severely restricted. This raises questions about the ideological boundaries of the alternative political coalition.
If 67 parliamentary seats are available to parties opposed to Netanyahu, but 19 of those seats cannot be considered acceptable partners because they are held by Arab-majority parties, the problem is not simply the absence of a parliamentary majority. It is the political refusal to recognise those representatives as legitimate partners in governing.
The willingness to include right-wing politicians, including figures who have advocated a loyalty oath for Israeli citizenship, while excluding Arab parties demonstrates the asymmetry of political acceptance. Ideological differences can apparently be accommodated when the parties belong to the Jewish political establishment, but the inclusion of Arab representatives crosses a different boundary.
This is why the question at the heart of Israeli politics is so simple, despite the complicated negotiations surrounding government formation. The decisive obstacle is not the constitutional structure, the number of parliamentary seats or the mechanics of coalition-building. It is the unwillingness of mainstream political leadership to treat Arab representation as an ordinary and legitimate part of national government.
The limits of political equality
The exclusion of Arab parties has implications beyond the formation of a single government. It concerns the nature of citizenship, the meaning of democratic representation and the relationship between majority rule and minority rights. A democracy requires more than the participation of a numerical majority. It also requires institutions that protect equal political standing and prevent the permanent marginalisation of particular communities.
The issue cannot be resolved merely by offering Arab politicians limited ministerial responsibilities or by allowing them to participate in parliamentary debates. Meaningful political inclusion requires that elected representatives be considered for public responsibility on the same basis as other politicians. Their political positions may be challenged, their policies may be opposed and their conduct may be scrutinised, but their identity should not automatically disqualify them from government.
Israel’s coalition negotiations therefore reveal a deeper crisis of democratic equality. The country may possess an elaborate parliamentary system, competitive elections and a diverse political landscape, but these institutions cannot fully demonstrate democratic inclusion if a substantial group of elected representatives remains excluded from executive power because of its identity.
Ultimately, the question is not whether Arab parties must be included in every Israeli government. No democratic system requires every party to join a governing coalition. The more fundamental question is whether Arab representatives are rejected because of their political positions or because they are Arab. When national identity becomes the determining factor, coalition politics ceases to be merely a contest of ideas and becomes an instrument of political exclusion.
The arithmetic of the Knesset may be complicated, but the underlying political choice is not. A parliamentary majority exists on paper; what is missing is the willingness to recognise Arab political representation as an equal and legitimate component of government. That is the obscenely simple question at the heart of Israeli politics.
M. Gessen is a Russian American journalist, author, and translator who has written extensively on LGBT rights and authoritarian regimes.









