Xi Jinping’s Purges May Strengthen Party Control, but They Leave the Question of Succession Unresolved
For nearly two decades, scholars commonly explained the survival of Chinese communist rule through the strength of the institutions created after Mao Zedong. Unlike communist regimes in Europe that eventually collapsed, the Chinese Communist Party developed mechanisms intended to make political leadership more predictable. Term limits, collective leadership and increasingly merit-based promotion were seen as important foundations of the party’s durability.
Xi Jinping’s leadership, however, has challenged much of that conventional explanation. Over the past decade, he has dismantled or weakened several institutional arrangements associated with the post-Mao era. Presidential term limits were abolished in 2018, collective leadership has diminished, and no clear successor has emerged. At the same time, Xi has overseen extensive disciplinary campaigns, including major investigations and removals within the People’s Liberation Army. Since 2022, dozens of senior military officers have been formally removed or have disappeared from public view.
These developments are often interpreted in Washington as signs of political insecurity: a powerful leader increasingly suspicious of officials around him and determined to consolidate his personal authority. If China’s political resilience depended primarily on the formal institutions constructed after Mao, then the erosion of those institutions and repeated purges might suggest growing fragility.
Yet the party has shown little indication of institutional disintegration. The article instead argues that the disciplinary campaigns themselves may help explain why the Chinese Communist Party has remained politically durable. Rather than treating purges simply as evidence of weakness, they can be understood as part of a deeply rooted system through which the party monitors officials, enforces obedience and continuously renews internal discipline.
From Elimination to Rectification
Political purges have existed throughout the history of the Chinese Communist Party, including violent episodes before the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949. Mao himself used lethal purges during the early communist movement.
But the Chinese system also developed another form of discipline: rectification. Unlike a conventional purge designed to eliminate perceived enemies through imprisonment, exile or death, rectification generally seeks to keep officials within the political system while reshaping their behaviour and reducing their status when necessary.
The distinction is important. The objective is not always to destroy politically problematic officials. In many cases, it is to compel them to acknowledge mistakes, demonstrate loyalty and accept continued party supervision.
This approach developed early in the party’s history. In 1929, Mao’s resolution on correcting mistaken ideas within the party presented ideological deviations as problems that could potentially be corrected through criticism and self-criticism.
The system became much more institutionalised during the Yan’an Rectification Movement of 1942–45. As Communist Party membership expanded rapidly, leaders faced the challenge of assessing large numbers of relatively new members. Cadres were required to document their personal histories, examine their conduct, confess shortcomings before colleagues and undergo formal evaluation by party authorities.
The underlying principle was straightforward: discipline the individual, correct unacceptable behaviour and, where possible, retain the cadre rather than permanently eliminate him or her.
A System That Has Survived for Decades
Although China has changed dramatically since the Mao era, the basic disciplinary procedure has remained remarkably persistent.
An official accused of political or administrative shortcomings may be required to prepare a written account of his conduct. His explanation can then be compared with statements from colleagues and information already contained in his personnel record. Depending on the findings, sanctions can range from warnings and probation to removal from the party.
Crucially, the documentation produced during the process becomes part of the official’s permanent personnel file. Even when an individual survives disciplinary action and remains inside the system, the record of the investigation remains available to party authorities.
This means rectification does not necessarily depend on genuinely changing an official’s political beliefs. Cadres may simply learn what they are expected to say during self-criticism exercises and return to their previous behaviour once a campaign ends.
But ideological conversion may not be the central objective. The more important outcome is the creation of a permanent institutional record documenting an official’s history, political weaknesses, relationships and previous disciplinary problems.
Such records give the leadership a powerful mechanism of control. Officials know that their files can be reopened and used in future disciplinary proceedings. The possibility of renewed scrutiny therefore creates continuing incentives for conformity even after a particular campaign has ended.
Discipline as a Tool of Central Control
The disciplinary system also helps Beijing manage a vast and fragmented party-state. China contains numerous bureaucratic organisations, regional interests and administrative institutions, each with its own priorities.
Rectification campaigns can cut across these institutional divisions. Once the central leadership identifies a disciplinary campaign as a priority, officials throughout the system understand that compliance is expected.
The process combines incentives and punishments. Officials demonstrating the expected attitude may receive leniency, while those resisting the campaign can face professional marginalisation, removal or imprisonment. In this way, disciplinary campaigns provide the central leadership with a mechanism for imposing common priorities across an otherwise complicated administrative system.
Xi Jinping and the Idea of “Self-Revolution”
Xi has incorporated this tradition into his concept of “self-revolution.” The idea holds that the Communist Party must continuously identify and correct its own internal weaknesses if it is to avoid the fate of political systems that eventually collapsed.
This approach reflects Xi’s interpretation of the Soviet Union’s dissolution. He has argued that the Soviet Communist Party allowed its internal discipline to deteriorate, contributing to the destruction of the political system itself.
Under Xi’s model, therefore, permanent internal supervision is not merely a temporary anti-corruption campaign. It becomes part of the party’s strategy for political survival.
The symbolism has been deliberate. Xi has repeatedly connected contemporary disciplinary campaigns with historically important sites of Communist Party rectification, including Gutian and Yan’an, reinforcing the message that present-day political discipline is rooted in the party’s earlier history.
The Cost of Political Discipline
This system, however, involves significant trade-offs.
Repeated investigations and removals can weaken the effectiveness of important institutions, particularly the military. Senior commands may remain vacant, experienced officers can disappear from leadership positions, and ambitious officials may conclude that avoiding responsibility is safer than building an extensive record of independent decision-making.
The result can be a tension between political control and operational effectiveness. For the Communist Party, political loyalty has historically taken priority when the two objectives conflict.
The Problem the System Cannot Resolve: Succession
The deeper weakness lies elsewhere. Rectification can discipline officials, prevent organised internal opposition and reinforce the authority of the leadership, but it cannot determine who should eventually replace the supreme leader.
Indeed, the same system may make succession more difficult. By preventing senior officials from developing independent political authority, repeated disciplinary campaigns can reduce the possibility that an obvious successor will emerge.
Earlier Chinese leaders possessed mechanisms that helped manage this problem. Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping drew authority from their revolutionary credentials, while later generations increasingly relied on institutional arrangements such as leadership norms, term limits and more regularised succession practices.
Xi occupies a different position. He does not possess the revolutionary legitimacy of Mao or Deng, while several of the institutional arrangements that previously structured leadership succession have been weakened under his rule.
The article therefore identifies succession—not the number of officials being investigated—as the central uncertainty facing China’s political system.
China’s disciplinary machinery may continue to reinforce internal political control. But the very system that helps prevent elite fragmentation offers no clear mechanism for transferring supreme authority when the current leader eventually leaves office. That unresolved question may prove far more consequential for China’s long-term political stability than the purges themselves.
