Arshad Mahmood Awan
The recent clash between the ruling coalition and the clerical old guard over the Societies Registration (Amendment) Act, 2024, has been resolved—at least temporarily—thanks to President Asif Zardari’s intervention. The bill was signed into law by the President and accompanied by an ordinance that allowed madressahs (Islamic religious schools) to register either with the Ministry of Industries and Production or the Directorate General of Religious Education. This compromise was designed to placate the clerics, notably Maulana Fazlur Rehman and his JUI-F party, who had been strongly advocating for the new legislation. However, the outcome leaves many key issues unaddressed, especially in the context of Pakistan’s international obligations regarding terror financing, money laundering, and the regulation of religious institutions.
The Societies Registration (Amendment) Act was initially a political concession to the JUI-F in exchange for its support on the 26th Amendment. The government had hoped that passing this bill would strengthen ties with the clerical faction and secure their backing for crucial amendments. But in the face of concerns from various quarters—including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and international observers—the ruling coalition recognized that implementing the law in its original form could put Pakistan’s compliance with global anti-terrorism financing and anti-money laundering regulations at risk.
President Zardari, sensitive to these concerns, exercised caution and withheld his full assent. He argued that the new law conflicted with the spirit of provincial autonomy enshrined in Pakistan’s constitution, as education falls under provincial jurisdiction. His refusal to fully approve the bill also underscored the government’s desire to avoid escalating the situation further, especially given the sensitivities surrounding the clerical groups’ demands.
Despite this pushback, the clerical establishment, led by the powerful religious figures associated with the five major madressah boards, dug in their heels. The clerics threatened widespread protests and public unrest if the law wasn’t passed, an indication of how deeply entrenched the religious groups’ interests are in Pakistan’s political landscape. Their resistance was not just about the legalities of the bill, but also about preserving their influence over religious education and maintaining their grip on an institution that has long been at the center of debates on extremism and militancy in Pakistan.
In the face of this pressure, the ruling coalition had to make a difficult choice. It opted for a compromise: the president issued an ordinance that allowed madressahs to choose which government department they would register with. The decision to allow this flexibility in registration—either with the Ministry of Industries and Production or the Directorate General of Religious Education—was a calculated move to save face for all parties involved. However, while this may have appeased the religious establishment in the short term, the underlying issues surrounding madressah reform remain unresolved.
The core of the debate lies in how madressahs should be regulated and integrated into Pakistan’s broader educational system. Critics of the ordinance argue that it undermines the gains made through previous reforms in 2019, which had sought to bring madressahs under more direct supervision by the provincial education departments. As educational institutions, madressahs should fall under the purview of the relevant provincial education ministries, which are better equipped to monitor curricula, ensure transparency, and address issues of extremism and militancy. The current ordinance, which allows madressahs to register with the industries ministry, is widely seen as a politically motivated move that distracts from the more important issue of effective educational oversight.
The 2019 madressah reforms were a step in the right direction, as they sought to improve the standards of religious education while preventing the spread of extremist ideologies. However, the government’s decision to backtrack on these reforms, even partially, raises questions about its commitment to curbing militancy and extremism. There is an undeniable need for madressah reform in Pakistan, but it cannot be approached in a piecemeal manner or used as a bargaining chip in political negotiations.
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For Pakistan to effectively address issues related to militancy, extremism, and the financing of terrorism, it must have a clear understanding of how many madressahs exist, what they teach, and how they are funded. The government’s ability to regulate religious institutions is essential for ensuring that Pakistan does not become a haven for terrorist organizations, which has been a concern for both domestic and international stakeholders. The lack of a cohesive policy on madressah reform and regulation leaves the state vulnerable to criticism and undermines its credibility in tackling extremism.
It is clear that Pakistan cannot afford to continue kicking the madressah reform issue down the road. The political leadership must recognize the long-term implications of their decisions on this front and work towards a comprehensive strategy that addresses the real issues at hand. This includes ensuring that religious schools are held accountable, their funding is transparent, and their curricula do not promote hatred or violence. Without such reforms, Pakistan will continue to face challenges in meeting its international obligations and preventing the spread of extremist ideologies.
At the same time, the government must ensure that madressah reform does not become a politically charged issue that is used to appease certain factions or consolidate power. It is crucial that this issue be handled with the seriousness and urgency it deserves, rather than being treated as a bargaining tool in the pursuit of short-term political gains.
In conclusion, while the recent compromise between the ruling coalition and the clerical establishment may have averted an immediate crisis, it has failed to address the fundamental issues surrounding madressah reform. Pakistan’s political leadership must take a more proactive approach to this issue, moving beyond political gamesmanship and focusing on creating a clear, transparent, and sustainable framework for religious education. Only then can the country hope to make meaningful progress in its fight against extremism, militancy, and terrorism.