Mudassir Rizwan

In the wake of the recent attack in Indian-administered Kashmir that claimed 26 lives, India has responded with a series of diplomatic and strategic measures against Pakistan. Among the most provocative is the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) — a landmark agreement signed in 1960 that has historically governed water sharing between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. This move has reignited a long-standing and contentious question: Can India stop the Indus River and its tributaries from flowing into Pakistan?

Understanding the Indus Waters Treaty: A Fragile Lifeline

The Indus Waters Treaty, brokered by the World Bank, has been a cornerstone of water diplomacy between India and Pakistan. It allocates the eastern rivers of the Indus basin — Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej — to India, while granting Pakistan control over the western rivers — Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab, which together constitute nearly 80% of Pakistan’s water resources. These waters are vital for Pakistan’s agriculture, hydropower, and overall economic stability.

Despite enduring wars and constant political tensions, the treaty had remained intact until now. India’s unilateral suspension of the agreement signals a significant escalation, especially considering its strategic position as the upstream country, theoretically giving it control over the water flow into Pakistan.

The Reality Behind India’s Water Control Capabilities

While the suspension of the treaty is symbolically powerful, the logistical and infrastructural reality tells a different story. Experts assert that India lacks the massive storage capacity and complex canal systems required to effectively withhold or divert the colossal volumes of water that flow from the Indus and its tributaries during peak seasons.

Most of India’s current hydropower infrastructure on these rivers is run-of-the-river — meaning it utilizes the natural flow of water to generate electricity without significant storage. As Himanshu Thakkar from the South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People explains, these facilities do not possess the ability to impound large volumes of water for extended periods, limiting India’s ability to cut off water supplies to Pakistan, especially during the monsoon season.

Even India’s utilization of its own 20% share under the treaty has been far from optimal. This underuse is often cited by Indian strategists advocating for the construction of new storage projects — an approach vehemently opposed by Pakistan due to fears of water manipulation and treaty violations.

Potential Risks During the Dry Season

However, experts caution that the real threat may lie during the dry season, when river flows are already low. In such periods, even marginal reductions in water supply can have outsized impacts on Pakistan’s water availability. Without the treaty’s oversight mechanisms, India could theoretically alter the timing and volume of releases from its hydropower projects, which could harm Pakistani agriculture and hydropower production.

According to Hassan F. Khan, an environmental policy expert, the absence of treaty constraints may allow India to exert more subtle yet impactful control — particularly through the strategic timing of water releases and silt flushing. The sudden release of accumulated silt from Indian reservoirs, without prior coordination, could damage downstream infrastructure and ecosystems in Pakistan.

The “Water Bomb” Hypothesis: Weaponizing Rivers?

There is an ongoing debate about whether India could “weaponize” water — using it as a tool of coercion or aggression. This idea, sometimes referred to as a “water bomb,” involves the deliberate withholding and sudden release of water to cause flooding and chaos downstream. While the concept is theoretically possible, India would risk flooding its own regions, as most of its dams are situated far from the Pakistan border. Moreover, such a move would likely provoke international condemnation and escalate regional tensions beyond control.

Strategic Implications Beyond the Indus Basin

The implications of India’s suspension of the treaty extend beyond its bilateral dispute with Pakistan. The Indus River originates in Tibet, making China a key player in this hydro-political equation. Notably, China, a close ally of Pakistan, controls the headwaters of not only the Indus but also the Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo), which flows into northeast India.

In a striking parallel, after a previous militant attack in 2016, China blocked a tributary of the Yarlung Tsangpo, citing hydropower construction needs. The timing led many to view it as a strategic response aligned with Pakistan’s interests. With Beijing now planning the world’s largest dam on the lower Yarlung Tsangpo, India is increasingly concerned about its own downstream vulnerability.

A Geopolitical Flashpoint, Not an Imminent Water Cut-Off

In conclusion, India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty is a high-stakes diplomatic maneuver, but not an immediate threat to Pakistan’s water supply. The physical and logistical constraints of India’s infrastructure, coupled with potential domestic and international backlash, make a total water blockade unlikely in the short term.

However, the move does signal a shifting paradigm — one where water, increasingly scarce due to climate change and growing demands, is becoming a potent geopolitical tool. The risk lies less in a dramatic water war and more in the slow erosion of trust and cooperation over shared rivers, turning water into yet another front in the fraught relationship between India and Pakistan.