Editorial
Pakistan contributes less than one per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions but remains among the countries most exposed to climate-related disasters. At COP31, its climate minister presented a case built around resilience, renewable energy and national responsibility. Yet the country’s experience exposes a deeper failure in the international climate system: those suffering the greatest consequences are not necessarily receiving the resources needed to prevent and recover from them.
Pakistan’s climate predicament represents one of the most striking inequalities of the global climate crisis. It contributes less than one per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions, yet repeatedly experiences devastating floods, extreme heat, glacier-related hazards, displacement and mounting economic losses. The country is confronted with the consequences of a crisis to which it has contributed comparatively little, while much of the financing intended to support climate action remains concentrated in economies with far greater emissions and financial capacity.
Speaking to TRT World on the sidelines of COP31 in Antalya, Pakistan’s Climate Change Minister Malik presented this contradiction as central to Islamabad’s message at the international summit. His argument was straightforward: Pakistan is prepared to reduce its own emissions, invest in renewable energy and strengthen climate resilience, but the international community must recognise that climate finance should follow vulnerability and the scale of climate-related devastation, not merely the concentration of emissions or investment opportunities.
The interview offered more than a diplomatic appeal for assistance. It raised a fundamental question about the global climate order: if countries least responsible for climate change are among those suffering its most severe consequences, what obligations do the major emitters have towards them?
For Pakistan, this question is no longer theoretical. It is increasingly a matter of economic survival, public welfare and intergenerational responsibility.
The unequal burden of climate change
The minister described the scale of Pakistan’s climate-related losses over the past decade and a half as a national emergency. Referring to five major flood episodes, he cited approximately 6,000 deaths, around 20,000 people injured or disabled, 14 million people affected and more than 30 million displaced.
These figures illustrate the human consequences of climate disasters, but they do not capture their full social and economic costs. Displacement disrupts education, employment and family life. Flood-related damage to agricultural land threatens food security and rural incomes. The destruction of homes and infrastructure places additional pressure on public finances, while the loss of access to healthcare can increase maternal and infant mortality.
Climate vulnerability, therefore, cannot be measured simply by the number of people killed or the value of damaged infrastructure. It must also account for the long-term deterioration of livelihoods, institutional capacity and development prospects.
Pakistan’s experience demonstrates how climate disasters can reverse years of economic progress. The devastating floods of 2022 affected tens of millions of people and caused extensive damage to housing, agriculture, infrastructure and public services. Estimates cited by the minister placed reconstruction costs at between 8.5 and 9.5 per cent of national gross domestic product.
For an economy whose annual growth rate has frequently remained around 3 to 5 per cent, a single disaster imposing losses equivalent to nearly a tenth of GDP represents a profound economic shock. It absorbs resources that could otherwise be directed towards education, healthcare, infrastructure and productive investment.
This is the economic dimension of climate injustice: vulnerable countries are required to spend an increasingly large share of their limited resources repairing damage caused by a global problem they did little to create.
Climate finance must follow vulnerability
One of the minister’s strongest arguments concerned the distribution of international climate finance.
He argued that the countries responsible for the largest share of global emissions also command a disproportionate share of available green financing, while vulnerable developing countries struggle to secure resources for adaptation and reconstruction.
He described this as a contradiction in the international climate system: financing is effectively following emissions and investment opportunities rather than the scale of climate-related devastation.
The argument deserves serious consideration. Climate finance is intended to support both the transition towards low-carbon development and the protection of communities exposed to climate hazards. These are related but distinct objectives.
Mitigation financing supports the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions through renewable energy, energy efficiency, cleaner transport and industrial transformation. Adaptation financing, by contrast, helps countries prepare for and withstand the consequences of climate change through resilient infrastructure, improved water management, disaster preparedness, climate-smart agriculture and stronger public institutions.
Loss and damage financing addresses the consequences of climate impacts that cannot be adequately prevented through mitigation or adaptation.
A financing architecture that concentrates excessively on commercially attractive mitigation projects risks leaving vulnerable populations without the resources required to protect themselves against floods, heatwaves, droughts and other climate-related hazards.
Pakistan’s argument at COP31 should therefore be understood as a demand for a more balanced international climate framework. The country needs investment in clean energy, but it also requires grants and affordable financing for flood protection, resilient housing, water infrastructure, agricultural adaptation and disaster response.
