Muhammad Toqeer
Ask a resident of any Pakistani town who they would call when a drain overflows, a street light goes dark, or the neighbourhood school has no teacher. Few will name an elected representative from their own area. Most will name an officer, a distant MPA, or no one at all.
This simple fact says a lot about how Pakistan is run. On paper, we have three tiers of government: federal, provincial and local. In practice, the third tier is weak, often absent, and rarely trusted with real power. That is why local government is the missing link in our governance structure.
What local government really means
Local government is a system in which people elect their own representatives to manage the affairs of their village, neighbourhood, town or district. These representatives look after water supply, sanitation, street lights, roads, primary health, schools and local markets.
The idea is easy to understand. The people who live with a problem should have a say in fixing it, and they should know whom to hold responsible if it is not fixed. An officer posted by the provincial government answers to his seniors. An elected councillor answers to the voters. That difference is the heart of the matter.
A history of starts and stops
Local councils are not new to this land. The British set up municipal committees and district boards in the nineteenth century, and Lord Ripon’s resolution of 1882 encouraged elected bodies. But the purpose was to collect taxes and keep order, not to share power. The district officer remained the real master.
After independence, the pattern continued. General Ayub Khan introduced Basic Democracies in 1959, which also served to build support for his rule. General Zia-ul-Haq brought his local government ordinances in 1979. General Pervez Musharraf’s Devolution Plan of 2001 was the boldest attempt, giving districts real powers and elected heads. Each system was built by a military ruler and changed or rolled back after he left. Elected governments, for their part, preferred to keep power in provincial capitals. The result is a system that never had time to put down roots.
What the Constitution says
The 1973 Constitution touches local government in two places. Article 32 says the State shall encourage local government institutions made up of elected representatives, with special representation for peasants, workers and women. But Article 32 sits among the Principles of Policy, which are guidelines. A citizen cannot go to court to enforce them.
The 18th Amendment of 2010 added Article 140-A, which is stronger. It says each province shall set up a local government system by law and hand over political, administrative and financial authority to elected local representatives. It also gives the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) the job of holding these elections. Yet the words “by law” leave the shape of the system to the provinces. The Constitution asks for local government, but it does not say how much power it must have or how long it must be allowed to live.
A house with a gap
The 18th Amendment moved many powers, including education and health, from Islamabad to the provinces. That was a step towards a true federation. But the powers stopped at the provincial capitals. They did not travel further down to districts and towns. Provincial governments, which complained for years about the centre’s control, now do much the same to local councils.
Six signs of the missing link
Weak guarantees. Because Articles 32 and 140-A leave so much to provincial legislatures, local bodies can be dissolved early or left without elections for years. In 2021, the Supreme Court restored Punjab’s local bodies after the provincial government dissolved them, saying the move had taken away the voice of the people who elected them. The court had to step in because the Constitution itself gave little protection.
Power stays at the top. Each province has its own local government law, with versions and amendments passed in different years, such as 2010, 2013, 2015 and 2019. The details differ, but the thread is common. The provincial government can dissolve councils, approve budgets, post key officers and take back functions. Provincial coordination committees add another layer of control instead of giving councils room to work.
Very little money. A council without funds can do very little. Local bodies in Pakistan depend on provincial grants that are often small and late. Kerala, in India, offers a useful contrast. After India’s constitutional changes on local government in the early 1990s, Kerala launched its People’s Plan Campaign in 1996. It set aside a large share of the state’s development budget for local bodies and gave them staff and institutions to run. Councils there plan, spend and answer to voters. In Pakistan, functions have often been devolved on paper while the money and staff stayed behind. Dr Amjad Saqib, in his book Devolution and Governance Reforms in Pakistan, has argued for deeper devolution and better governance for this very reason.
Unsteady elections. Local elections are often late, and they are held mostly when courts push. Whether they should be held on a party or non-party basis has been argued before judges again and again, and the Supreme Court’s 2026 verdict is the latest chapter. Non-party polls sound neutral, but they tend to leave candidates dependent on family influence and personal networks, and they stop political parties from building leaders at the local level. The ECP is meant to run these elections, but it often has to wait for provincial governments to pass laws or finish ward boundaries.
Officers over elected members. In many districts, real decisions rest with officers rather than elected councillors. A look at district coordination committees in Balochistan shows how this works in practice. When officers sit at the centre of district decisions and elected representatives stay at the edges, the voter’s voice becomes an afterthought.
No power to make rules. Local councils in Pakistan have almost no power to make rules of their own. Even small bylaws usually need provincial approval. In the UK, councils cannot make national laws either, but they are created by an Act of Parliament, face regular elections, raise their own money through council tax, and have wide powers to act for the good of their area. A local body that must ask permission for everything is an extension of the provincial government, not a government in its own right.
The price we pay
Uneven growth. When no elected body plans for the whole area, development goes where the influential live. Big cities and rich neighbourhoods get roads, parks and clean water. Villages and poor settlements wait. Over time, this uneven growth hardens into a class-based society. Rosita Armytage’s book Big Capital in an Unequal World, which studies the lives of Pakistan’s wealthy, shows how closely money, status and political connections are tied together. A strong local government could pull the other way by sending resources to the places that need them most.
Dynastic politics. Local councils are where ordinary workers learn politics, win small elections and rise. Without them, the road to leadership is blocked and political power stays in the same families. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, in How Democracies Die, warn that democracies often weaken slowly from within, not only through sudden coups. A country with weak democracy at the grassroots has fewer ways to renew its leaders and fewer people with a real stake in the system.
The way forward
First, the Constitution should be strengthened. Article 140-A can be amended to set minimum protections that no province can ignore: fixed terms for councils, elections within a set time after a term ends, no dissolution except under strict conditions with court review, and a guaranteed share of provincial funds. Article 32 should move from a hopeful guideline to a firm commitment.
Second, the provincial local government laws should be amended to give councils real money, their own sources of revenue, the power to hire and manage staff, and the power to make bylaws. Provincial committees should advise and coordinate, not control. Kerala’s example shows that when money, functions and staff move together, local bodies can deliver.
Some people worry that local councils may be captured by local elites or may waste funds. These worries are fair. But they are reasons for good rules, audits and open budgets, not for having no local government at all.
Conclusion
Pakistan has built the upper floors of its governance house but left the ground floor unfinished. Citizens meet the state at the level of the street, the school, the clinic and the tap. When elected local government is weak or missing, the link between people and their rulers breaks.
Fixing this does not need a new idea. The Constitution already promises it. What is needed is the will to turn that promise into protected powers, steady funds and regular elections. Until then, the missing link will remain the biggest gap in Pakistan’s governance.
Muhammad Toqeer is a CSP officer.
