Editorial
The recent flare-up between India and Pakistan following the Pahalgam incident placed the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) squarely in the spotlight. Amid escalating hostilities, PAF’s response was swift and highly coordinated, particularly during Operations Sindoor and Bunyanun Marsoos. These operations showcased not only technical prowess but also a bold assertion of national defence, strategically countering Indian offensives.
During Operation Sindoor, the PAF successfully downed five Indian fighter jets and neutralised several UAVs, including the Heron drone—an essential tool in India’s surveillance arsenal. These precise air defence actions disrupted India’s intelligence-gathering capabilities and curbed further aggression, serving as a morale booster for both civilians and troops.
In retaliation, Operation Bunyanun Marsoos targeted Indian airbases, logistics hubs, and ammunition depots. The planning was meticulous, and the air strikes executed with remarkable accuracy, causing substantial disruption to India’s military infrastructure—all while avoiding collateral damage. Importantly, PAF accomplished this without sustaining losses, underscoring its effective preparation and skilled execution.
However, while PAF’s performance deserves recognition, the overly celebratory tone of state narratives risks turning military success into national myth-making. A sober assessment must acknowledge the fragile regional stability and the long-term consequences of such escalations. Heroism in battle must not overshadow the broader goal: de-escalation and peace.
PAF’s operational leadership, marked by modernisation efforts and inter-branch coordination, clearly contributed to its tactical edge. Yet, military strength should remain a tool of deterrence, not dominance. In showcasing its capability to defend the nation, the PAF also sent a broader message — that Pakistan is prepared, but not reckless.
Moving forward, the real test will be maintaining readiness while prioritising diplomacy. In a volatile region, military success must be balanced with efforts to prevent the next confrontation, not prepare for it.