The minister acknowledged that international assistance has become less predictable. He referred to a reported 23 per cent decline in support from developed countries to developing economies during the current year, describing the reduction as evidence of weakening international cooperation.
He also pointed to the broader deterioration of multilateral institutions and the weakening of established international arrangements.
This concern is particularly relevant for developing countries. Climate change is a transnational problem, but its consequences are experienced through national institutions and local communities. When international financing becomes uncertain, countries with limited fiscal space are left to absorb a growing share of the costs.
The economic case for prevention
The minister’s comments also highlighted an important contradiction in Pakistan’s domestic climate policy: despite limited financial resources, the country cannot afford to postpone investment in preventive infrastructure.
He argued that the cost of reconstruction following major disasters is substantially higher than the cost of preparing for them.
The 2022 floods provide a powerful illustration. If reconstruction costs reached between 8.5 and 9.5 per cent of GDP, investments in flood-resistant infrastructure, early warning systems, drainage, river management and resilient settlements could potentially have reduced the scale of the losses.
Prevention, however, requires long-term planning and institutional continuity. It involves difficult decisions about land use, urban expansion, construction standards, water management and the protection of vulnerable communities.
Pakistan’s development model has historically placed considerable emphasis on responding to disasters after they occur. Relief operations and reconstruction are necessary, but they cannot substitute for a systematic national approach to climate risk.
A resilient state must identify vulnerable areas before disasters strike, enforce building regulations, protect natural drainage systems, improve forecasting and warning mechanisms, and ensure that local governments have the resources to respond effectively.
Climate resilience must also become an integral part of public investment decisions. Roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, housing schemes and irrigation infrastructure should be assessed not only for their immediate economic value but also for their ability to withstand future climate conditions.
The real challenge is to move from disaster management towards disaster prevention.
Pakistan’s renewable energy transition
While seeking international support, the minister also emphasised that Pakistan was not presenting itself merely as a victim of climate change.
He highlighted the country’s rapid expansion of rooftop solar energy, estimating that approximately 37 to 38 gigawatts of solar panels had been installed or imported for rooftop use in recent years. He acknowledged that the figure was disputed by some observers who distinguish between imports and actual installed capacity, but argued that the broader direction of the transition was clear.
The expansion of distributed solar power represents a significant development in Pakistan’s energy landscape. Households and businesses have increasingly turned towards rooftop solar to reduce electricity costs and secure a more reliable energy supply.
This transition has important implications for energy security, investment and the country’s exposure to imported fossil fuels. It also demonstrates how economic incentives and technological changes can accelerate the adoption of renewable energy, sometimes faster than conventional government planning.
However, the expansion of rooftop solar must be supported by a coherent energy policy. Grid stability, electricity pricing, distributed generation regulations, battery storage and the financial sustainability of electricity distribution companies all require attention.
The minister also stated that approximately 55 per cent of Pakistan’s energy mix was clean and referred to discussions with the energy minister about increasing this share to between 70 and 75 per cent over the coming years.
He further cited the government’s automotive policy as evidence of a transition towards electric vehicles.
These commitments indicate that Pakistan’s climate strategy is increasingly connected to broader questions of energy security and industrial transformation. Renewable energy is not simply an environmental objective; it can reduce dependence on imported fuels, improve the balance of payments and create opportunities for domestic investment.
Nevertheless, ambitious targets must be accompanied by transparent measurement, reliable data and practical implementation plans. Claims about installed renewable capacity, the composition of the energy mix and future targets should be independently verifiable if Pakistan is to strengthen its credibility in international climate negotiations.
The challenge of turning commitments into institutions
Pakistan’s climate vulnerability is intensified by weaknesses in governance and institutional coordination.
Climate change affects agriculture, water resources, energy, urban planning, public health, transport and disaster management. These sectors are administered through different federal and provincial institutions, making coordination essential.
A national climate policy cannot succeed if its implementation remains fragmented. Federal authorities may announce targets, but provincial governments manage many of the services and development functions directly affected by climate risks. Local governments, meanwhile, are often closest to communities exposed to flooding, heatwaves, water shortages and inadequate sanitation.
This makes institutional decentralisation an important component of climate resilience.
Local governments need the authority, financial resources and technical capacity to maintain drainage systems, regulate land use, manage waste, protect local water resources and coordinate emergency responses. Provincial governments must integrate climate risks into development planning, while federal institutions should provide national coordination, scientific information and financial support.
