Mubashir Nadeem
As the conflict in Gaza approaches its one-year mark, Israel’s aim to dismantle Hamas continues to be out of reach. Despite its military strength and technological superiority, backed by support from the United States and Europe, Israel has been unable to achieve the decisive victory sought by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Efforts by the U.S., Egypt, Qatar, and other nations to negotiate a ceasefire in exchange for Israeli hostages have stalled, with little progress beyond statements from global leaders. Politics has seemingly overshadowed this multifaceted issue, which encompasses occupation, the struggle for freedom, terrorism, religion, personal agendas, and more. In the following analysis, we delve into the conflicting perspectives of the involved parties and delve into the potential future scenarios in this ongoing human tragedy.
From Israel’s standpoint, it has effectively neutralized or seized vital supply routes from Egypt to Gaza, including the crucial Philadelphi Corridor, a 300-foot-wide, eight-mile-long strip from Israel’s border to the Mediterranean. This corridor, serving as a link between Gaza and Egypt, was a critical channel for the transport of weapons and provisions to Hamas. Israel claims to have eliminated or detained around 14,000 combatants in Gaza and eliminated half of the leadership of Hamas’s military wing, the Qassam Brigades, including prominent figures like Muhammad Deif and Marwan Issa. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) assert that they now have unrestricted movement across Gaza and suggest that Hamas is sufficiently weakened, reportedly indicating its willingness to relinquish civilian control of Gaza after a ceasefire.
However, Israel fears that a withdrawal from Gaza at this stage could enable Hamas to regroup and regain strength within a year. Israeli military officials project that another two to three months of intense combat in central and southern Gaza will be necessary before transitioning to intelligence-based operations and strikes over the following year. This approach aims to eradicate remaining Hamas fighters and dismantle their weapons infrastructure before transferring administrative control of Gaza to another entity. The U.S. assessment indicates that Hamas is no longer capable of orchestrating attacks on the scale of those seen on October 7, and its capacity to launch smaller terrorist operations is in doubt. Nonetheless, American officials caution that Hamas may reconstitute itself after Israeli forces withdraw from an area, particularly if there is no clear follow-up plan for governance and security.
Israel recognizes that the safe return of approximately 115 hostages, whether alive or deceased, can only be ensured through negotiations.
On the other hand, Hamas has pursued a strategy of “survival as victory” from the outset. It has instructed its fighters to conceal themselves within its extensive tunnel network beneath Gaza or among the civilian populace. While Israel has attempted to target these tunnels, the underground network has proven to be more extensive than anticipated, enabling Hamas leaders and fighters to evade capture. Hamas contends that Israeli forces are fatigued and eager for an end to the conflict, believing that continued fighting will result in more civilian casualties, amplifying global opposition to Israel while garnering support for the Palestinian cause.
Simultaneously, the U.S. has formed security and economic coalitions to contain Russia in Europe, China in the Pacific, and to isolate Iran in the Middle East. These coalitions span from Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region to India in the Persian Gulf and NATO in Europe. A proposed defense alliance with Saudi Arabia is pivotal in linking these alliances. However, for the U.S. Congress to approve a defense pact with Saudi Arabia, the olive branch would be the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. In return, Saudi Arabia would require a ceasefire in Gaza and a commitment to a two-state solution leading to a Palestinian state in the future. A ceasefire agreement with Hamas, coupled with the release of Israeli hostages, could also compel Hezbollah to cease hostilities. Subsequently, Israel could initiate negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, paving the way for normalized relations with Saudi Arabia—a significant diplomatic victory for both the U.S. and Israel. This could potentially pave the way for Egypt, the UAE, and Morocco to deploy peacekeeping forces to Gaza, with the Palestinian Authority representing the Palestinian people rather than Hamas. Such a coalition could counter Iran’s alliances with Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias.
However, this diplomatic scenario faces obstacles. Prime Minister Netanyahu, indicted in 2019 on charges of fraud, bribery, and breach of trust, is motivated to remain in power to evade imprisonment if convicted. His government relies on a fragile coalition with far-right Jewish supremacists who oppose a two-state solution and threaten to topple his government if he agrees to a ceasefire or a deal with Saudi Arabia. Netanyahu has historically undermined the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, criticizing its incompetence and corruption, despite its recognition of Israel and signing of the Oslo Accords. He has allowed Hamas to strengthen in Gaza as a means to keep the Palestinian people divided, even permitting Qatar to send $1 billion to Hamas for humanitarian aid and salaries.
Netanyahu is cognizant of the growing criticism of Israel’s actions in Gaza from the younger Democratic base in the U.S. Therefore, a Democratic victory in the upcoming U.S. elections would not align with his interests. If Netanyahu refuses to agree to a ceasefire and a hostage deal, this would place U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris in a difficult position, forcing her either to criticize Netanyahu and risk losing Jewish support, or to remain silent and lose Arab backing—both of which could harm her in the eyes of American voters. Conversely, former President Donald Trump supports Netanyahu’s hardline approach in Gaza. A Trump victory in the 2024 U.S. elections would align with Netanyahu’s goals. If Trump wins, Netanyahu could announce a ceasefire, the return of hostages, and a Saudi deal, declaring it a victory for Israel, which could secure his re-election without needing the support of right-wing coalition partners.
In a broader context, Netanyahu perceives an alliance with Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern nations as a diplomatic milestone, forming an Israeli-Arab partnership against Iran’s regional influence. However, this alliance would be incomplete without Pakistan, which possesses one of the world’s most potent militaries and is the only nuclear-armed Islamic country. Pakistan’s fragile economy, reliant on financial aid from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Western lenders, might compel it to join the coalition, provided there is a path to Palestinian statehood and relief from its mounting foreign debt. Nonetheless, Pakistan faces a challenging decision, as its populace has long regarded Israel as an occupying force. The prospect of Pakistan recognizing Israel—something inconceivable for nearly eight decades—would signify a monumental shift. The question remains whether Pakistan will join the Israel-Saudi alliance, and if Israel will consider the Saudi deal complete without Pakistan’s involvement.
The resolution to the war in Gaza and the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict is far more intricate than the immediate dynamics between Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank. A myriad of conflicting interests, extending well beyond the Middle East, must align before there is any prospect of enduring peace in the region and the world.