Pakistan also needs stronger systems for collecting climate data, assessing disaster exposure and evaluating the effectiveness of adaptation projects. Without reliable information, public investment risks being directed towards politically attractive projects rather than areas of greatest vulnerability.
Climate finance should therefore be linked to measurable outcomes, transparent procurement and institutional accountability. The objective must be to ensure that funding reaches the communities and infrastructure most exposed to climate risks.
The weakening of multilateralism
The minister’s remarks about declining international assistance point towards a wider concern: the weakening of multilateral cooperation at a time when climate action requires greater coordination.
The Paris Agreement established a framework through which countries committed to limiting global warming, with efforts directed towards keeping the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. Yet current policy trajectories remain insufficient to meet that ambition.
The minister expressed deep concern about projections suggesting that global warming could reach approximately 2.7 to 2.8 degrees Celsius by the end of the century if current policies remain in place.
Such a trajectory would expose countries like Pakistan to increasingly severe climate risks. Rising temperatures can intensify heatwaves, alter rainfall patterns, accelerate glacier loss and place additional pressure on water and food systems.
The consequences would not remain confined to developing countries. As the minister observed, extreme heat has increasingly affected Europe and other regions, demonstrating that climate-related disruption is not geographically contained.
His broader point was that climate change is becoming a shared global experience, even though responsibility and vulnerability remain profoundly unequal.
This distinction should shape international negotiations. The fact that climate disasters are now affecting more regions does not erase the historical and continuing differences in emissions, economic capacity and exposure to risk.
A credible multilateral response must recognise these differences rather than treat every country as if it had contributed equally to the crisis or possessed the same capacity to respond.
Pakistan must lead through credibility, not rhetoric
Perhaps the most significant part of the interview was the minister’s insistence that Pakistan would continue its climate efforts regardless of whether international assistance materialised in full.
He argued that the country had a responsibility towards its own citizens and future generations, and that international support would accelerate the process rather than determine whether it proceeded.
This is an important principle of national responsibility. Pakistan cannot outsource its climate resilience to international donors. It must strengthen domestic institutions, reform energy and water management, enforce environmental standards and ensure that public investment accounts for climate risks.
At the same time, national responsibility should not become an excuse for international inaction. The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities recognises that all countries have a role in addressing climate change, but their responsibilities and capacities differ.
Pakistan must therefore pursue two objectives simultaneously: strengthen its domestic climate response and continue demanding a fairer international financing system.
Its credibility will depend on the consistency between its diplomatic arguments and domestic performance. Renewable energy expansion, climate-resilient infrastructure, transparent emissions reporting and effective adaptation programmes must become measurable national achievements rather than recurring conference commitments.
Beyond COP31: From climate diplomacy to climate governance
Pakistan’s participation in COP31 should be assessed against a broader question than the amount of financial assistance it secures. The country needs to use international climate diplomacy to advance a comprehensive national programme of resilience, energy transition and institutional reform.
The immediate priorities are clear: improve flood protection, strengthen early warning systems, protect vulnerable communities, expand clean energy, modernise water management and make public infrastructure more resilient. Equally important is the development of transparent mechanisms through which climate financing can be allocated, monitored and evaluated.
Internationally, Pakistan must continue advocating for predictable adaptation funding, accessible loss and damage support and a climate finance system that gives greater consideration to vulnerability.
The minister’s declaration that Pakistan is not seeking to play the victim card is a useful statement of national resolve. But refusing to adopt a posture of helplessness does not mean accepting an unfair distribution of responsibility.
Pakistan can take ownership of its domestic reforms while demanding that major emitters honour their international commitments.
The climate crisis has exposed the limitations of an international system in which economic power, emissions responsibility and vulnerability are distributed so unevenly. Pakistan’s experience makes this contradiction particularly visible.
The country contributes less than one per cent of global emissions, but its citizens continue to pay a disproportionate price through lost lives, damaged livelihoods, displaced communities and repeated economic setbacks.
The ultimate test of COP31 will not be the strength of its declarations or the number of commitments announced. It will be whether the international community can translate climate responsibility into practical support and whether vulnerable countries can convert that support into resilient institutions and sustainable development.
For Pakistan, climate change is no longer a distant environmental concern. It is a question of economic security, institutional capacity and the future of its next generation.
